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Abstract
The ability of operators to “gracefully transition” (maintaining control and awareness of the
system without excessive workload or decrements in flight performance) between levels of
automation (LOA) in several case studies and in a simulated lunar landing was investigated
in anticipation of future lunar missions.
Endsley’s situation awareness model (extended to apply to supervisory control systems)
and the Sheridan/Verplank and Proud/Hart LOA scales were used to analyze six mar-
itime, aviation, and aerospace case studies and formulate design guidelines for enhancing
mode transitions. These motivated an experiment in which thirteen subjects with flight
simulator experience flew 24 approach trajectories (half including a landing point redes-
ignation) that transitioned from a fully automatic flight control mode to either: pitch
rate-control/attitude hold (RC/AH) with automatic rate-of-descent (ROD), roll-pitch-yaw
(RPY) RC/AH with automatic ROD, or RPY RC/AH with incremental ROD. Subjective
and objective workloads were measured using a Modified Bedford Scale and secondary task
response time, respectively. A tertiary task - verbal callouts of altitude, fuel, and location,
provided a measure of pilot situation awareness. Flight performance was evaluated using
the pitch axis tracking error.
Friedman pairwise tests demonstrated that secondary task response time significantly in-
creased following the mode transition. Subjects’ workload ratings, when ranked, showed
unanimous agreement that workload was lowest prior to the transition, and highest during.
The accuracy of the situation awareness verbal callouts decreased significantly after the
transition. The immediate eﬀect of redesignation was statistically concordant across sub-
jects. Pitch axis tracking mean square error following a mode transition was greater in trials
with redesignations (p = 0.0005), and increased consistently with control mode diﬃculty
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(p = 0.025) in runs with no redesignation, but not in runs with redesignations.
Using callouts to assess the dynamics of situation awareness is a novel technique. Dra-
matic changes in subjective and objective workload and situation awareness occur after
mode transitions, depending on control mode diﬃculty, that have an apparently reciprocal
relationship. The case studies and experimental results suggested a dozen guidelines for
design of supervisory control systems intended to promote transition gracefulness.
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Senior Research Engineer
Senior Lecturer
Thesis Supervisor: Kevin R. Duda
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Chapter 1
Introduction to Graceful
Transitions
1.1 Graceful Transitions
Multi-modal automation systems, by their nature, require operators to transition between
modes to accomplish mission goals. Nonetheless, as detailed in Sections 2.1-2.2, existing
theories of supervisory control, taxonomies of Levels of Automation (LOA), and design
heuristics (e.g. Fitt’s List) largely focus on choosing a single appropriate level of automa-
tion for the particular application, ignoring the fact that automated systems need to be
designed to facilitate graceful transitions between operating modes. Some aspects of mode
transitions have been captured using concepts such as “mode awareness”, “clumsy automa-
tion” and “automation surprise.” For the purposes of this thesis, we defined the ability of
a supervisory control system to gracefully transition between modes as:
The ability of a complex system to change between levels of automation/levels
of supervisory control (including automation modes) with the operator main-
taining control and awareness of the system without excessive workload or sac-
rificing system performance.
1.2 Real-World Applications
In cases of commercial aviation, multi-modal automation systems are used in everyday
procedures, with numerous goal-specific modes that operators must constantly navigate
between. Diﬃculties associated with mode transitions have been noted by several authors
15
[1, 2, 3, 4]. Understanding how to implement such systems without excessive workload or
sacrificing system performance is vital to improving safety and eﬃciency.
The following sections detail several case studies and highlight the dramatic eﬀects that
multi-modal automation systems can have on operator workload and situational awareness,
as well as overall system performance. These case studies are used to develop a set of design
principles for multi-modal system automation design with respect to the dynamic relation-
ship between modes. These case studies also help to form the basis for the experiment
detailed in previous sections.
16
Chapter 2
Case Studies Background
2.1 Understanding Automation
Recent increases in the computational power of computers have outstripped the under-
standing of how best to implement their abilities, leading to a lopsided relationship in
computer-integrated systems; increasingly complex systems are supplied with an immense
set of capabilities with less understanding of the eﬀects on operator performance [5, 6]. As a
result, many automation derived failures have been introduced into such systems that were
otherwise absent (see Section 6.2). A consideration of optimal automation implementation
with respect to the operator was initially taken by Fitts et al. [7], who compiled a com-
prehensive list of recommendations regarding task allocation between man and machine
(see Table 2.1). Revisions to this approach have been made, adding new design guidelines
and modifying past assumptions regarding comparison between the human and computer
[5, 8]. Additionally, some terminology has been defined.
• Clumsy Automation - Automation that places additional and unevenly distributed
workload, communication, and coordination demands on pilots without adequate
support [1]; automation that lightens workload when it is already low, and raises it
when it is high [1]; automation that creates periods of work “under” load or under-
stimulation and periods of work overloads or bottle necks.
• Brittle Automation - Automation that possess only limited functionality and little
or no capability to learn; the set of situations the automation addresses is too small,
and doesn’t have the capability to respond to the entire range of normal operation
activities [9].
• Literal Automation - describes the character of a conventionally automated system,
strictly to follow the instructions given by the human operator no matter whether
17
Table 2.1: Fitts’ List: Machines vs. Human
Human Strengths Machine Strengths
1 Ability to detect small of visual or acous-
tic energy.
1 Ability to respond quickly to signals, and
to apply great force smoothly and pre-
cisely.
2 Ability to perceive pattern of light or
sound
2 Ability to perform repetitive, routine
tasks.
3 Ability to improvise and use flexible pro-
cedures.
3 Ability to store information briefly and
then to erase it completely.
4 Ability to store very large amounts of in-
formation for long periods and to recall
relevant facts at the appropriate time.
4 Ability to reason deductively, include
computational ability.
5 Ability to reason deductively. 5 Ability to handle highly complex opera-
tions, i.e. to do many diﬀerent things at
once.
6 Ability to exercise judgement.
they are correct or might wrong [10].
• Opaque Automation - Automation that fails to provide suﬃcient feedback concerning
its activities [3, 11].
• Automation Surprise - The result of a breakdown in the interaction between human
operators and automated systems, where it is diﬃcult for the human to track the
activities being completed by the automation and as a result is surprised by the
behavior of the automation. Leads to questions like, what is it doing now, why did
it do that, or what is it going to do next [7, 9].
• Automation Mode - An automated process that is capable of carrying out long se-
quences of tasks autonomously in the absence of additional commands from the hu-
man supervisors [7], not withstanding parameter changes by the operator.
• Automation Level - A point within a continuum that specifies the full or partial
replacement of a function by automation that was previously carried out by the
human operator. This implies that automation is not all or none, but can vary across
a continuum of levels, from the lowest level of fully manual performance to the highest
level of full automation [12].
• Supervisory Control Level - A point within a continuum that species the authority,
responsibility, and allocation of functions within a task between the automation and
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the human operator [13].
2.2 Levels of Automation
Sheridan and Verplank initially proposed Levels of Automation (LOA) as a way of de-
scribing automation in undersea telerobotics, and this approach has become standard in
automation design and analysis [14]. Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens later reevalu-
ated this approach and summarized Sheridan’s original levels, as shown in Table 2.2 [12].
Other LOA taxonomies have been produced, most notably those of Endsley and Wickens
[15, 16, 17].
Table 2.2: Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens’ LOA [12]
Level Description
10 The computer decides everything, acts autonomously
9 informs the humans only if it, the computer, decides to
8 informs the human only if asked
7 executes automatically, then necessarily informs the human, and
6 allows the human restricted time to veto before automatic execution, or
5 executes the suggestion if the human approves, or
4 suggests one alternative
3 narrows the selection down to a few, or
2 The computer oﬀers a complete set of decision/action alternatives, or
1 The computer oﬀers no assistance: the human must take all decisions and actions.
Parasuraman, Sheridan, andWickens proposed a new LOA taxonomy which added a second
dimension in light of the four stage model of human information processing (simplified from
more extensive models [18]). This taxonomy describes human information processing as an
iterative serial sequence of information acquisition, information analysis, decision selection,
and action implementation and suggests levels of automation within each stage [12]. This
second dimension in the classification of automation is similar to the OODA model (an
acronym for observe, orient, decide, and act), an analysis method used in modeling fighter
pilot information processing techniques [19, 20]. Endsley and Kaber used a similar approach
while investigating the dynamic relationship between diﬀerent levels of automation [15].
Later, Proud and Hart [21] used the OODA model specifically for describing this second
dimension by developing a 2D LOA taxonomy that had 8 LOAs for each phase. These
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levels were used in the analysis of the case studies and are described in Appendix A, Table
A.1.
2.3 Situational Awareness
A model proposed by Endsley of situational awareness is shown in Figure 2.1 [22]. This
model shows the critical role that situational awareness plays in the decision making process
and provides a general description of the more specific case of operator awareness and
response during a mode transition. Such specificity has been suggested previously [3, 23].
The model maps the following eﬀects as they relate to situational awareness:
• Individual’s information-processing mechanisms
• Innate abilities
• Experience
• Training
• Goals and objectives
• Preconceptions
Additionally, factors not external to the user are included:
• System capability
• Interface design
• Stress and workload
• Complexity
• Automation
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Figure 2.1: A model of situational awareness in dynamic decision making [22]
This model does not suggest that inadequate situational awareness leads to poor perfor-
mance; downstream cognitive processes such as decision making can positively influence
outcomes [24]. The underlying mechanisms of this model are further elucidated by Endsley
in a mechanistic model, shown in Figure 2.2, which distinguishes the following blocks of
a four stage model of information processing: perception, interpretation-comprehension-
projection, decision making, and action guidance. Human preattentive processing, atten-
tion resources, and memory are included as well. As detailed in Chapter 3, the Endsley
model shown in Figure 2.1 was further extended to describe situational awareness and in-
formation processing in order to provide a conceptual framework for analysis of some case
studies of mode transition accidents and incidents. Hence additional details of the Endsley
model are reviewed below.
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Short Term Sensory Store
This element refers to the use of stimuli characteristics, such as spatial proximity, color,
shape, and movement to preattentively (prior to using attention resources) filter and high-
light information [25, 26]. This block serves to reduce a sensory scene into a manageable
set of stimuli, varying in salience. The recognition of certain stimuli in this block help form
the basis of Level 1 situational awareness [27].
Attention Resources
Attention resources feed each block within working memory and serves as governor for how
much information may be processed at once. Attention resources not only determine the
quantity of information that can be processed, but the quality by which it is processed as
well [27]. Long-term memory, cue salience, and frequency of occurrence all play a factor in
the allocation of attention resources [28].
Perception
Perception further categorizes and filters information following preattentive processing.
However, in contrast to the short term sensory store, attentive resources are used here in ap-
plying learned expectancies based on long term memory [29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35]. Advance
knowledge of information characteristics and expectations, such as might be developed by
repeated experience in an environment and top-down attention processing, facilitate this
process, which produces the elements of Level 1 situational awareness [27].
Interpretation-Comprehension-Projection
This block forms Level 2 and 3 situational awareness and is otherwise referred to as working
memory, in which new information is combined with pre-existing information to form a
“composite picture” of a situation [27]. Projections to future states are also made here,
which form Level 3 situational awareness; however, this function is highly taxing on working
memory capacity [36].
Decision Making
The decision making block refers to processing following data synthesis and may contain
any number of heuristics or probabilistic algorithms for determining a course of action [37].
One such model of decision making is of Bayesian statistics and Causal Induction Theory
[38]; however, such specificity is not required in this model, as this block only specifies the
general translation from data to action decision.
Action Guidance
Action guidance refers to the execution of a chosen action, anywhere from complex ath-
letic and coordinated movement to the pressing of a button. Depending on long-term
memory stores, this block can experience a certain amount of automaticity, referring to a
preprogrammed execution of the action requiring fewer attentional resources than a more
conscious action [27].
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Figure 2.2: A mechanisms model of Situational Awareness [22]
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Long Term Memory
For the purposes of this model, long-term memory encompasses the concept of mental mod-
els, which are defined as “mechanisms whereby humans are able to generate descriptions of
system purpose and form, explanations of system functioning and observed system states,
and predictions of future states” [39]. Such mental models are related to the schema repre-
sented in the model, which provide a framework for perception and associations in complex
networks of incoming information [40, 41]. Additionally, specialized scripts are associated
with these schema, which provide preprogrammed sequences of actions [42].
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Chapter 3
Case Studies Methods
3.1 Framework for Analysis
The model in Figure 2.1 is particularly applicable for the purposes of understanding the
ability of a system to transition gracefully, as situation awareness (and mode awareness,
a subset of situational awareness) are a key element in graceful transitions; however, the
model is vague with respect to the human-computer decision making processes. As such,
an updated model is proposed in Figure 3.1, which was used as a basis for identifying
factors in graceful transitions in the case studies.
This updated model specifies 3 levels of mode awareness, similar to the concept of system
awareness, as a subset of situational awareness [3, 23]: the awareness of a the available
modes and the current mode of operation (Level 1), the current mode output as well as the
logic behind that output (Level 2), and any future modes that will be experience and how
those will behave in context of the system and environmental states (Level 3). Automation
is also characterized by (1) the complexity of its architecture [10], (2) its capabilities/limits
of operation [9], (3) the characteristic of the particular mode of operation being considered
[7], (4) the interface design between the operator and the automation, (5) the opacity of
automation, both concerning the mode as well as the overall architecture [3, 11], and (6)
the disparity between the two modes of operation being considered in an analysis.
These proposed model updates flow from both insights gained from the case studies as well
as updates to Endsley’s mechanistic model, shown in Figure 3.2. This particular model was
used in identifying transition mechanisms and places the four-stage information processing
model alongside a four stage automation model, similar to that proposed in recent LOA
work [12, 15, 21]. In this model, LOA are an emergent property of information flow between
the human and the automation within phases and between information processing blocks,
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Figure 3.1: Updated model of dynamic decision making [27]
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which is governed by the mode setting and represented as information flow valves. Parallel
processing of multiple tasks is not explicitly modeled here; such task interactions should
be considered in the future, as research concerning integrated and separable dimensions in
display design suggests interesting interactions [18].
Mode Setting
The mode setting block determines which mode the system operates in and sets each of
these parameters with respect to each phase of the active information processing. The
mode setting process was included within the situational awareness block, as the mode
setting is “machine long-term memory,” and is analogous to machine situational awareness.
Mode confusion has usually attributed to the human [43, 44], but the conservative human-
systems designer might argue the converse: the machine was situationally unaware of the
human.
Monitoring the mode setting aﬀects additional attention resources from the operator: (1)
attention resources are allocated to monitoring and setting the current mode setting and
(2) the mode setting determines the allocation of attention to the four phases of human
information processing. Though a mode may be cognitively undemanding, it might still
draw a large amount of attention from the human based on a lack of trust in the automa-
tion at the time. Additionally, the mode setting aﬀects the mental model of the operator
in the way schema are developed and applied to the current situation; these schema re-
cursively aﬀect the chosen mode. This explains the well-known phenomena of operators
developing whole new methods of controlling a system based on the implementation of
automation.
Sensors
With any modern-day system, sensors are major and/or necessary component of data
collection. The way in which these sensors are active (filtering, direction, sensitivity, fidelity,
etc.) is directed by the mode setting and corresponds to the active mode of the entire
system.
Active Mode
The active mode describes the flow through of information as determined by the mode
setting. Given diﬀerent LOA, information will flow between the human and the computer
diﬀerently. For example, in a high LOA the synthesis of information from the two decision
blocks (human and computer) being fed to the action blocks (human and computer) would
primarily come from the computer.
The human processing phases will never be completely isolated from each other as the
human processing model is continuous by nature. However, automation is able to ignore
particular results, integrations, and actions from previous phases and is not continuously
serial. Thus, parallel human processing can exist in a completely supervisory sense: the
human can shadow the automation even at the highest levels of automation.
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Figure 3.2: Updated model of situational awareness and information processing
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Automation Interface
The automation interface is particularly important, as it determines how the active mode
interacts with the human. The ideal interface should show no information lost between the
active mode and human. The interface is determined by the mode setting of the currently
active mode. In some cases the interface will not change with the mode setting (static
displays, single screen displays, etc.); however, in highly complex systems, nested interface
displays are very common.
Interface filtering is separate from that which is intended for display by the current active
mode. An example of interface filtering occurred in the Apollo 13, where the critical
piece of information was displayed to the astronauts at the time preceding the accident;
however, due to the poor interface design that particular piece of information was missed.
The active mode intended to provide this information to the user, but the design of the
interface eﬀectively blocked this information due to clutter. Such eﬀects should not be
confused with the filtering caused by high-workload: the interface refers to the passing
of information to the operator, whereas workload aﬀects the operator’s reception of that
information.
3.2 Overview of Analysis
Six case studies (shown in Table 3.1) from marine operations, aviation, and aerospace were
selected and analyzed, each containing at least one instance of a mode transition. For
each instance, the levels of automation of the mode prior to the transition and following
the transition were defined. These levels of automation formed the basis for characterizing
the “LOA Disparity” factor shown in Figure 3.1. This characterization was done first
using Sheridan and Verplank’s LOA taxonomy, and then using Proud and Hart’s LOA
taxonomy.
Table 3.1: Case studies in graceful transitions
Number Application Description
1 Maritime The Crown Princess heeling incident
2 Maritime The grounding of the Royal Majesty
3 Aviation Crash of Aeroflot-Nord Flight 821
4 Aviation TNT Airways Limited Cargo Flight 325N impact on runway
5 Aerospace Space Shuttle STS-3 PIO at landing
6 Aerospace Apollo 11 lunar landing
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Following the particular characterization of “LOA Disparity”, each transition was consid-
ered in the framework of the extended versions of Endsley’s situational awareness models
(shown in Figure 3.1 and 3.2). First, the triggering factors were identified based on Figure
3.1. Second, the same model was used to identify factors related to the ungracefulness of
the transition were identified. This identification was based on earlier proposed definition
of a “graceful transition”. For example, in transitions with excessive workloads, stress and
workload were identified as a factor in the ungracefulness, with other related elements as
defined by the context of the transition. In cases of graceful transitions, no factors were
identified. Third, mechanisms within the extended situational awareness model (see Figure
3.2) were identified. Finally, following this classification of each transition, specific design
lessons were identified each transition. Each of these models was continually developed
with each successive case study; if transition was not adequately characterized with the
existing factors model, a new factor was added or an existing factor was expanded to
encompass it. Because these models developed throughout the review of all six case stud-
ies, these models were retroactively applied to earlier-reviewed case studies for complete
consideration within the full context of the completed models.
Separate summary lists of all active factors (triggering and gracefulness) and mechanisms
in the case studies were made. The total occurrences of each factor trigger factor was
divided by the number of transition instances to generate the occurrence percentage shown
in Figure 4.1. The total occurrences of each factor in ungracefulness was divided by the
number of total ungraceful transitions to determine the occurrence rates shown in Figure
4.2. The occurrences of certain mechanisms were also divided by the totla number of
ungraceful transitions to generate the occurrence percentage shown in Figure 4.3. Using
occurrence totals and the specific design lessons from each transition, a set of generalized
Design Principles were created (see 4.1). The factors and mechanisms identified as active
in each transition were then mapped to the general design principles based on the specific
those lessons learned encompassed by that principle.
3.3 Overview of Case Studes
The following sections provide brief descriptions and summaries of the six case studies.
There are a number of cases of mode transitions in application that could have been
used. These case studies represent a broad set of applications for multi-modal automation
and generally provided detailed reports adequate for the analysis of the mode transitions’
eﬀects.
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3.3.1 Maritime Cases
The Crown Princess
The following case study refers to the Heeling Accident of the Crown Princess in the
Atlantic Ocean oﬀ of Port Canaveral, FL on July 18th, 2006 [45]. The cruise ship Crown
Princess heeled at a maximum angle of about 24 degrees due to a number of factors,
chiefly being misguided input from the 2nd oﬃcer into control system that was too slow to
respond. These control inputs followed the disengagement of the ship’s autopilot, which
was operating in a regime unsuited for its operational environment. No casualties were
sustained in this accident.
The following instances of mode transitions were identified and analyzed within this case
study:
1. Transition from manual steering to heading mode in the trackpilot by the captain.
2. Change in status of the 2nd oﬃcer from monitoring to supervising.
3. Transition back to manual steering from heading mode by the 2nd oﬃcer
(For a detailed analysis of this case study, see Appendix B.)
The Royal Majesty
As described in the NTSB reports [46], on June 10th, 1995, the Panamanian passenger
ship Royal Majesty grounded on Rose and Crown Shoal about 10 miles east of Nantucket
Island, Massachusetts, and about 17 miles from where the watch oﬃcers thought the vessel
was. The vessel, with 1,509 persons on board, was en route from St. George’s, Bermuda,
to Boston, Massachusetts.
The major cause of the accident was the result of a loss of GPS data input into the NACOS
of the ship, resulting in a transition to Dead-Reckoning. The bridge crew’s failure to observe
this mode change, which had been caused by a disconnected cable, ultimately resulted in
the NACOS steering the ship oﬀ course due to a lack of current, wind, and sea data.
The following instances of transition were identified within this case study:
1. The navigator set the navigation and command system (NACOS) 25 on the naviga-
tion (NAV) mode
2. The transition of the position data from GPS to Dead Reckoning (DR) mode
3. The second oﬃcer switched from autopilot to manual when the Royal Majesty unex-
pectedly veered to port
(For a detailed review of the Royal Majesty Case Study, refer to Appendix C.)
3.3.2 Aviation Cases
Aeroflot-Nord Flight 821
On September 14th, 2008, Aeroflot-Nord Flight 821, a Boeing 737-500 crashed outside of
the Perm Airport in Russia. Prior to the approach to the runway, the system experienced a
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large number of mode transitions, much of which was exacerbated by a asymmetric thrust
split in the engines. On approach to Perm airport, the pilots attempted to execute a missed
approach, during which the airliner lost radio contact and impacted the ground. There
were no survivors [47, 48].
The accident report suggests that neither of the pilots had the skill or experience required
to fly such a craft, which inevitably dominates any discussion of grace in mode transi-
tions [47, 48]. Additionally, the pilot in command (PIC) was reported as being inebriated,
greatly reducing his ability to cope with changes in the system. While it should be under-
stood that no high-performance system such as a passenger airliner be required to operate
gracefully with an impaired operator, the condition of this operator gives a unique look
at the consequences of an “oﬀ-nominal” operator case and can provide insight into how to
make a system more robust in terms of grace in mode transitions.
The following cases of transition were identified in this accident base on the report by the
Russian Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK):
1. Prior to the approach, the autothrottle was disengaged. The transition was prepro-
grammed.
2. In entering the approach, a switch to “Altitude Hold” (ALT HOLD) was made. Prior
to the transition, the aircraft had been operating in “Level Change ” (LVL CHANGE)
mode. Soon following a switch was made to “Lateral Navigation” (LNAV), with the
report describing it as most likely mistaken input by one of the pilots. As such, a
transition was made from “Lateral Navigation” to Control Wheel Steering in both
roll (CWS ROLL) and pitch (CWS PITCH) immediately after.
3. During the approach a transition was made to full manual control by the disengage-
ment of the autopilot.
(For a detailed analysis of this case study, see Appendix D.)
TNT Airways Limited Cargo Flight 325N
On June 15th, 2006, a cargo flight (Boeing 737-300) run by TNT Airways Limited at-
tempted a CAT III1approach at the East Midlands airport. On approach the commander
disengaged the aircraft autopilot by mistake. In attempting to reengage the autopilot
the pilot failed to accurately judge his proximity to the ground and did not execute the
TO/GA (Take-oﬀ/Go-around) procedure quickly enough to keep the airplane landing gear
from hitting the ground. The autopilot was never successfully re-engaged. In the impact
the nose gear was broken oﬀ. After regaining altitude, the crew made an emergency landing
at Birmingham Airport (BHX) [43, 44].
1Category III A is a precision instrument approach and landing with (1) a decision height lower than
100 feet above touchdown zone elevation, or no decision height (alert height) and (2) and a runway visual
range not less than 200 meters (656 ft).
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The following transitions were identified in the case study:
1. The accidental transition to manual when the pilot attempted to respond to ATC.
2. The attempted transition by the commander to re-engage both autopilots immedi-
ately following the first transition case.
3. The last minute re-engagement of the autopilot in approach mode.
4. The final transition into TOGA mode just before ground impact.
(For a detailed review of this case study refer to Appendix E.)
3.3.3 Aerospace Cases
STS-3 Case Study
Throughout the initial missions of the space shuttle, a major portion of operations was
devoted to final validation of the shuttle’s systems. In particular, the autoland system
capabilities and its interaction with the pilot was of particular concern to designers and
operational managers. In STS-3, a scheduled transition to CSS mode (manual mode)
resulted in a pilot-induced-oscillation (PIO) which, while it didn’t cause a mission failure,
led to a reevaluation of the ability of pilots to re-engage themselves in the control loop task
at such a late stage. This was the only shuttle landing at White Sands, and the moving
dust at the time of the land was thought to been related to the PIO [49]
The only transition being studied in this particular case study is that procedural transition
which took place between autoland to manual.
(For a detailed look at this case study refer to Appendix F.)
Apollo 11
The first lunar landing was made in a “manual” control mode by Neil Armstrong; however,
this was not considered the nominal landing [50]. Two mode transitions were examined in
the first moon landing:
1. The manual control checkout which preceded the final transition into manual control
(RCAH with Incremental Rate-of-Descent).
2. The transition to manual control, which was maintained until touchdown.
(For detailed look at the first moon landing see Appendix G.)
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Chapter 4
Lessons from the Mode Transition
Case Studies
4.1 Design Principles
This chapter presents an analysis of the commonality of various factors in triggering mode
transitions, and making them ungraceful. Based on this, a list of design principles is
formulated that incorporate lessons learned from the case studies, shown in 4.1. Further
discussion of the details behind these principles may be found in the Appendices. These
design principles should be considered as guidelines context may require exceptions.
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Table 4.1: Design principles indexed by case study
No. Description Case
1 Don’t transition to a higher level of automation if the reverse operation will be required in the near future:
the disparity of LOA has a more detrimental eﬀect on performance when moving from high to low.
B.2, B.4, C.2,
C.4
2 Design systems so that transitions ideally occur with low variance in system states. B.2, B.3, B.4,
C.2, C.4, D.3,
F.1, G.1
3 A system should either improve the chances of correct action or safeguard against the wrong input. Reduce
the number of input options available immediately after a mode transition, especially when high stress and
workload are predicted.
B.4, C.4, D.4,
F.1
4 Automation should be transparent (not opaque) to the operator, especially when switching between modes;
however, caution should be taken to not overwhelm the operator with the inner-workings of the automation.
B.2, B.4, C.4,
C.4
5 Make mode transitions extremely clear in activation and descriptions, especially when triggered internally
or when state errors are slow moving.
C.3 D.7, E.4
6 Design modes to complete high level system goals and not low level state goals to reduce amount of “mode-
hopping” (successively switching modes within a short period of time) which takes place. Combine similar
modes and reduce the number of modes available.
D.6, D.7
7 Reduce the number of control loops which must be taken over in a transition. This principle must be
balance with Principle 6.
D.4, D.6, E.3,
F.1, G.2
8 Provide undo functions when safety margins permit, and explicitly inform the user when a transition cannot
be undone.
D.5, D.6, D.7,
E.2, E.3
9 Use authority to proceed when workload and time-pressures permit. C.3, D.6, E.2
10 Use mode preview displays and trend displays when possible to augment operator situational awareness
before and during a transition.
D.3, E.2, E.4,
E.5 F.1, G.2
11 Design modes to reflect the way a human would approach the task, not how a machine might. This is
related to Principle 4.
D.4, E.3
12 Reduce any extraneous stimuli generated by the system during mode transitions. D.5, D.7, E.4,
F.1, G.1, G.2
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4.2 Triggers in Mode Transitions
A bar chart detailing the occurrence rate of certain factors in triggering mode transitions
(both graceful or ungraceful) is shown in Figure 4.1. These occurrence rates show that the
system states were the most pervasive of all the factors, with the performance of actions
and operator automaticity as the second most frequent.
Figure 4.1: Occurrence rates of mode transition triggers from the updated Endsley model
of situational awareness as identified in the case studies
4.3 Factors in Ungraceful Transitions
A bar chart detailing the contribution certain factors in causing a mode transitions to be
ungraceful, as identified within the case studies, is shown in Figure 4.2. Most notably,
high stress and workload were often present in making transitions ungraceful, as were
the environmental state and the system states. Operator situational awareness, a related
factor, was a frequent contributor as well. Table 4.2 maps these various factors to the
Design Principles which address them.
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Figure 4.2: Occurrence rates of factors in ungraceful mode transitions from case studies
4.4 Mechanisms in Ungraceful Transitions
A bar chart detailing the occurrence rate of particular mechanisms resulting in ungrace-
ful mode transitions is shown in Figure 4.3. The two most frequent mechanisms seen are
attention resources and operator schema, suggesting that mode transitions generate a sig-
nificant draw on such resources and often lead operators to develop faulty understandings
of a situation. Additionally, the operator’s inability to interpret, comprehend, and project
information (linked to both attentional resources and schema) contributes to ungraceful
transitions, based on case study review. Table 4.3 maps these mechanisms to the various
Design Principles which address them.
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Table 4.2: Factors from the updated Endsley model of situational awareness aﬀected by
design principles
Factor
Design Principle
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
System State X X X X
Environment State X X
General SA X X X X X X X X X X
Mode SA X X X X X X X
Interface X X X X X X X
LOA Disparity X X
Stress & Workload X X X X
Opacity X X X X X
Capability X X
Complexity X X
Automaticity X X X
Info Processing Mechanisms X X X X
Action Guidance X X X
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Figure 4.3: Occurrence rates of mechanisms from the updated Endsley mechanisms model
of situational awareness as identified in the ungraceful mode transitions from case studies
Table 4.3: Mechanisms from Endsley’s model of situational awareness aﬀected by Design
Principles
Factor
Design Principle
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Mode Setting X X X X X X X X X
Action Guidance X X X X
Schema X X X X X X X
Scripts X
Decision Making X X X X X
Interface X X X X X X X
Perception X X X
Attention Resources X X
Interp., Comp., & Proj. X X X X X X
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4.5 Discussion
These case studies are only a small sample of ungraceful transitions in multi-modal automa-
tion systems. In particular, automation surprise and mode confusion are observed in these
case studies quite often. This was recognized and is reflected in the adaptation of Endsley’s
models of situational awareness. However, the non-occurence of these phenomena should
not be taken as identical to a graceful transition: ungraceful transitions as defined in this
thesis can arise in cases where neither of these are present. Automation surprise and mode
confusion can describe extreme cases of ungraceful transitions, but it are not identical;
for example, the Crown Princess was a very ungraceful transition, and there was severe
automation surprise, but this was caused by the system transitioning ungracefully.
Considering the large number of automation surprises seen in the case studies, it is not
surprising that system states and operator automaticity were the most frequently occurring
trigger factors (see Figures 3.1 and 4.1). First, the system states were what gave the
operator a sense of automation surprise. Second, the automaticity of the operator suggests
unconscious mode triggers, making it easier for operators to be surprised by the system
states.
The significance of automation surprise as a symptom of ungraceful transitions is also shown
by the large role that stress and workload played in the case studies. Environmental states
and system states were also frequent factors in the ungraceful transition and were most
likely related to the frequency of the workload and stress factor. The eﬀect of workload and
stress can clearly be seen in the role that attention resources and operator schema played as
well. Attention resources were a viewed as a mechanism in 85% of the ungraceful transitions
identified as ungraceful in the case studies, and this was often because of an insuﬃcient
supply of resources during the transition (Figure 4.3. Additionally, the operator schema
were often incomplete (or wrong) regarding the system state and/or mode setting. While
such conditions describe conditions disposed toward automation surprise, they also show
that attention resources and operator schema are also important indications of a graceful
transition: ample spare attention and a highly resolved operator schema are present in a
graceful transition.
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Chapter 5
Historical Background on Lunar
Landing Task
“We choose to go to the moon. We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do
the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard, because that
goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because that
challenge is one that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and
one which we intend to win, and the others, too.”
-John F. Kennedy, 1962, Rice University
There is arguably no other phrase uttered by a politician that resonates with any aerospace
engineer more than these words spoken by President John F. Kennedy in 1962 at Rice
University [51]. These words challenged a generation of engineers to do something no one
had ever done before. In going to the moon, humanity reached into the stars, grasping a
vast new set of scientific questions and engineering challenges, least among which was the
design of a controllable spacecraft.
The following chapters address this design challenge by investigating how operators dy-
namically interact with a multi-modal automation system purposed for lunar landing.
Specifically, they describe an experiment which investigated the eﬀects of control mode
diﬃculty and landing point redesignation on pilot workload, situational awareness, and
performance.
5.1 Lunar Landing Then
The initial concept in Apollo was one of direct descent and ascent: straight from the Earth,
to the moon, and back [52]. Believing this to be an infeasible strategy, John Houbolt at
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Langley Research Center championed the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous (LOR) strategy for
landing on the moon, in which a small craft would detach from the main craft and proceed
to the surface [53, 54]; however, in proposing such a strategy it became necessary to
understand how a lunar lander would be piloted, if at all.
Beginning with the Mercury program, this was a central issue facing NASA engineers, a
story which was documented by Tom Wolfe in the book, The Right Stuﬀ, and dramatized
by Philip Kaufman’s movie of the same title. The question still remains one of importance
and its influence in the design of Apollo has been one of interest in the development of
technology[52]. Computers provided a rigidity to the mission which, while aﬀording more
certainty to NASA engineers, acted as handcuﬀs in an unforeseen situation. Additionally,
what the computer should tell the pilot and the pilot’s ability to respond became a question
concern in a human-computer system.
Figure 5.1: Apollo landing phases [55]
As engineers further refined the LOR concept and explored the question of human control,
the concept of a phased lunar landing approach was developed. Such an approach, while
not strictly fuel optimal, focused on increasing the reliability, redundancy, and flight safety
of the landing [56, 57, 58]. It drew from NASA’s aviation heritage by splitting a landing into
a Braking Phase, Final Approach Phase, and Terminal Descent Phase (shown in Figure
5.1). In a nominal landing the computer flew the spacecraft through each phase, while
the astronauts constantly monitored systems and provided authority to proceed to the
computer; still, the astronauts would need to completely assume the flying task from the
computer in the final stages of the landing. The flying task was extremely diﬃcult, with
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Neil Armstrong remarking [59]:
“I think I was probably over-controlling a little bit...I was surprised that I had as much
trouble as I did in determining translational velocities. I don’t think I did a very good
job of flying the vehicle smoothly in that time period [Landing Phase]. I felt that I
was a little bit erratic.”
Apollo 11 was by no means an exception: every touchdown on the moon’s surface was done
in manual control. Given the relatively poor resolution in the mapping of the moon up
until that time, small landing hazards, such as rocks and craters could have (and almost
did) proved fatal to the lunar module (LM). It was the job of the astronaut pilot, and the
engineers had allocated more than a minute’s worth of fuel, to deal with these contingencies
as they arose by re-designating to a new landing site and, finally, to assume control of the
vehicle and guide it to the surface [52].
Due to the complex nature of spacecraft thruster control systems, both available manual
modes, P66 and P67, used computer-mediated inputs from the human to control the space-
craft. P66, the manual mode in which every single lunar landing occurred, provided Rate
Control Attitude Hold (RCAH), in which inceptor deflections commanded the attitude rate
of the spacecraft, which was otherwise held constant by the computer when there were no
inceptor inputs. At the same time, the pilot was aﬀorded incremental Rate of Descent
(ROD) control, which gave him a degree of control over the vertical speed of the LM (ROD
was controlled by increments of 1 feet per second using a toggle switch). P67, also known
as Manual Guidance mode [60], was only meant as a backup to P66, aﬀording the pilot
with RCAH attitude control along with full continuous control over the main thruster. P67
was never used in flight, since it was found to be diﬃcult to control [61].
These control modes were thoroughly investigated using the LLRV (Lunar Landing Re-
search Vehicle) built by NASA [62, 63]. Minimal, if any, consideration was given to pilot
performance in transitions between the fully automatic P65 program and any subsequent
manual control mode that the astronaut might switch to. Fortunately, this didn’t prove to
be fatal to any of the missions due to the extreme amounts of training aﬀorded to the pilots
with the LLRV and LLTVs [59, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68]; however, the eﬀect of the transition was
hinted at in the first two missions [59, 64] when they described their “over-controlling” of
the system. In future lunar landing, the eﬀect of such transitions needs to be understood
in order to ensure success.
5.2 A Phased Approach
Apollo separated lunar landing into three phases: Braking, Approach, and Terminal De-
scent, shown in Figure 5.1. Each phase was controlled by a diﬀerent program within the
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Lunar Guidance Computer (LGC) and helped fulfill the requirements of the mission ar-
chitecture [56]. The crew, consisting of the commander (CDR) and the Lunar Module
Pilot (LMP), was highly involved throughout the landing: the commander monitored and
controlled the descent using visual cues, various hand controllers, and switches, while the
LM pilot monitored the computer display, verbally relayed pertinent data (altitude, alti-
tude rate, fuel, etc.) to the commander, and entered data into the computer [55]. Other
additional tasks handled by the astronauts included data callouts to ground control (data
requests lessened during the Terminal Descent Phase) as well as the operation of secondary
systems (e.g. the communications antenna) which placed an extremely high workload bur-
den on the pilots (see transcripts of Apollo 11 landing [50]).
5.2.1 The Braking Phase
The Braking Phase followed Descent Orbit Insertion (DOI) and was initialized on command
of the astronauts by the selection of P63 (Program 63 in the LGC) and occurred at an
altitude approximately 50,000 ft above the moon’s surface and 260 nm up range of the
landing site. The DPS (Descent Propulsion System) engine operated at full throttle for
nearly the entire duration of the braking phase as it was primarily designed for eﬃcient
propellant usage while reducing velocity for the approach phase [56, 58]. Orientation about
the thrust-axis (yaw) was at the discretion of the pilots and during Apollo 11 the craft was
oriented windows down for landmark tracking; however, in later landings this orientation
was not kept in order to conserve fuel. Once the guidance-calculated TGO (Time-to-
go) clock reached 60 seconds the computer automatically switched to P64 to begin the
approach phase [56, 58]. Throughout this phase astronauts monitored the progress of the
GN&C system. Transition to the Approach Phase was confirmed by the astronauts when
the computer automatically switched to P64 [69].
5.2.2 The Approach Phase
The Approach Phase began when the “High Gate” guidance condition was reached (velocity
at ∼730 fps, flight path angle at -14◦ [57]). This phase provided visual confirmation of
the landing site by the astronauts and highlights the architectural choices concerning the
human [56, 58]: continual visibility of the lunar surface was available during this phase
until approximately 5 seconds before entering terminal descent [55]. Additionally, the
human was allowed the opportunity to incrementally change the landing target using the
landing point redesignation system, which consisted of a set of etchings on the window that
projected a landing site using numbers passed by the guidance computer. Throughout this
phase the LMP would read two-digit landing point designator values from the computer
to the CDR who, using a set of window etchings (see Figure 5.2), would redesignate if
necessary.
5.2.3 Terminal Descent
Terminal descent refers to the phase following the arrival at the “Low Gate” guidance
condition (approx. 100 feet altitude, 36 feet ground range from the landing site [55])
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(a) Inside (b) Outside
Figure 5.2: LPD Window Etchings
spanning all the way until touchdown ( see Table 5.1). As the phase progressed, the view
of the landing site became obscured by the structure of the LM as well as blow-back dust
kicked up from the thrust of the main engine; hence, guidance was only based on nulling
velocities and not position control [55]. The phase still allowed the human to assert himself
over the craft when he deemed necessary; however, the system was programmed to land
automatically in P65 [56, 58].
5.3 Controlling Apollo
The main manual control implementation in Apollo was Rate-Control/Attitude Hold with
and incremental Rate-of-Descent (ROD), in which a deflection of the Rotational Hand
Controller (RHC) would correspond to the rate-of-change in spacecraft attitude, while the
rate-of-descent changed with each control click (1 fps). Other control modes based on the
diﬀerent orders of attitude control, both acceleration and position, were conceived of as
well [60]. Attitude Acceleration commanded angular accelerations based on the deflection
of the RHC. Attitude Command controlled angular attitude proportionally to the RHC
1Time from ignition of the DPS
2Horizontal velocity relative to surface
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Table 5.1: Apollo 11 Premission Powered Descent Event Summary [56]
Event
TFI1 Inertial Vel. Altitude Rate Altitude ∆ V
min:sec fps fps ft fps
A Ullage -00:07 - - - -
B Powered Descent Initia-
tion
00:00 5,560 -4 48,814 0
C Throttle to maximum
thrust
00:26 5,529 -3 48,725 31
D Rotate to windows up po-
sition
02:56 4,000 -50 44,934 1,572
E LR altitude update 04:18 3,065 -89 39,201 2,536
F Throttle recovery 06:24 1,458 -106 24,639 4,239
G LR velocity update 06:42 1,315 -127 22,644 4,399
H High Gate 08:26 506 -145 7,515 5,375
I Low Gate 10:06 55 (
268) -16 512 6,175
J Touchdown (probe con-
tact)
11:54 -15 (0) -3 12 6,775
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position (i.e. a vertical RHC corresponded to a vertical spacecraft). These control modes
were extensively tested in fixed-based simulators as well as free-flying mockups [61, 62, 63],
focusing particularly on handling qualities (defined as the flight characteristics of a vehicle
that describe the ease and precision with which a pilot is able to perform a task [70]) as a
function of the control authority and power. The result of this testing was a lunar module
in which the maximum angular rate command in a RCAH mode was 20 degrees per second
[71, 72, 73], a value deemed as mandatory by astronauts [60, 71]. More recent studies
have found that as control authority increases handling quality ratings improve [74], as
do increases control power and reduction in the maximum-rate command. Such results
depend highly on the dynamics of the vehicle being tested.
5.4 Lunar Landing Now
Fifty years later, the physics of lunar landing remain unchanged; however, mission goals
have seen dramatic changes. In responding to President Bush’s Vision for Space Explo-
ration [75], NASA embarked on the Constellation Program (CxP), which was to carry
humans toward to the moon, Mars, and beyond, with a number of technological and goal-
based changes from the Apollo Program [76]. The Apollo Program sought to “land a
man on the moon and return him to safely to the Earth”, largely for the sake of national
pride [51, 77]. The Constellation Program has shifted this focus to the concerns of lunar
scientists and that of technology development for future Martian missions [78]. In order
to gain further extraterrestrial ground experience relatively close to home, NASA is look-
ing towards establishing an extended lunar presence [79]. Additionally, advances in flight
deck technology will introduce considerable diﬀerences in the cockpit of any Constellation
vehicle compared to that seen in Apollo [76].
The current Design Reference Missions (DRMs) for Constellation require global lunar ac-
cess (NASA CxP 70007 5.8.1 [80]). The lunar poles are of particular interest since the
recent Lunar CRater Observation Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) mission provided the first
tangible evidence of water in some permanently shaded craters on the moon [81]. This
desire for global access carries a host of new requirements and engineering challenges re-
lated to astronaut performance when evaluating landing sites and flying manually: a lack
of atmosphere removes diﬀusive distance cues, the Non-Lamebertian regolith diﬀers from
terrestrial soil greatly in shadow generation and reflectivity, the lack of familiar objects re-
moves comparative perceptual cues, and vestibular illusions result from the reduced lunar
gravity [65, 82, 83]. Additionally, strict regulation of landing site topography and sun angle
as done in Apollo will not be possible in locations such as the lunar poles [84]. In order
to mitigate some of these eﬀects, future landings will use specialized automation systems,
such as the Autonomous Landing Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) System which
will combat the problem of unknown terrain and landing hazards [85, 86]; however, flyijng
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without window visual cues immediately raises concerns: Apollo astronauts preferred to
use out-the-window visual cues while in manual control [65, 66, 67, 68].
In addition to the global lunar access requirement, Constellation’s new lunar lander is to
also have both autonomous and human-in-the-loop flight capability for either crewed or
cargo missions (NASA CxP 70007 [80]). This particular requirement will directly impact
the design of any future lunar module and will create a significant human factors design
challenge similar to, though distinct from, that which was faced during Apollo, where
a highly complex three-phase landing was combined with a multi-modal Guidance, Nav-
igation, and Control (GN&C) automation system to allow for several modes of human
interaction (see Section 5.1). While it is likely that the nominal landing will be mostly
automatic, the system must be capable of a manual takeover, in which the crew can gain
immediate access to necessary data and controls (NASA CxP 70007 4.2.15 [80] and NASA
CxP 70024 3.6.5 [87]). Additionally, the NASA Human Rating Requirements (HRRs) cur-
rently mandate that the crew have the capability to monitor, operate, and control the
crewed space system and subsystems (NASA NPR 8705.2B 3.3.1) and be able to manually
override higher level software control/automation (NASA NPR 8705.2B 3.3.2) [88]. Essen-
tially, the role of the human in the sense of failure mitigation and handling has remained
similar to that seen in Apollo:
“Operations personnel should have the ability to intervene and override any onboard
decision regardless of sensor indications. A central objective of the sensor systems is
to facilitate the situational awareness of both the crew and of remote operators (be
they on the Earth or another vehicle). The design should allow the operator to make
a rapid assessment of the current situation, including the exposure and investigation
of oﬀ-nominal states. The design of the crewed vehicles should allow for the crew to
provide functional redundancy to the automated and Earth-in-the-loop systems where
practical.”
(NASA CxP 70000 3.1.3.6.2 [89])
Hence, the new requirements have necessitated the increase in automation capability with
systems such as ALHAT and were supported by the development of digital control systems
and integrated computer displays (e.g. a glass cockpit) [76, 83, 90]. The small variety
of modes used in Apollo was only a subset of a variety of possible control modes which
were tested or could have been implemented (an Attitude Control Velocity Hold mode was
included during testing [63]) and already new control modes are being considered, each
of which oﬀers a specialized mode with which the operator can achieve his or her goals
[60, 91]. However, the history of automation development has shown that as the capability
of automation is expanded, more modes of operation are introduced, creating complex
multi-modal automation architectures that can easily confuse even the most experienced
human operator [11]. A good example of this can been seen in the past development of
aircraft, which saw a dramatic increase in the number of displays in the cockpits before
the problem was addressed with integrated display systems (see Figure 5.3) [92].
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This historical tendency of creating progressively opaque and incomprehensible systems
was researched in a three year study of pilots in advanced technology transport aircraft,
which found that pilot situational awareness with respect to the current operation mode
of the aircraft, as well as all possible modes, was often deficient [1]. Aside from just
understanding a single mode of operation, multi-modal architectures require understanding
the interactions between modes when transitioning from one to another, a condition evident
in Apollo which will most likely be a concern of Constellation. Further, in cases of extreme
operational environments and high risk missions, this becomes an issue of great importance,
as an unexpected mode interaction could lead to catastrophic failure. Somewhat ironically,
these mode transitions are, by their nature, coupled with extreme operating environments
and/or situations, as such circumstances often act as the triggers for mode transitions
[93]. With such mission requirements and system concerns, understanding the transition
to and between manual control modes will be of critical importance in any future lunar
mission.
Figure 5.3: Trends in display development in aviation [92]
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Chapter 6
Experimental Background
6.1 Manual Control
The crossover model is the standard for human performance modeling in manual control
applications: the human is modeled as a quasilinear controller that, when combined with
the plant, tends towards a 1st order integrator system – phase lags increase with the order
of the plant (e.g. 0th human-plant system had less phase lag than 2nd order) [94]. As a
corollary to the model, the human is nearly incapable of controlling high-order (greater
than 2nd order) without previewing of future states. Instead, the crossover model predicts
the occurrence of Pilot Induced Oscillations (PIOs) and instabilities. Such events would
occur when a pilot’s input occurs with a 180◦ phase lag compared with system output,
creating an potentially unrecoverable resonance in the system. Such phenomena are well
known and have been observed and documented, occurring even in advanced systems such
as the Space Shuttle Orbiter[95].
The model has been applied to both single- and two-axis control tasks, which have shown
no diﬀerence in error tracking, but significant diﬀerences in lead time constants in two-
axis tracking [96]; unfortunately, the adaptive nature of human control still escapes this
model, which must include (1) input adaptation [97, 98], (2) controlled element adaptation
[99] (3) task adaptation, and (4) programmed adaptation [100]. An investigation into
human performance dealing with instantaneous “complex transitions” (transitions between
diﬀerent system orders of system dynamics) revealed that 3 phases can be identified as the
pretransition retention phase in which the operator initially acts as if nothing happened,
the optimal control phase in which a time-optimal control strategy is adopted (e.g. a bang-
bang approach) until error is reduced to within a tolerable level, and the adjustment to
steady-state tracking phase in which errors are further reduced and a new steady state
operating point is achieved [101].
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6.1.1 Jumping “In the Loop”
Recently, research attention has been directed to problems where the operator of a highly
automated system has to suddenly “jump in the loop” and assume control [100, 102].
This phenomenon of degraded operator performance in the transient phase between two
modes of control has been evident in numerous applications, not just within aeronautics
[43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 103, 104]. This loss of operator performance has principally been
linked to poor situational awareness, a symptom of diﬃculties in vigilance and complacency
which reduce an operator’s performance in error detection and mitigation within various
applications of automation [23, 93, 105, 106]. This phenomenon was observed in some of
the case studies (see Chapter 4).
6.2 Modes, Multi-modal Systems, and Adaptive Automation
The promises of improved performance and eﬃciencies in modern automation systems have
had mixed results: operators must learn to interact with many of automation modes [93].
This has given rise to such problems as automation surprise [11], operator complacency
[106], and skill degradation [93]. Additionally, multi-modal systems inherently demand the
operator to be dynamically operating in and between modes, as is currently required in
modern commercial aircraft [1] and multi-process control applications [107]. Some work
has been directed at using display design in mitigating this issue [108, 109].
In the study of human-computer task allocation, a general distinction is made between Su-
pervisory Control (human principally monitors and performs high level control functions)
and Manual Control, with finer distinctions being described with Levels of Automation
[14, 110]. These concepts have since been expanded and investigated [12], with one study
showing that a mode transition between LOA (see Table 6.1) in an expert system had
a significant eﬀect on both transient performance as well as time-to-recovery: batch pro-
cessing (level 3) and automated decision making (level 8) showed reduced performance
during cases with mode switches in comparison to a cases without. Additionally, it was
determined that batch processing (level 3) and automated decision making (level 8) had a
significantly greater recovery time than manual control (level 1) and action support (level
2) [15, 111].
With improved computer capabilities and the widespread introduction of fly-by-wire sys-
tems [112], the scope of what is considered as Manual Control has expanded. It no longer is
restricted to strictly mechanical systems, but encompasses dynamically augmented systems
as well [49]. Augmented vehicle manual control modes such as Rate-Control-Attitude-Hold
(RCAH) [71] are examples of modes which normally make the vehicle much easier for the
human pilot to fly. Augmented vehicles can still have multiple control modes, ranging from
relatively simple manual to a high level of supervisory control [113]); still, the problem of
54
Table 6.1: Endsley’s Levels of Automation [15]
Level Title Description
1 Manual Control (MC)
The human performs all tasks including monitoring the state of the system, generating
performance options, selecting the option to perform (decision making) and physically
implementing it.
2 Action Support (AS)
At this level, the system assists the operator with performance of selected action, although
some human control actions are required.
3 Batch Processing (BP)
Although the human generates and selects the options to be performed, they then are
turned over to the system to be carried out automatically.
4 Shared Control (SHC)
Both the human and the computer generated possible decision options. The human still
retains full control over the selection of which option to implement; however, carrying out
the actions is shared between the human and the system.
5 Decision Support (DS)
The computer generates a list of decision options that the human can select from or the
operator may generate his or her own options. Once the human has selected an option, it
is turned over to the computer to implement.
6
Blended Decision
Making (BDM)
At this level, the computer generates a list of decision options that it selects from and
carries out if the human consents. The human may approve of the computer’s selected
option or select one form among those generated by the computer or the operator. The
computer will then carry out the selected action.
7 Rigid System (RS)
This level is representative of a system that presents only a limited set of actions to the
operator. The operator’s role is to select from among this set. He or she may not generate
any other options.
8
Automated Decision
Making (ADM)
At this level, the system selects the best option to implement and carry out that action,
based upon a list of alternatives it generates (augmented by alternatives suggested by the
human operator).
9
Supervisory Control
(SC)
At this level the system generates options, selects the option to implement, and carries
out that action. The human mainly monitors the system and intervenes if necessary.
Intervention places the human in the role of making a diﬀerent option selection, thus
eﬀectively shifting to decision support LOA.
10 Full Automation (FA) At this level, the system carries out all actions.
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mode navigation exists as more modes are introduced, a problem that some have suggested
might be mitigated through adaptive automation [109]. Recently, Sheridan [113] consid-
ered the distinctions between “adaptive automation”, “adaptive control”, and “supervisory
control”. Adaptive automation describes systems where the allocation of the primary con-
trol task to either human or computer changes with time to accommodate changes in
environment or operational requirements. “Adaptive control” describes systems where the
automation control laws change independent of the human role to accommodate changes
in plant dynamics. “Supervisory control” describes cases where the human delegates lower
control levels to automation. Issues in adaptive automation and time varying levels of
supervisory control have been considered (e.g. [114, 115, 116, 117]), but many questions
are unresolved so this area remains an important one for research.
6.3 Measurement of Gracefulness in Transitions
The following characteristics were distinguished when defining a graceful transition: the
operator’s maintenance of situational awareness, maintenance of control in system perfor-
mance, and the reasonable workload levels; all maintenance must be accomplished in such a
way that workload does not excessively increase or decrease. When considering situational
awareness or workload, one can distinguish between subjective measurements (operator
perceptions) and objective measurements (physical quantities that can be measured as
surrogates). Such distinctions are not unheard of: measurement strategies of situational
awareness focus on both a subjective (SART) and objective (SAGAT), as does workload
measurement (side-task measurement vs. SWAT or NASA-TLX methods [118, 119]).
6.3.1 Situational Awareness
Situational awareness quantifies a human’s understanding of his or her current situation
objectively (or subjectively) described and is generally classified in three levels [22]:
1. Perception - awareness of the presence of a piece of information
2. Comprehension - understanding of information (by itself and in context of other
information)
3. Projection - extension of information into the future by projecting future system
states
While there have been varying opinions on situational awareness, both in its relevancy and
definition [120, 2], the most widely accepted definition is “the perception of the elements in
the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning
and the project of their status in the near future” [22]. A further distinction may be made to
system awareness which includes such elements as system status, functioning and settings,
fuel, time distance available on fuel, flight modes and automation entries and settings, and
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impact of malfunctions /system degrades and settings on system performance and flight
safety [23].
In measuring situational awareness, two measurement techniques, SAGAT (Situational
Awareness Global Assessment Technique) and SART (Situational Awareness Rating Tech-
nique), are generally used, each providing a particular sensitivity and diagnosticity to the
measurement of situational awareness [121, 24, 122]. The is based on a comprehensive
assessment of operator situational awareness requirements [123] and oﬀers an objective
measurement of situational awareness; however, its implementation is restricted to freezing
during a trial for measurement purposes. The latter is based on the subject’s own opinion
of how aware of the situation they were [124] and was developed in the infancy of situational
awareness concerns within aviation [22, 125]. This is a subjective measure and must accept
the confounding influence of the subject’s comprehension of the relevant information space
of the problem. As such, traditional measurement of situational awareness provides the
experimentalist a diﬃcult trade-oﬀ, as detailed in Table 6.2
Table 6.2: SAGAT and SART: Pros and Cons
SAGAT SART
Pros - Objective measurement and devoid of
subjective confounding
Pros - Easy to implement and can be tailored
to fit application (3-axis or 10-axis implemen-
tation)
Cons - Diﬃcult to implement. Highly intru-
sive and requiring experimental freezes
Cons - Subjective confounding of measure-
ment and diﬃculty in anchoring measure-
ments
6.3.2 Workload
Workload describes the amount of work that a person is required to perfrom over a given
period of time [126]. It can refer to two diﬀerent quantities, both physical and cognitive,
and the human is limited in the amount of workload that they can handle in either case.
The limitations of cognitive workload are less obvious than those of physical workload and
are quite relevant to human-computer design. It is important to understand how much
information a human can handle.
The use of a secondary task, otherwise known as the Additive Factors Method, is a method
of objective workload measurement that infers the remaining supply of operator attention
resources based on response times to a purposefully conflicting secondary task [127, 128].
It has been used in the calculation of mental workload and has enjoyed much success
[129, 130], though criticisms have been made of the specificity with which the the mea-
surement can be used [18]; however, this becomes less of a concern when measuring gross
workload.
Subjective measures of workload include SWAT (Subjective Workload Assessment Tech-
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nique and NASA-TLX (Task Load Index) [118, 119]. The Modified Bedford Scale subjec-
tively measures workload via the operator’s judgement of their spare attention resources
[131]. In order to improve the anchoring and sensitivity of the original Bedford scale, a
Modified Bedford Scale was introduced which used a diﬀerent adjective scaling. Being
developed alongside scales such as the Cooper-Harper handling quality scale, such heritage
is quite evident in the structure of the Modified Bedford Scale [132, 133], which is shown
in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: The Modified Bedford Scale
6.3.3 Performance
The objective measurement of control and performance, a quantity paramount to the suc-
cess of any mission, will be contingent upon the context of the system. An aviation example
might measure such performance using the Mean Square of the Error, referring to the pilot’s
deviation from the guidance targets. Other areas of application would necessarily measure
diﬀerent quantities, such as course tracking in maritime navigation or the accuracy of
reactor core temperature in nuclear process management.
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Chapter 7
Methods
In order to test several hypotheses related to the eﬀects of Control Mode level of automation
and the eﬀect of large state errors on the grace of a transition we had 13 subjects fly the
final stages of 48 simulated lunar landings (24 training runs, 24 experimental runs) in
The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc. (Draper) Fixed-Base Simulator (Figure 7.1).
All subjects gave informed consent in accordance with the MIT Committee on the Use
of Humans as Experimental Subjects (see Appendix M). Runs were terminated before
touchdown. During each run, subjects were instructed to give first priority to nulling
guidance errors shown on the flight director and rate-of-descent indicator, second priority to
responding to the “comm light”, and third priority to providing verbal callouts of altitude,
fuel and hazards. In 24 of the runs (12 training runs, 12 experimental runs) subjects
were forced to null large state errors in the flight director which were introduced by a
computer-determined landing point Redesignation.
Every run began in a fully automatic Control Mode and transitioned mid-run to one of
three diﬀerent manual Control Modes, in which the subject had to actively null the flight
director errors. Each Control Mode operated at a diﬀerent level of automation (depending
on the number of control loops closed by the operator). The gracefulness of transition
to the new Control Mode was measured by how well the subject maintained control and
awareness of the situation without excessive workload or sacrificing system performance.
Maintenance of control was measured by the counting the number of wrong control inputs;
awareness was measured using a system of verbal callouts; workload was measured with
response times to a secondary task and with the Modified Bedford rating scale; perfor-
mance was measured by the flight technical error (mean square error) in the pitch axis
(see Section 7.3 for full details). Subjects were also asked to rank order the gracefulness of
transition for each combination of Control Mode and Redesignation condition – six in all.
We expected that transition to a level of automation requiring a greater number of manual
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control loop closures would be increasingly less graceful, since it would impose a higher
attentional workload, and potentially impair performance and some aspects of situational
awareness not directly related to the loop closures. We also expected that runs without a
Redesignation (low state errors) would be more graceful than runs with a Redesignation
(large state errors).
Figure 7.1: The Draper Fixed-Base Lunar Simulator
7.1 Experimental Apparatus
The Draper Fixed-Base Lunar Simulator used two displays, a Primary Flight Display
(PFD) and a Horizontal Situation Display (HSD). These displays were adapted from a
similar NSBRI Project SA01604. The PFD was presented to the operator on a 16” Dell
LCDmonitor directly in front of the operator and contained information on vehicle attitude,
heading, velocity, altitude, descent rate, fuel remaining, time-to-go, and Control Mode (see
Figure 7.2). Flight director and guidance cues were provided for the roll and pitch axes,
the descent rate, and the desired heading using magenta indicators. In primary flight task,
subjects were instructed to keep the attitude indicator pip centered on the flight director
needles within ±1 degree (less than the width of the attitude indicator pip) and to keep
the descent rate within ±0.5 feet per second of the guidance (tick parks on the Vertical
Speed Indicator are 1 foot per second). Subjects were instructed to disregard the heading
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flight director cue. Subjects also performed a tertiary task, making verbal callouts of the
altitude and fuel levels using the altimeter and the fuel gauge on the PFD. They referred
to the mode annunciator when a mode change occurred to determine the new mode of
operation (see Section 7.1.1).
Figure 7.2: Primary Flight Display
The HSD (shown in Figure 7.3) was presented on a second 16” Dell LCD monitor to the
immediate right of the PFD and showed a 2-D plan view (heading-up) of a map with
marked hazards (red shading) and three predetermined landing points, overlaid on the
lunar surface (see Section 7.1.3). The spacecraft ownship was fixed on the center and the
map translated and rotated according to vehicle motion. Subjects were required to make
verbal callouts using this display when they fully crossed over or exited a hazardous region
as indicated by red shaded areas on the HSD terrain. Response time to the appearance
of the comm light provided a secondary task performance objective measure of operator
workload (see Section 7.3.1). While the comm light was meant to measure secondary task
performance, it also functioned as surrogate for other system tasks an astronaut would be
required to attend to. A full description of the PFD and HSD as was given to subjects
during their training can be found in Appendix H.
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Figure 7.3: Horizontal Situation Display
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Spacecraft states (roll-pitch-yaw angles, horizontal velocities, horizontal position, descent
rate, altitude), guidance-desired values (roll, pitch, yaw, descent rate), and operator inputs
(inceptor roll-pitch-yaw values, comm light button responses) were recorded at 10 Hz. Each
data point was time-stamped with the simulation clock in seconds. The number of correct
verbal callouts (see Section 7.3.2) were recorded by hand from a position sitting to the
left of the subject, where both the PFD and HSD could be seen. Data was processed in
Matlab and included the computation of flight technical error (mean square error in pitch,
actual vs. guidance-desired), comm light response times, and the counting of the number
of wrong inceptor inputs per run.
7.1.1 Dynamics and Control Modes
We used four Control Modes in the experiment: Full Automatic (FA), Single-axis RCAH
(Pitch) with automatic rate-of-decent (SA), Triple-axis RCAH (Roll-Pitch-Yaw) with au-
tomatic rate-of-descent (TA), and Triple-axis RCAH (Roll-Pitch-Yaw) with Incremental
Rate-of-Descent (TA-ROD). In FA modes, the guidance equations provided by Bilimo-
ria [74] and described here closed all feedback loops (roll/pitch/yaw and rate-of-descent);
guidance commands were shown via the flight director needles. All runs began in FA and
then transitioned to either SA, TA, or TA-ROD. SA placed the subject in command of the
rate of pitch while the computer maintained control over roll, yaw (maintained northern
heading), and descent rate. TA placed the subject in complete command of attitude rate
in roll, pitch, and yaw, and the computer in control of descent rate. TA-ROD placed the
subject in complete command of attitude rate in roll, pitch, and yaw, with the addition of
incremental control over rate of descent. TA-ROD is the analog of the P66 control used
in the Apollo LM. We defined the levels of automation of the lander control modes, from
highest to lowest, as FA, SA, TA, and then TA-ROD, based on the number of control loops
the operator had to close manually (0, 1, 2, and 3 respectively.)
A conventional autopilot mode annunciator (Figure 7.4) was provided at the top of the
PFD, and indicated the current operating mode. When operating in FA, all boxes below
PITCH, ROLL, YAW, and DESCENT would read AUTO. When operation in one of the
manual Control Modes, the appropriate boxes would change to reflect the new Control
Mode (e.g. TA-ROD would read RCAH beneath PITCH, ROLL, YAW, and would read
INC beneath DESENT). A auditory beep accompanied any Control Mode transition.
Figure 7.4: The mode annunciator (Mode FA)
The vehicle dynamics and control model was derived from the Altair LDAC-1 Delta vehicle
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parameters [60], and guidance laws were implemented to follow a reference trajectory [74].
In the RCAH control mode, the pilot commands an attitude rate which tilts the thrust vec-
tor and accelerates the vehicle laterally in the direction of the tilt (approximately first order
control to attitude, and therefore third order control to position over the lunar surface).
The commanded attitude rate was linearly proportional to the inceptor displacement with
a maximum of 30 deg/sec in pitch and roll and 20 deg/sec in yaw at full inceptor deflection.
When the pilot zeroed any inceptor deflection, the attitude rate was nulled and the tilt
angle of the vehicle was automatically held constant. The control system was modeled to
have a small (2 millisecond) time delay; the large moment of inertia of the vehicle and the
sizing and placement of the LDAC-1 Delta vehicle reaction control system thrusters lim-
ited the maximum achievable attitude acceleration (control power) to 3.0 deg/sec2 in pitch
and roll and 2.0 deg/sec2 in yaw [60]. This eﬀectively resulted in the characterization of
the innermost control loop as a first order system between inceptor input and commanded
attitude rate, but with a variable lag which is short for small inputs, but can be as much
as approximately five seconds for maximum pitch/roll rate commands. As a result, when
large attitude rates were commanded, this variable lag increased the order of the control
system to approximately fourth order (pilot commands attitude acceleration; fourth order
to position). In addition, the modeled flight control system did not instantaneously achieve
the maximum achievable control power; there was a first-order lag with a time constant
of τ =160 milliseconds to reach the maximum attitude acceleration in each of the control
axes.
The descent engine was assumed to be a fixed-gimbal and had a maximum thrust of 10,000
lbs, with a specific impulse of 300 seconds. Fuel consumption was modeled based on the
thrust output and the specific impulse of the engine. The engine could be throttled between
10% and 60% of maximum thrust, below 10% there was no output and above 60% engine
output was 100% thrust. Total fuel mass budgeted for the experimental profile was 50
slugs. The descent rate was regulated within +/- 1 ft/sec using a proportional feedback
controller with a time constant of τ = 125 milliseconds. To maintain the descent rate
when the vehicle was tilted from the vertical, the thrust was increased proportionally to
the cosine of the tilt angle; larger tilt angles resulted in larger lateral accelerations. The dry
vehicle mass was 493 slugs. Fuel slosh or a changing center of mass with fuel consumption
was not modeled.
The guidance laws [74] were designed to follow a reference trajectory throughout the ex-
perimental scenario, and the resultant guidance cues were presented to the subject (via
a flight director) as errors in pitch, roll, yaw and altitude rate from the desired vehicle
state. The reference trajectory was calculated based on the range to target and the pro-
jected time until arrival at a point 150 ft above the selected landing point. The initial
descent rate (guidance recommended and actual) was -16 ft/sec and decreased linearly to
-3 ft/sec until the vehicle was below 150 ft (as specified by Bilimoria [74]) and within 15
ft horizontal range of the designated landing point. This eﬀectively resulted in the vehicle
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being in a hover at approximately 90 ft altitude until it was within 15 ft of the landing
point. This range criterion was kept regardless of mode, and if subjects descended below
the reference height the computer would command an ascent to return the vehicle to the
reference trajectory. As a result of the tilt of the vehicle from vertical, lateral accelerations
were generated via the automatic control system (FA control mode) or via the pitch/roll
commands (SA, TA, TA-ROD control modes) to null position errors relative to the ref-
erence trajectory in the horizontal plane. In the case where the vehicle was not on the
reference trajectory, recommended pitch/roll and altitude rate were calculated and pre-
sented to the pilot via flight director cues to return to the reference trajectory. The gain
within the altitude rate guidance algorithm was set to Kh = 1/25 [74], whereas it was KV
= 1/1000 for the calculation of the lateral acceleration guidance. These gains, applied to
the diﬀerence between the actual and reference trajectory altitude and lateral velocity af-
fected the calculation of altitude rate and lateral acceleration guidance along the reference
trajectory. The recommended lateral velocity was proportional to the range to the selected
landing point. Knowing the lateral acceleration, mass of the vehicle, and current thrust,
the guidance recommended roll and pitch angles could then be computed (and presented)
to the pilot to return to the reference trajectory.
The pitch and roll attitude guidance components provided the pilot with recommended tilt
of the vehicle to null the position error from the reference trajectory. The flight director
cues were presented as “fly to,” which gave the pilot the direction of the recommended pitch
and roll commands to null the error. These cues were computed as the diﬀerence between
the guidance computed roll/pitch/yaw angles and the corresponding actual values [74], and
would reflect the changing in the selected point during runs that required a landing point
redesignation. The maximum guidance recommended pitch and roll angles were limited
to +/- 45 degrees to limit the eﬀect of large trajectory errors [74]. The subject was not
given explicit feedback on position errors. Yaw guidance displayed the relative heading to
the selected landing point; the subject was not required to null these heading errors during
piloting task (TA or TA-ROD modes). The computer would maintain a northern heading
in FA and SA modes. Altitude rate guidance was generated to maintain the vehicle on the
reference trajectory in the vertical plane, and was presented on the vertical speed indicator
as a recommended altitude rate flight director cue.
7.1.2 Landing Point Redesignation
Three possible landing points, labeled as 1, 2, and 3, were shown on the map in the HSD.
This landing point display was derived from a previous experiment investigating human
decision making in landing point redesignation [134]. The primary landing point was high-
lighted in magenta and surrounded by a box, with the range-to-target (in feet) just above
(see Figure 7.5a). Alternate landing points were displayed in light blue with numbers (see
Figure 7.5b). The landing points were prioritized by the automation system. Subjects were
not allowed to redesignate to a new landing point: only the computer could redesignate.
Preprogrammed Redesignations were used to create large state errors at the time of the
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Control Mode transition in half of the runs. Rejected landing points were indicated by an
“X” placed over the rejected landing point (see Figure 7.5c). All Redesignations were made
directly down range from lander in the direction of travel, and were similar in magnitude
for every Redesignation run. Redesignations occurred simultaneously with the transition
to a manual Control Mode.
(a) Primary (b) Secondary (c) Rejected
Figure 7.5: Landing points
7.1.3 Maps
Eight Map types were used in the simulation, 4 for runs with Redesignations and 4 for
runs without Redesignation. Each Map showed a hazard map overlaid on topographical
map of the lunar surface, as might generated by a system such as the ALHAT [84, 85,
135, 136]. We designed each map so that the lander would cross between hazardous and
non-hazardous regions at approximately the same time, regardless of map, when correctly
following the guidance trajectory. This meant that the hazard callouts (see Section 7.3.2)
would be required at the same time during a run with a Redesignation and a run without
a Redesignation. Because the verbal callouts occurred at the same time, we could consider
Map type as a set of 4 (SW, SE, NE, NW) instead of a set of 8 (SW, SE, NE, NW with
Redesignation and SW, SE, NE, NW without Redesignation). Each Map type is shown
in Figure 7.1.3. The primary landing point always appeared in the center of the hazard
map.
7.2 Experimental Timeline
Subjects were trained prior to the 48 runs with a set of training slides (Appendix L) using
a laptop (MacBook Pro) computer next to the simulator. Each slide was accompanied
by an audio track to supplement and explain the information on the slides. The script
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(a) Map SW (No Redesignation) (b) Map SE (No Redesignation) (c) Map NE (No Redesignation)
(d) Map NW (No Redesigna-
tion)
(e) Map SW (Redesignation) (f) Map SE (Redesignation)
(g) Map NE (Redesignation) (h) Map NW (Redesignation)
Figure 7.6: Experiment Maps. Circle represents point of origin. Arrow represents initial
direction of travel. (SW = Southwest, SE = Southeast, NE = Northeast, NW = Northwest
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of these audio tracks can be found in Appendix H. After completing the training slides
subjects were allowed to take a break before beginning flight familiarization training. In
the familiarization training, subjects reviewed the operation of each Control Mode without
mode transitions or landing point Redesignations in the following order: FA, SA, TA,
TA-ROD. See Appendix H for the familiarization training script. Subjects were allowed
to fly each Control Mode to touchdown until they reported that they felt comfortable.
Subjects were given the option of taking a break before continuing to main body of the
experiment.
Each experiment session consisted of a number of mode familiarization runs, followed by
24 training runs, and finally 24 formal experiment runs. All runs were terminated after the
final verbal callout (either 100 ft or 4% Fuel, depending on subject performance) and were
only analyzed between 0 and 69 seconds (2 seconds following the forced extinguishment
of the last comm light probe). During the first 24 runs subjects were instructed on how
to make the verbal callouts, achieve the correct prioritization of tasks (Priority 1 - flying,
Priority 2 - responding to the comm light, Priority 3 - verbal callouts), and rate their
workload using the Modified Bedford Scale. This interaction was not scripted.
During the experimental trials the second set of 24 runs the interaction between subject
and experimenter was kept to a minimum. All runs began in FA Mode at an altitude of
500 ft above the lunar surface with an initial descent rate of -16 fps, corresponding to the
low gate condition used in Apollo (see Table 5.1). The lander began each approach at an
attitude in opposition to the forward velocity (pitch angle of 19◦ and a roll angle of 19◦),
which is initialized at 15 fps in magnitude towards the center of the map. The descent rate
decreased linearly from -16 fps at 500 ft to -3 fps directly over the landing site, accordingly
to the equations provided by Bilimoria [74]. If the horizontal range to the landing point
was not within 15 ft, the guidance commanded a hover until the range was closed.
The Control Mode transition was made by the computer between 20-25 seconds, a time
which we varied randomly1to prevent operators from precisely predicting the transition.
The operator was alerted to the Control Mode transition with a auditory beep, and was
required to consult the mode annunciator to determine the new Control Mode (see Figure
7.4). Table 7.1 shows the sequence of runs, which was designed to balance the sequence of
run type (Control Mode - Redesignation configurations).
1A time between 20 and 25 seconds was chosen using the Matlab rand() algorithm.
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Table 7.1: Sequence of trials for training and experimental runs
Trial Mode Redesign. Map Trial Mode Redesign. Map
1 SA No SW - No LPR 13 SA No NE - No LPR
2 TA No NE - No LPR 14 TA-ROD No SE - No LPR
3 TA-ROD No NW - No LPR 15 TA No SE - No LPR
4 TA Yes SW - LPR 16 TA-ROD No SW - No LPR
5 SA Yes NW - LPR 17 TA-ROD Yes NW - LPR
6 TA-ROD Yes SW- LPR 18 TA Yes NW - LPR
7 SA No SE - No LPR 19 TA Yes NE - LPR
8 TA-ROD No NW - No LPR 20 SA Yes SE - No LPR
9 SA Yes NW - LPR 21 TA No SW - No LPR
10 TA No NW - No LPR 22 SA Yes SW - LPR
11 TA Yes SE - LPR 23 SA No NW - No LPR
12 TA-ROD Yes SE - LPR 24 TA-ROD Yes NE - LPR
7.3 Measurements
The gracefulness of transition to the new Control Mode was measured by how well the
subject maintained control and awareness of the situation without excessive workload or
sacrificing system performance. The number of pitch and roll control inputs in an inap-
propriate direction and axis was measured, and used as a measure of manual control per-
formance and mode awareness; awareness was measured using a system of verbal callouts;
workload was measured with response times to a secondary task and with the Modified
Bedford rating scale; performance was measured by the flight technical error (mean square
error) in the pitch axis.
7.3.1 Measuring Workload: Response Times & Bedford Ratings
Objective workload was measured using the response time to a “comm light”. This comm
light appeared on the lower right of the HSD (see Figure 7.3). The various states of the
comm light are shown in Figure 7.7. Throughout a run this comm light was illuminated
either blue or green a total of ten times2. The illumination schedule of the comm light is
shown in Table 7.2. The operator responded to the color of the outer circle (the color of
the inner circle stayed constant as a reference) by pressing one of two buttons on the top
of the inceptor, each marked with a corresponding color. If the operator ignored the comm
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light too long, after a few seconds (see Table 7.2) it would automatically extinguish
(a) Inactive (b) Blue (c) Green
Figure 7.7: The comm light
Table 7.2: Comm Light Illumination Schedule
Number Illumination Interval3 Forced Extinguish Time
(#) (sec) (sec)
1 [3,5] 9
2 [9,11] 15
3 [15,17] 21
4 [25,27] 31
5 [31,33] 37
6 [37,39] 43
7 [43,45] 49
8 [49,51] 55
9 [55,57] 61
10 [61,63] 67
Subjective workload was measured using the Modified Bedford Rating Scale. Following a
run, subjects were asked to rate their workload before, during, and after the transition.
During the transition was defined for subjects in training as the period beginning with the
mode transition and ending when the flight director errors were nulled and the subject felt
in control of the spacecraft. After the transition was the period following the during phase
3The default color of the comm light was turquoise in order to reduce the contrast between an illuminated
or extinguished comm light. We used this to increase the sensitivity of the measure after pilot experiments
showed an insensitivity when operators could rely on peripheral vision for this light.
3Color of comm light illumination was assigned randomly using the standard randomization package
provided with MATLAB
70
(see Appendix H). We trained subjects to rate their transitions in this manner throughout
the first 24 trials.
Hypothesis 1
The following was hypothesized regarding workload metrics:
Both subjective and objective workload would spike immediately following
the transition to manual control and then decay to a steady state value.
The magnitude of the spike would be greater in runs with a Redesignation
than in runs without a Redesignation. The magnitude of the spike would
become larger with decreasing level of automation in the Control Mode.
Excessive workload characterizes one aspect of gracefulness: large increases
and variability of the workload over time indicates a less graceful transition
with respect to operator workload.
7.3.2 Measuring Situational Awareness: Verbal Callouts
Subjects were instructed to make certain verbal callouts during each run (21 total: 14
altitude, 4 fuel level, 3 hazard crossings). We used verbal callouts of diﬀerent states because
they were a minimally invasive way of continuously measuring situational awareness, since
pilots already use them to maintain situational awareness. During familiarization and the
first 24 runs subjects were trained in making these callouts, which are shown in Table
7.3. This ordering in Table7.3 is a nominal ordering. If subjects did not perfectly follow
guidance the ordering may be diﬀerent.
Callouts referred to information from each of the displays and were directly relevant to
the task. Approximately 6 of these callouts occurred before the transition (depending
on the randomization of the Control Mode transition time). We measured an operator’s
situational awareness based on percentage of correct callouts a subject made each run
(defined as occurring within 1-2 seconds of the event as determined by the experimenter).
The nature of the callouts occasionally led to a clustering several callouts, which subjects
had to quickly attend to. In these cases we recognized that not all of the callouts could
be made within the space of 1-2 seconds, and so callouts in these clusters were aﬀorded a
certain amount of leniency: a series callouts with no pauses were counted as having been
made correctly. A single experimenter conducted all experiments to reduce the uncertainty
in judging correct callouts, which were recorded by hand during each run.
Hypothesis 2
The following was hypothesized regarding situational awareness metrics:
Situational awareness would follow the inverse trend of workload: awareness
would drop immediately following the transition to manual control and
would gradually return to a steady state value. The magnitude of the drop
would be greater in runs with Redesignation and less in runs without a
Redesignation. The magnitude of the drop would reduce with increasing
level of automation in the Control Mode. Large drops and variability over
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Table 7.3: Situational awareness (verbal) callouts
Altitude Fuel Hazard Crossing
450 ft
400 ft
350 ft
300 ft 7% Fuel Cross to non-hazard
250 ft
225 ft
200 ft 6% Fuel Cross to hazard
175 ft
150 ft Cross to non-hazard
140 ft 5% Fuel
130 ft
120 ft
110 ft 4% Fuel
100 ft
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time are characteristic of an ungraceful transition: a graceful transition
requires the maintenance of situational awareness.
7.3.3 Measuring Performance: Flight Technical Error
We chose the mean square error (MSE) between the actual pitch angle and the guidance
(flight director) pitch angle following the transition to manual control as a measure of
human-system performance because it was an axis controlled by the operator in each
Mode and allowed for direct comparison. In order to allow for comparison between runs
with and with a Redesignation, we measured the error due to a Redesignation in FA
Mode (no transition) separate from experimentation. A total of 4 runs were made (1 in
each Redesignation Map), and these errors were averaged (there was variability introduced
based on the time of redesignation. We subtracted this average from all runs with a
Redesignation present. We considered increased MSE as a less graceful transition in the
performance metric.
Hypothesis 3
The following was hypothesized regarding performance metrics:
The presence of a Redesignation and decreased level of automation in the
Control Mode (SA < TA < TA-ROD) would negatively aﬀect the perfor-
mance. A reduction in performance characterizes an attribute of ungraceful
transition: a graceful transition requires that performance be maintained.
7.3.4 Measuring Control: Number of Wrong Inputs
We counted the number of wrong inceptor inputs for each run, which served to measure
the appropriateness of control action. A wrong inceptor input was defined as any inceptor
movement opposite the direction required for nulling the flight director errors. Any inputs
into the roll axis when the operator was not controlling this axis were also counted as wrong
inputs. Yaw and descent rate inputs were not considered in this measurement.
Hypothesis 4
The following was hypothesized regarding the number of wrong inceptor inputs:
The number of wrong inputs would be greater in runs with Redesignation
and less in runs without Redesignations. The number of wrong inputs
would also reduce with increasing level of automation in the Control Mode.
Large numbers of wrong inputs suggest poor quality of control and describe
another aspect of an ungraceful transition: a graceful transition maintains
control of the system.
7.3.5 Operator Rankings of Gracefulness
Following all 48 trials, subjects were asked to rank the transitions which they experi-
enced (SA, No Redesignation; TA, No Redesignation; TA-ROD, No-Redesignation; SA-
Redesignation, TA-Redesignation, TA-ROD-Redesignation) based on the definition of grace-
ful transition as provided earlier in this thesis.
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Hypothesis 5
The following was hypothesized regarding the pilot rankings of gracefulness:
Ratings would correspond to the level of automation in the Control Modes,
with an oﬀset based on the presences of a Redesignation. This will serve
to validation for a subjective measure of gracefulness.
7.3.6 Data Analysis
All analysis was performed with SYSTAT 13.0 (Systat Software Inc.). The analysis con-
sidered only the second set of 24 runs for each subject. Runs in which the subject crashed
were omitted from analysis. A crash was defined as any contact with the ground occurring
during the run (a nominal would have been terminated before landing). Runs with excep-
tionally large and erroneous control inputs due to fatigue were also omitted from analysis.
If the experimentalist saw such an error, he asked the subject if they felt the input was due
to fatigue. If fatigue was the cause subjects were given a quick break and then allowed to
continue. In total, only 5 runs were omitted from analysis, due to fatigue or a crash.
Since many measures were non normally distributed or were inherently ranked data, we
utilized nonparametric methods, particularly the Friedman Two-Way ANOVA for ranked
data (Systat NPAR FRIEDMAN) to test the null hypothesis that our variables came from
the same population. Systats Friedman analysis furnished p values, the Friedman Test
Statistic, and multiple comparison test tables.
We calculated the average mean square deviation (MSE) in each Redesignation - Control
Mode combination for each subject over the various replications of that combination. The
average mean square deviation found in the FA Control Mode was measured in the non-
Redesignation and Redesignation runs and subtracted from the corresponding measures in
the manually controlled runs to estimate the MSE due to manual control alone. We used
a Friedman analysis to test the diﬀerence in MSE before and after the transition, as well
as the eﬀects of Redesignation and Control Mode on the MSE after the transition.
We calculated the average response time for each comm light probe for each Map type
and for each combination of Redesignation and Control Mode. Since the comm light
probes are spaced in time, the analysis of their response times allows us to take time-
profiles of responses under the fixed conditions of Redesignation and Control Mode, for six
diﬀerent combinations of those – a separate combination for each run of 69 seconds. Each
combination is applied 4 times over the course of the experiment making, in all, 24 runs of
6 diﬀerent types, each replicated 4 times.
We applied a Friedman analysis to see if subjects agreed on which probes were most
challenging (gave highest response times.) The same test was applied to responses under
Redesignation to see if subjects preferred one to the other condition, to Control Mode, and
to workload ratings and situational awareness callouts at various fixed times within a run.
These within-subject comparisons using the Friedman test allow us to use each subject as
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his/her own control.
Subjects occasionally did not perform the actions assigned to the portion of the experiment
they were supposed to be performing. If they were assigned to perform single-axis control
(Control Mode SA) they sometimes applied control in the roll axis (appropriate for Control
Modes TA or TA-ROD). These were treated as errors of wrong input and the number of
wrong inputs measures the maintenance of control. Those too were analyzed by Friedman
test to see if subjects agreed on when their situational awareness was greatest and least,
as measured against their own performances over other runs.
7.4 Subject Demographics
We recruited 13 subjects (10 males, 3 females) from the MIT/Draper community. All
subjects gave informed consent in accordance with the MIT Committee on the Use of
Humans as Experimental Subjects (see Appendix M). Their average age was 26.2±3.4
years The average age among female subjects was 25.7±3.8 years, among male subjects was
26.3±3.7 years. All subjects had flight simulator experience (Microsoft Flight Simulator
or comparable). Four subjects (all male) having had actual flight experience; one was a
licensed pilot.
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Chapter 8
Results
8.1 Objective Workload
We found no eﬀect of Map type. There was, however, a significant eﬀect (Friedman statistic
= 82.291, df = 9, p = 0.0005) of probe sequence number over all probes. This suggests
that subjects generally agreed on which probe instances were most and least demanding.
A Friedman analysis found a significant eﬀect of probe order on average response time
over probes 4-10 (Friedman statistic = 14.11, df = 6 , p = 0.028). This means again,
only that the subjects agreed on which probe positions were most challenging. Those
were not consistently early or late in sequence, but the subjects’ responses to the probes
were concordant as measured by the Friedman test. As anticipated, Friedman pairwise
comparisons showed that response times in probes 1-3 were significantly lower than in
probes 4-10 (see Tables A.2 and A.3). This shows that the mode transition significantly
increased the response times, our objective measure of workload.
We expected a spike in comm light response time after the transition to manual control
which occurred just before probe 4 as an indication of increased workload. The size of
that spike was expected to vary with Control Mode and Redesignation condition starting
with probe 4 because those were expected to impose diﬀerent workloads. Subjects only
marginally agreed on the diﬃculty of runs with a Redesignation compared to those without
a Redesignation in probe 4 (Friedman Statistic = 3.769, df = 1, p = 0.052) and probe 7
(Friedman Statistic, = 3.769, df = 1, p = 0.052). Figure 8.1 shows that response times
increased after the transition, but additionally changing the landing point did not produce
an additional large reliable change in workload lasting many seconds. A redesignation
eﬀect was expected, and may well exist, but it may have been obscured by the variability
in our data.
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Figure 8.1: Eﬀects of Redesignation on the average comm light response time (n = 13).
Errors shown are the standard error of the mean.)
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The subjects did not agree, however, as to the ranking of diﬃculty of Control Modes until
after probe 4: the Friedman test on the average comm light response times in probe 4
did not give a significant result, but in in probe 5 it gave a marginally-significant result
(Friedman statistic = 5.69, p=0.058, df=2). This suggests that in the interim the subjects’
responses coalesced to the point where they agreed on the eﬀects of the transition to
manual control on their workload as by measured by their consistent rankings of comm
light response times across Control Modes. The overall eﬀect of Control Mode can be seen
in Figure 8.2.
Figure 8.2: Eﬀects of Control Mode on the average comm light response time (n = 13).
Errors shown are the standard error of the mean. (SA = Single-axis RCAH in pitch, TA
= Triple-axis RCAH, TA-ROD = Triple-axis RCAH with incremental rate-of-descent.)
Although Control Mode showed a large eﬀect on secondary task response time (Figure
8.2), because the curves were essentially parallel in time after Probe 5 suggests that if an
interaction between control mode and probe number exists, such that workload remains
high for TA-ROD, but diminishes for TA and SA modes, the eﬀect must be small, or
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masked by the variability in the data. The Friedman test on the average response time
across probes 4-7 showed that Redesignation had no eﬀect. The full analysis is shown, for
this and the other analyses, in Table A.4-A.7.
8.2 Subjective Workload
Analysis showed no significant eﬀect of Map type in any phase. We expected to see a spike
in the subjective workload similar to the one observed in the comm light response times.
Modified Bedford workload scores, when ranked, were completely consistent for all subjects
for every combination of Mode and Redesignation. They ranked “Before” lowest, then,
“After” and “During” Workload as highest. Not surprisingly, this ranking was significant
(Kendall Concordance=1, Friedman statistic =14, df=2, p = 0.001). Redesignation had no
significant eﬀect on the average workload rating in “Before” or in the “After” phase. The
subjective workload did vary with Redesignation in the ‘During” phase (Friedman statistic
= 8.333, df = 1, p = 0.004), as shown in Figure 8.3.
Subjects agreed on the ranking of the eﬀects of Control Mode as measured by the average
workload rating within the “During” phase (Friedman statistic = 26.000, df = 2, p =
0.0005) and the “After” (Friedman statistic = 23.804, p = 0.0005, df = 2); however, the
eﬀect of Control Mode was not significant in the “Before” phase. All pair-wise comparisons
were significant (p = 0.0005) and rankings can be seen in Figure 8.4.
8.3 Verbal Callouts
A Friedman test found no significant eﬀect of Map type on the percent of correct callouts
made in a run. We expected a drop in the average percent of correct callouts made
following the transition into a manual Control Mode, as shown in Figure 8.5. Subjects
were concordant on the average percent of correct callouts (Friedman statistic = 177.635,
df = 20, p = 0.0005) over all 21 callouts (rankings shown in Table A.8), and pairwise
comparisons showed that 4 of the 6 callouts before the mode transition callouts (450 ft,
400 ft, 350 ft, 300 ft) had significantly higher percentages than those callouts after the
transition (e.g. 300 ft pairwise comparisons are shown in Table A.9). All 6 callouts before
the mode transition (450 ft, 400 ft, 350 ft, 300 ft, Hazard 1, 7% Fuel) had significantly
higher percentages than callouts occurring after the transition and before the 120 ft callout
(250 ft, 225 ft, 200 ft, Hazard 2, 6% Fuel, 175 ft, 150 ft, Hazard 3, 140 ft, 5% Fuel, 130 ft).
This shows that the mode transition significantly reduced the percentage of verbal callouts
which occurred afterwards. As will be shown later, the situational awareness measures
follow the same pattern as the workload measures (when inverted).
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Figure 8.3: Eﬀects of Redesignation on the average Modified Bedford workload ratings (n
= 13 Subjects). Errors shown are the standard error of the mean.
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Figure 8.4: Eﬀects of Control Mode on the average Modified Bedford workload ratings,
within phases (n = 13). Errors shown are the standard error of the mean. (SA = Single-axis
RCAH in pitch, TA = Triple-axis RCAH, TA-ROD = Triple-axis RCAH with incremental
rate-of-descent.)
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Figure 8.5: Average percent of correct callouts made against altitude (time), fuel level, and
the appearance of hazards (n = 13). Errors shown are the standard error of the mean.
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Figure 8.6 shows the eﬀects of Redesignation on the percent number of callouts made. As
shown in Table A.10, Friedman test results showed that subjects agreed on the rank eﬀect
of Redesignation at the 250, 225 and 200 foot altitudes immediately after the redesignation,
and pairwise comparisons of percent correct showed that the percentage correct at 250 feet
was significantly diﬀerent than at 225 or 200 feet (see Table A.11).
Figure 8.6: The eﬀect of Redesignation on the average percent of correct callouts made (n
= 13). Errors shown are the standard deviation of the mean.
We expected a transient returning to a steady state level of situational awareness and that
it would be a function of both Control Mode and Redesignation. The relative ranks of
the three Control Modes on the average percent of correct callouts were compared (over
the 13 subjects) at 20 points and found concordant at 9 of the 15 by Friedman test, as
shown in Tables A.12 - A.15. Figure 8.7 shows the eﬀect of Control Mode on average
percent of correct callouts. That the curves are approximately parallel shows that the
eﬀect of each Control Mode is consistent following the transition and does not change with
time – the vertical heights between the curves is roughly consistent across time. The most
striking feature of the verbal callouts is the seemingly periodic sequence of dips following
the transition. Of those dips, four of the five are fuel level callouts and are most likely due
to the diﬃculty subjects had in scanning that display element.
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Figure 8.7: Eﬀect of mode on the average percent of correct callouts made (n = 13). (SA =
Single-axis RCAH in pitch, TA = Triple-axis RCAH, TA-ROD = Triple-axis RCAH with
incremental rate-of-descent.)
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8.4 Performance
We calculated the average mean square deviation (MSE) in each Redesignation - Control
Mode combination for each subject over the various replications of that combination. The
average mean square deviation found in the FA Control Mode was found to be 82.0±6.6
deg2 in Redesignation runs. Those estimates were subtracted from the corresponding
measures in the manually controlled runs to estimate the MSE due to manual control
alone. With these corrections we found that the MSE was greater after the transition than
before (Friedman statistic = 13.000, df = 1, p = 0.0005).
The MSE values were larger in runs with a Redesignation than in runs without in the
“After” phase (Friedman statistic = 13.000, df = 1, p = 0.0005), shown in Figure 8.8. The
values of MSE increased consistently from SA to TA to TA-ROD (Figure 8.9) when there
was no Redesignation (Friedman statistic = 7.385, df = 2, p = 0.025), but not consistently
in runs in which there was a Redesignation (Friedman statistic = 7.769, df = 2, p =
0.092). The lack of a significant result could be due to the increased variance in runs with
Redesignations (F(12,12) = 0.028, p = 0.0005). This was an unexpected result and made
it more diﬃcult to clearly establish the eﬀects of Control Mode for the Redesignation runs.
We would expect a larger sample size to show a significant eﬀect of Control Mode on MSE
in Pitch for both Redesignation conditions.
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Figure 8.8: The eﬀect of Redesignation on the Average MSE in Pitch. Errors shown are
the standard error of the means.
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Figure 8.9: The eﬀects of Control Mode on the Average MSE in Pitch. (SA = single-axis
pitch RCAH, TA = triple-axis RCAH, TA-ROD = triple-axis with incremental rate of
descent). Errors shown is the standard error of the mean.
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8.5 Number of Wrong Inputs
There was no significant eﬀect of Map type on the average number of wrong inputs by
Friedman test. Subjects showed concordant eﬀects of Redesignation on the average number
of wrong inputs (Friedman statistic = 9.308, p = 0.002, df = 1). These eﬀects and ranks
are shown in Figure 8.10. No eﬀect of Control Mode was seen by Friedman test.
Figure 8.10: Eﬀects of Redesignation on average number of wrong inputs (n = 13). Errors
shown are the standard error of the mean.
89
8.6 Rankings of Gracefulness
Table 8.1 shows the rankings of gracefulness provided by subjects following the experiment.
All subjects agreed that the gracefulness decreased from SA to TA to TA-ROD separately
in each Redesignation category. As Table 8.1 and Figure 8.11 show, however, they did not
agree perfectly on the full ranking of the six Redesignation - Control Mode configurations:
an overlap existed between runs in SA Mode with a Redesignation and those in TA-
ROD Mode without a Redesignation. The Friedman test on those six configurations was
significant (Freidman statistic = 54.429, df = 5, p = 0.0005) and results are shown in
Tables A.16 and A.17. Subject 4 gave equivalent ratings instead of singular rankings and
was removed from this analysis.
Table 8.1: Subject rankings of gracefulness
Subject
No Redesignation Redesignation
SA TA TA-ROD SA TA TA-ROD
Subject 0 1 2 5 3 4 6
Subject 1 1 3 5 2 4 6
Subject 2 1 3 5 2 4 6
Subject 3 1 2 4 3 5 6
Subject 4 - - - - - -
Subject 5 1 2 3 4 5 6
Subject 6 1 2 5 3 4 6
Subject 7 1 2 5 3 4 6
Subject 8 1 2 3 4 5 6
Subject 9 1 2 3 4 5 6
Subject 10 1 2 4 3 5 6
Subject 11 1 3 5 2 4 6
Subject 12 1 2 4 3 5 6
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Figure 8.11: Subject rankings of gracefulness
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Chapter 9
Discussion
9.1 Workload & Situational Awareness
The response time to the secondary task (comm light) is an indicator of how much spare
attention a subject had at particular points throughout a run. The comm light task was
not just a simple response: it required both attention for visual scanning and attention for
information processing and decision making (decide between 2 colors) and was, therefore,
a very sensitive measurement of spare attention. Spare attention is assumed inversely
related to workload (low spare attention = high workload), so these response times can
be interpreted to indicate progression of workload over time. Additionally, the Modified
Bedford ratings provide the subjects’ estimates of their spare attention at three points of
interest (before, during, and after the transition) during the runs. Both measures of spare
attention were concordant in the trends that they observed, which increases the construct
validity of separating a run into 3 phases for the subjective workload (before, during, and
after).
Similarly, the verbal callouts (tertiary task) expressed how often a subject was aware of
certain information relevant to the task for similar run types. The percentage of correct
verbal callouts made was interpreted as an indicator of situational awareness. Verbal
callouts such as these are often used by pilots in everyday operations, so the added workload
of verbalizing the information represented by the callouts was considered minimal. This
method of measuring situational awareness provides a unique way of measuring temporal
changes in tertiary task situational awareness that is not available to methods like SART
or SAGAT.
Verbal callouts do not provide the same resolution into the quality of the operator’s situ-
ational awareness as SART or SAGAT: the information space of what is considered “situ-
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ationally aware” is restricted. In this experiment, subjects could not be probed regarding
any aspect of the situation: they had to be trained as to what pieces of information they
would be expected to know. While this doesn’t provide a complete measure of overall
situational awareness, it does provide a great deal of information about the components
of situational awareness that are lost when workload increases due to mode changes or a
landing point redesignation. Subjects were trained to make nulling the guidance errors
their first priority. Had they been asked questions about guidance errors, they probably
would have scored very highly on that component of situational awareness. Typically when
workload is increased, attention tunnels onto the primary task, and situational awareness
as well as performance on secondary tasks decreases. Additionally, subjects were instructed
to only make the callout when they observed the state that they were calling out. This
made it unlikely that the subjects were unconsciously making callouts in a preprogrammed
fashion. Foreknowledge of the callouts, at best, served to inflate the measure of situational
awareness; not invalidate it (e.g. subjects could be expecting a callout, but they still needed
to make it correctly).
In this experiment, the scope of the verbal callouts was limited to altitude, fuel level, and
hazards because these occurred at approximately the same time in each run. This resulted
in certain callouts being clustered into short time periods. However, any clustering eﬀecting
would have reduced the average percentage in each callout, and this was not observed.
The most striking feature in the callout data is the oscillatory nature that is observed
following the transition. The first low point after the transition occurred at 225 ft, and
this is taken as an indication of the increased workload due to the transition: subjects were
observed as being preoccupied with determining the new Control Mode and responding
to any observed guidance errors. Every other low point, including the one preceding the
transition, was a fuel callout. These low percentages should not be taken to mean that sub-
jects were completely negligent of the fuel callouts (subjects often made fuel callouts late),
but rather that the fuel display was in a location that subjects did not scan as frequently.
This result shows not only the sensitivity of these callouts in measuring situational aware-
ness, but also shows the utility of its application in the design and evaluation of displays.
Consistent low points indicate an inadequate scan frequency.
This continuous measurement technique provided by the verbal callouts presents a very
practical way of understanding situational awareness. The SAGAT and SART both provide
task-encompassing measures that dont easily give information on precisely when a subject
is situationally aware or unaware. This experiment shows that situational awareness varies
significantly with time (on the order of seconds) in these of a mode transition. Understand-
ing the time-sequence of situational awareness can provide designers with an understanding
of when operators are aware of something, and not just what they are aware of. A analysis
using both verbal callouts and a measurement like SAGAT or SART would be provided
with a complete picture of situational awareness: time-dependency and content.
94
Subjects were instructed to prioritize tasks in the following manner: (1) flight performance,
(2) comm light, (3) verbal callouts. Reports from the subjects and the data suggest that
this prioritization was achieved. Throughout training, subjects were reminded to correctly
prioritize these tasks; all subjects reported that they felt they were correctly prioritizing
by the end of the training runs. Additionally, the dropping of the fuel callout and not
comm light response times provides additional evidence that subjects were prioritizing
correctly.
It is likely that this experiment underestimates the eﬀect that would be seen in an actual
landing: in a real-world application the operator the operator would also have to designate
a new landing location. Additionally, most landing redesignations will not be conveniently
downrange of the craft. These would both be expected to increase the eﬀect of a Re-
designation, and so any direct application of this research to should take the eﬀects of
Redesignation seriously.
Objective workload data did show a large increase in workload at the time of the transition;
however, it failed to show any significant recession in the period following the transition.
Redesignation showed no eﬀect immediately after the transition in the objective workload
data. However, the subjective workload data did significantly show these eﬀects (both of
the mode transition and Redesignation) and the objective workload data displays trends
which – though not statistically significant – resemble the same behavior. The inability to
show such a recession was most likely hampered by the variance seen in the data. Situa-
tional awareness also showed significance: percent of correct callouts dropped immediately
after the transition and then increased as a function of both landing point Redesignation
(directly after the transition) and Control Mode. The apparent recession in workload might
be related to the situational awareness recovery time; however, such an explanation is con-
tingent upon the observation of a significant recession. This behavior was not observed
due to variance of the data. Further experiments should investigate the existence of this
phenomenon.
Time dependencies and intrinsic interdependencies of workload and tertiary task situation
awareness has other interesting consequences for system design. It is possible that workload
might become so high during the transient, or situational awareness so low, that operators
find themselves constantly trying to catch up with the system and are never able to reach
the steady state. Additionally, these spikes in the responses immediately after the transition
should be considered when determining how much an operator should be responsible for
during this time period: operators are overworked and uniformed immediately following
the transition. Any input choices that need to be made at this time should be easy
for the operator to determine and implement. Using a mode preview display or a trend
display might help operators to prepare for the loss of situational awareness that they will
experience during a transition. Additionally, the use of command displays which would
indicate the direction of correct input could help mitigate the lack of situational awareness
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in the initial stages of transition.
These trends in workload and situational awareness data both support the predictions of
Hypotheses 1 and 2. The eﬀects of Control Mode level of automation are particularly
consistent with the previous research in manual control and handling qualities discussed
in Chapter 6. Further, the reduction in situational awareness measures the shows the
time-progression of the out-of-the-loop eﬀect on situational awareness as described in the
literature [23, 93, 105, 106].
9.2 Performance & Wrong Inputs
Analysis showed that the average MSE in pitch was increased by the presence of a Redes-
ignation. The level of automation in the Control Mode significantly aﬀected the average
MSE in pitch in runs without Redesignation: Mode SA had the least error and TA-ROD
had the highest. Notably, there was no significant diﬀerence in MSE between SA Mode
and TA Mode. This result is consistent with previous work considering single- and two-
axis control tasks [96]; however, the diﬀerence recorded between SA Mode and TA-ROD
Mode showed that there is a limit to the number of control axes which can be taken on
in a mode transition before performance suﬀers. Runs with a Redesignation were only
marginally aﬀected by the level of automation in the Control Mode, which suggests an
interaction between Redesignation and Control Mode. These findings support Hypothesis
3: the performance attribute of a gracefulness in a transition was reduced in runs with a
Redesignation and in Control Modes of a lower level of automation. In consideration of
their eﬀect on gracefulness, the increased level of automation in the Control Mode (fewer
control loops closed by the operator) led to a more graceful transition; the presence of a
Redesignation also resulted in less graceful transition. These findings are also consistent
with, and expand, the research of Kaber and Endsley investigating the eﬀects of switching
levels of automation on performance [23, 111].
The number of wrong control inputs also provide a measure of the operator’s maintenance
of control, as well as a gross estimate of situational awareness as it related directly to the
flying task. The eﬀect of a Redesignation on the number of wrong inputs was correlated
with the drop in situational awareness (verbal callouts) immediately after the transition.
The increased number of wrong inputs in runs with a Redesignation also correlates with the
increased variance of the MSE in pitch compared to runs without a Redesignation. These
measures together show that the certainty and accuracy of the subjects’ control strategy
was reduced in Redesignation runs. Trends of the number of wrong control inputs with
Control Mode seem to be present; however, these were not conclusively proven due to a
high variability in the data.
The trends of increased flight technical error following the transition and increased number
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of wrong inputs support Hypothesis 4 and should be considered when designing automa-
tion systems for graceful transitions: when transitioning into a more diﬃcult mode certain
fail-safes and command guidance features should be in place to help reduce the number of
wrong inputs that an operator is prone to. For example, the use of a command display
might reduce the uncertainty in the correct control input following a transition and im-
prove gracefulness; however, command displays do increase issues related to automation
trust. While the subject has a clear idea of what the automation thinks they ought to do,
the question of how much this suggestion should be trusted, particularly in cases where
transitions occur for failure mitigation. Further, increasing the level of automation of the
manual mode that the operator is required to transition into would be advisable. An ex-
ample would be to give preference manual modes with fewer control loops before requiring
a transition to full manual; however, this should be done with caution. Such modes, by
design, limit the pilot’s input and could keep them from a novel control solution unforeseen
by the automation.
9.3 Graceful Transitions
Subjects rankings corresponded directly with the level of automation in the Control Mode
and were oﬀset by Redesignation. Every subject reported SA as the most graceful Control
Mode transition to, and TA-ROD as the least within Redesignation and non-Redesignation
runs. This is shown by the overlapping eﬀect shown in Figure 8.11: subjects did not agree
on any ranking diﬀerence between non-Redesignation runs in TA-ROD and Redesignation
runs in SA. This confirms the predictions of Hypothesis 5 and suggests that our definition
of graceful transition provides a basis for the measurement of the gracefulness in transi-
tion.
In total, the results show that graceful transitions are more likely in cases where the
Control Mode is at a higher level of automation. The eﬀect of Mode shows that the
workload attribute in a graceful transition is contingent upon the Control Mode. This
result suggests that designers need to give careful consideration to what levels of automation
they will be switching between: certain mode switches will be more prone to ungraceful
transitions with respect to operator workload. Systems which operate at the extremes of
the levels of automation violate this important design principle and are particularly prone
to ungraceful transitions. Furthermore, workload is an extremely important quantity to
operators: systems that transition gracefully will be preferred over those that do not.
The interactions of each of these measures is important when considering gracefulness.
The quantities are naturally linked and the experimental data shows this. Workload in-
creased when situational awareness was low, describing an operator who was attempting
to either regain their awareness of the situation or was simply unaware because they were
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overworked. Performance dropped in cases of low situational awareness. Large numbers of
wrong inputs described a poor quality of control and were consistent with low situational
awareness. In essence, each of these measures are linked, and gracefulness describes their
equilibrium. When a mode transition takes place, this equilibrium is disturbed and the op-
erator must attempt to find their new operating point: systems which transition gracefully
aid in this process.
The results of the experiment suggest that the system designer is in a key position to aid in
the grace of a transition: levels of automation have a direct correspondence to how well a
system will transition gracefully. If the mode to which operators are required to transition
has a high level of automation the transition will most likely be graceful. It is important
to note that these levels of automation refer specifically to levels within a manual control
task; the results of this experiment cannot be generalized to transitions between purely
supervisory tasks.
9.4 Limitations
The largest limitation of this experiment is its neglect of automation surprise. The case
studies showed that this phenomenon is closely linked to the gracefulness of a mode tran-
sition; however, consistently replicating this phenomenon in an experimental setting is
extremely diﬃcult. Mode confusion may have existed in instances when operators mistook
TA-ROD for TA; still, this phenomena could not be easily induced and its occurrence was
too infrequent to measure. Hence, this experiment was intentionally limited to measuring
the gracefulness of transitions in which subjects were fully trained and had recent experi-
ence with the Control Modes. Subjects also were aware of the approximate time that the
transition would take place and could be certain that the transition would take place.
The second major limitation of this experiment was the length of the runs. In order
to save time in the experiment, runs were cut short after the final callout. In many runs,
particularly in those with a Redesignation and/or a lower level of automation in the Control
Mode (e.g. TA-ROD), a steady state value was not reached for any of the measures, which
did not allow for the definition of transition length.
In some of the trajectories being flown, subjects were actually flying backwards at the
beginning of the run. This was by design to force subjects to operator the control stick in
all four directions (forward, back, left, right) over the course of the 24 experimental runs.
Similarly, the trajectories were all of a similar geometry (Redesignations in the direction of
travel) to allow for comparison. A real lunar landing task with a Redesignation would most
likely not be directly in front of the lander, nor would the astronaut ever find themselves
flying backwards for long periods of time (they would yaw to see what was in front of
them).
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
10.1 Summary
In the beginning of this thesis, a graceful transition was defined as follows:
The ability of a complex system to change between levels of automation/levels
of supervisory control (including automation modes) with the operator main-
taining control and awareness of the system without excessive workload or sac-
rificing system performance
An experiment investigating the eﬀects of Control Mode and Redesignation on the grace-
fulness of a transition was performed and the results were presented and discussed in light
of this definition. In general, it was shown that decreased level of automation in the Control
Mode and the introduction of a Redesignation both served to reduce the gracefulness of
the mode transition. The quantities of workload and situational awareness both showed a
transient response which varied with Control Mode and Redesignation, as did the number
of wrong inceptor inputs. The experiment demonstrated the important interdependencies
between performance, workload, and situation awareness. These results showed that de-
signers of multi-modal automation systems must consider the level of automation in the
modes that they require operators to switch between and the time period in which such
transitions occur: decreased levels of automation and large state errors will result in a less
graceful mode transition.
Additionally, a set of 6 case studies were presented which investigated the question of
graceful transitions in practice. Many of these case studies showed ungraceful transitions
that flowed from a case of automation surprise and/or mode confusion. The gracefulness
of a transition was distinguished from these phenomena; however, in many of these case
studies it was intrinsically linked to the gracefulness of the transition. Two models of factors
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and mechanisms based on the work of Endsley in situational awareness were used in case
studies to drive the development of a set of design principles for designing multi-modal
automation systems for graceful transitions.
10.2 Future Work
Due to the multi-faceted nature of graceful transitions, there are many things to be investi-
gated. The experiment only manipulated two variables: the mode following the transition
and the presence of large state errors. All trials transitions were from a fully automatic
mode. Future investigations should utilize modes other than fully automated prior to the
transition, e.g. begin in SA mode and transition to TA-ROD. This could help determine if
gracefulness in a transition is contingent on the specific modes being used, or if it is only
the diﬀerence between the two modes that matters (e.g. 4 to 1 = 6 to 3).
The measurement of MSE in pitch here had a very coarse resolution: there was no dis-
tinction made between during the transition and after the transition. Using a finer grain
measure in any future work concerning transitions would be recommended. The length of
the runs did not consistently show the final steady state of all the measurements as time
constraints required that the runs be cut short, and this was the driving factor of only an-
alyzing “after” the transition with MSE. Any future experiment should increase the length
of run time to suﬃciently all of a settling of the quantities following the transition. This
would allow for the MSE to be broken into phases similar to those used for the Bedford
Workload ratings (before, during, and after). The time-dependency of the performance
in comparison to that of workload and situational awareness would further illuminate the
interactions between these quantities that lead to graceful transitions.
Further, automation surprise and mode confusion are both extremely diﬃcult quantities
induce in a controlled experimental setup; however, their relation to the gracefulness of a
transition is not trivial. As the case studies showed, mode confusion is often a precursor
to ungraceful transitions. When present, automation surprise can cause mode transition
workload to increase and performance to decrease even more than seen in the present kind
of experiment. Understanding how these particular phenomena interact with the other
attributes of gracefulness would be an area of further development. Additionally, there
is much to be gained in understanding how the other attributes of gracefulness, such as
control maintenance, workload, and performance aﬀect situations of mode confusion and
surprise.
Now that the gracefulness of a transition has been found to depend on the number of
manual control loop closures required, as well as the state errors present at the time of the
transition, future experiments might consider the case in which subjects are not certain
that a mode change will occur. Such an experiment could be designed as an extension
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of this experiment; however, subjects would complete two run sequences. In the first set
of runs, subjects would complete an experiment similar to that presented here, with the
computer always redesignating. In the second set, the computer would always redesignate,
but the subjects would experience a mode transition in only half the runs. By comparing
the workload, situational awareness, and performance measures between the two sets for
each subject, many aspects of automation surprise could be simulated, since on any run,
the subjects could not be certain that a mode transition would actually take place, and
what the specific transition would be. On the other hand, the subjects would be aware
that a sudden mode transition was possible and would have high recency in identifying
the transition and responding to it – which is not always the case in real world situations.
To completely simulate automation surprise subjects must be totally unaware of what is
happening; this eﬀect is lost the first time subjects experience the transition.
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Table A.1: LOA within the OODA information processing model[21]
Level
Description
Observe Orient Decide Act
1 The human is the only
source for gathering
and monitoring (defined
as filtering, prioritizing,
and understanding) all
data
The human is respon-
sible for analyzing all
data, making predic-
tions, and interpreta-
tion of the data.
The computer does not
assist in or perform
ranking tasks. Human
must do it all
The human alone can
execute decision.
2 The human is the prime
source for gathering
and monitoring all
data, with computer
backup.
The human is the
source of analysis
and predictions, with
computer verification
when needed. The
human is responsible
for interpretation of the
data.
The human performs all
ranking tasks, but the
computer can be used as
a tool for assistance.
The human is the prime
source of execution,
with computer backup
for contingencies (e.g.
deconditioned humans).
3 The computer is re-
sponsible for gathering
and displaying unfil-
tered, unhighlighted,
and unprioritized
information for the
human. The human is
the prime monitor for
all information.
The computer is the
source of analysis and
predictions as a calcula-
tor with human checks
of the calculations. The
human is responsible
for interpretation of the
data.
Both the human and
the computer perform
ranking tasks, the re-
sults from the human
are considered prime
The computer ex-
ecutes decision
after human grants
authority-to-proceed.
Human is backup for
contingencies.
4 The computer is respon-
sible for gathering the
information for the hu-
man and for display-
ing all information. It
highlights the relevant
non-prioritized informa-
tion for the user.
The computer analyzes
the data and makes pre-
dictions as a trusted cal-
culator. The human is
responsible for interpre-
tation of the data.
Both the human and the
computer perform rank-
ing tasks, the results
from the computer are
considered prime.
The computer allows
the human a prepro-
grammed time-to-veto
before execution.
Human is backup for
contingencies.
5 The computer is respon-
sible for gathering the
information for the hu-
man. It filters out
the unhighlighted data
and shows the remain-
ing data in a non-
prioritized fashion.
The computer overlays
predictions with analy-
sis and interprets the
data. The human is the
backup for interpreting
the data in contingen-
cies.
The computer performs
ranking tasks. All re-
sults, including “why”
decisions were made,
are displayed to the hu-
man.
The computer allows
the human a context-
dependent time-to-veto
before execution. Hu-
man is backup for con-
tingencies.
6 The computer gathers,
filters, and prioritizes
information display to
the human.
The computer overlays
predictions with analy-
sis and interprets the
data. The human is
shown all results for po-
tential override.
The computer performs
ranking tasks and dis-
plays a reduced set of
ranked options while
displaying “why” deci-
sions were made to the
human.
The computer executes
automatically, informs
the human, and allows
for override ability af-
ter execution. Human
is backup for contingen-
cies.
7 The computer gathers,
filters, and prioritizes
data without display-
ing any information to
the human. Though, a
“program functioning”
flag is displayed.
The computer analyzes,
predicts, interprets, and
integrates data into a
result which is only dis-
played to the human if
result fits programmed
context (context depen-
dent summaries).
The computer performs
final ranking and dis-
plays a reduced set of
ranked options without
displaying “why” deci-
sions were made to the
human.
The computer executes
automatically and only
informs the human if
required by context.
Override ability after
execution is allowed.
8 The computer gathers,
filters, and prioritizes
data without displaying
any information to the
human.
The computer predicts,
interprets, and inte-
grates data into a result
which is not displayed
to the human.
The computer performs
final ranking, but does
not display results to
the human.
The computer executes
automatically and does
not allow any human in-
teraction.
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Table A.2: Friedman ranking of averaged response time to the comm light probes 1-10 (n
= 13)
Probe Rank Sum
Probe 1 31.000
Probe 2 19.000
Probe 3 28.000
Probe 4 101.000
Probe 5 108.000
Probe 6 93.000
Probe 7 97.000
Probe 8 80.000
Probe 9 76.000
Probe 10 82.000
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Table A.3: Friedman pair-wise comparisons of averaged response times to comm light
probes (n = 13)
Probe Compared to: Statistic p-value (p < 0.05)
Probe 1
Probe 2 1.371 0.173
Probe 3 0.343 0.732
Probe 4 7.998 0.000 Yes
Probe 5 8.798 0.000 Yes
Probe 6 7.084 0.000 Yes
Probe 7 7.541 0.000 Yes
Probe 8 5.599 0.000 Yes
Probe 9 5.142 0.000 Yes
Probe 10 5.827 0.000 Yes
Probe 2
Probe 3 1.028 0.306
Probe 4 9.370 0.000 Yes
Probe 5 10.169 0.000 Yes
Probe 6 8.455 0.000 Yes
Probe 7 8.913 0.000 Yes
Probe 8 6.970 0.000 Yes
Probe 9 6.513 0.000 Yes
Probe 10 7.199 0.000 Yes
Probe 3
Probe 4 8.341 0.000 Yes
Probe 5 9.141 0.000 Yes
Probe 6 7.427 0.000 Yes
Probe 7 7.884 0.000 Yes
Probe 8 5.942 0.000 Yes
Probe 9 5.485 0.000 Yes
Probe 10 6.170 0.000 Yes
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Table A.4: Friedman ranking of averaged response time to the comm light probes 4-10 (n
= 13)
Probe Rank Sum
Probe 4 62.000
Probe 5 69.000
Probe 6 54.000
Probe 7 58.000
Probe 8 41.000
Probe 9 37.000
Probe 10 43.000
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Table A.5: Friedman pair-wise comparisons of averaged response times to comm light
probes 4-10 (n = 13)
Probe Compared to: Statistic p-value (p < 0.05)
Probe 4
Probe 5 0.675 0.502
Probe 6 0.771 0.443
Probe 7 0.385 0.701
Probe 8 2.024 0.047 Yes
Probe 9 2.409 0.019 Yes
Probe 10 1.831 0.071
Probe 5
Probe 6 1.446 0.153
Probe 7 1.060 0.293
Probe 8 2.698 0.009 Yes
Probe 9 3.084 0.003 Yes
Probe 10 2.506 0.014 Yes
Probe 6
Probe 7 0.385 0.701
Probe 8 1.253 0.214
Probe 9 1.638 0.106
Probe 10 1.060 0.293
Probe 7
Probe 8 1.638 0.106
Probe 9 2.024 0.047 Yes
Probe 10 1.446 0.153
Probe 8
Probe 9 0.385 0.701
Probe 10 0.193 0.848
Probe 9 Probe 10 0.578 0.565
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Table A.6: Friedman ranking of average comm light response times by probe and Control
Mode (n = 13). (SA = Single-axis RCAH in pitch, TA = Triple-axis RCAH, TA-ROD =
Triple-axis RCAH with incremental rate-of-descent.)
Friedman Rankings Rank Sums
df = 2 Probe 4 Probe 5 Probe 6 Probe 7 Probe 8 Probe 9 Probe 10
Friedman Statistic 4.145 5.692 3.846 9.385 6.000 7.176 8.000
p-value 0.125 0.058 0.146 0.009 0.050 0.028 0.308
Mode
SA 20.000 19.000 21.000 21.000 21.000 19.500 18.000
TA 29.000 29.000 26.000 22.000 24.000 25.500 28.000
TA-ROD 29.000 30.000 31.000 35.000 33.000 33.000 32.000
Table A.7: Friedman pair-wise comparisons of the average response times in each Control
Mode for each comm light probe (n = 13). (SA = Single-axis RCAH in pitch, TA =
Triple-axis RCAH, TA-ROD = Triple-axis RCAH with incremental rate-of-descent.)
Mode Compared to:
p-values
Probe 4 Probe 5 Probe 6 Probe 7 Probe 8 Probe 9 Probe 10
SA TA 0.077 0.043 0.318 0.816 0.525 0.192 0.033
SA TA-ROD 0.077 0.028 0.052 0.003 0.017 0.006 0.004
TA TA-ROD 1.000 0.833 0.318 0.005 0.065 0.107 0.374
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Table A.8: Friedman ranks of the average percent callouts made by time-sequence (n =13).
Callout Rank Sum Callout Rank Sum
450 ft 237.000 175 ft 115.500
400 ft 229.500 150 ft 132.000
350 ft 230.500 Hazard 3 109.000
Hazard 1 214.000 140 ft 88.000
7% Fuel 189.500 5% Fuel 45.500
300 ft 229.500 130 ft 137.500
250 ft 158.500 120 ft 175.500
225 ft 30.000 110 ft 182.500
200 ft 80.000 100 ft 170.500
Hazard 2 116.500 4% Fuel 94.000
6% Fuel 38.000
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Table A.9: Friedman pair-wise comparisons of 300 ft callout (n = 13)
Probe Compared to: Statistic p-value (p < 0.05)
300 ft
450 ft 0.407 0.684
400 ft 0.000 1.000
350 ft 0.054 0.957
Hazard 1 0.842 0.401
7% Fuel 2.173 0.031 Yes
250 ft 3.856 0.000 Yes
225 ft 10.835 0.000 Yes
200 ft 8.120 0.000 Yes
Hazard 2 6.137 0.000 Yes
6% Fuel 10.401 0.000 Yes
175 ft 6.192 0.000 Yes
150 ft 5.295 0.000 Yes
Hazard 3 6.545 0.000 Yes
140 ft 7.685 0.000 Yes
5% Fuel 9.994 0.000 Yes
130 ft 4.997 0.000 Yes
120 ft 2.933 0.004 Yes
110 ft 2.553 0.011 Yes
100 ft 3.204 0.002 Yes
4% Fuel 7.359 0.000 Yes
Table A.10: Friedman results of the eﬀect of LPR on the percent callouts made (n = 13)
Friedman Results Callout Rank Sum
df = 2 250 ft 225 ft 200 ft
Friedman Statistic 4.500 7.364 5.333
p-value 0.034 0.007 0.021
Redesignation
No LPR 22.500 24.000 23.500
LPR 16.500 15.000 15.500
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Table A.11: Friedman results of the eﬀect of LPR on the percent callouts made after the
transition (n = 13)
No Redesignation Redesignation
Probe No. Compared to Statistic p-value Probe No. Compared to Statistic p-value
250 ft
225 ft 6.663 0.0005
250 ft
225 ft 6.582 0.0005
200 ft 2.473 0.018 200 ft 3.118 0.004
Table A.12: Friedman rankings of mode for percent callouts made (n = 13). (SA =
Single-axis RCAH in pitch, TA = Triple-axis RCAH, TA-ROD = Triple-axis RCAH with
incremental rate-of-descent.)
Callout 250 ft 225 ft 200 ft Hazard 2 6% Fuel 175 ft 150 ft Hazard 3 140 ft 5% Fuel 130 ft
Statistic 8.629 7.818 7.875 3.511 15.167 21.565 14.244 7.511 4.409 14.913 13.064
p-value 0.013 0.020 0.019 0.173 0.001 0.0005 0.001 0.023 0.110 0.001 0.001
SA 21.500 32.000 32.000 29.500 36.000 36.000 34.000 33.500 30.000 33.000 34.500
TA 23.500 27.000 27.500 27.500 25.000 28.000 27.000 22.000 27.500 29.500 26.500
TA-ROD 33.000 19.000 18.500 21.000 17.000 14.000 17.000 22.500 20.500 15.500 17.000
Table A.13: Pair-wise comparisons of mode rankings for average percent callouts made (n
=13). (SA = Single-axis RCAH in pitch, TA = Triple-axis RCAH, TA-ROD = Triple-axis
RCAH with incremental rate-of-descent.)
Mode Compared to:
250 ft 225 ft 200 ft
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
SA TA 0.562 0.579 1.225 0.233 1.057 0.301
SA TA-ROD 3.231 0.004 3.184 0.004 3.171 0.004
TA TA-ROD 2.669 0.013 1.960 0.062 2.114 0.045
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Table A.14: Pair-wise comparisons of mode rankings for average percent callouts made (n
=13). (SA = Single-axis RCAH in pitch, TA = Triple-axis RCAH, TA-ROD = Triple-axis
RCAH with incremental rate-of-descent.)
Mode Compared to:
6% Fuel 175 ft 150 ft Hazard 3
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
SA TA 3.342 0.003 3.881 0.001 2.209 0.037 2.762 0.011
SA TA-ROD 5.773 0.000 10.672 0.0005 5.365 0.0005 2.642 0.014
TA TA-ROD 2.431 0.023 6.791 0.0005 3.156 0.004 0.120 0.905
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Table A.15: Pair-wise comparisons of mode rankings for average percent callouts made (n
=13). (SA = Single-axis RCAH in pitch, TA = Triple-axis RCAH, TA-ROD = Triple-axis
RCAH with incremental rate-of-descent.)
Mode Compared to:
5% Fuel 130 ft
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
SA TA 1.074 0.294 2.248 0.034
SA TA-ROD 5.369 0.000 4.917 0.000
TA TA-ROD 4.295 0.000 2.669 0.013
Table A.16: Friedman test of subject rankings of gracefulness (n = 12).
Run Type Rank Sum
SA, No LPR 12.000
TA, No LPR 27.000
TA-ROD, No LPR 51.000
SA, LPR 36.000
TA, LPR 54.000
TA-ROD, LPR 72.000
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Table A.17: Friedman test pair-wise comparisons of run types for subject rankings (n =
12).
Run Type Compared to: Statistic p-value
SA, No LPR TA, No LPR 5.142 0.000
SA, No LPR TA-ROD, No LPR 13.370 0.000
SA, No LPR SA, LPR 8.228 0.000
SA, No LPR TA, LPR 14.398 0.000
SA, No LPR TA-ROD, LPR 20.569 0.000
TA, No LPR TA-ROD, No LPR 8.228 0.000
TA, No LPR SA, LPR 3.085 0.003
TA, No LPR TA, LPR 9.256 0.000
TA, No LPR TA-ROD, LPR 15.427 0.000
TA-ROD, No LPR SA, LPR 5.142 0.000
TA-ROD, No LPR TA, LPR 1.028 0.308
TA-ROD, No LPR TA-ROD, LPR 7.199 0.000
SA, LPR TA, LPR 6.171 0.000
SA, LPR TA-ROD, LPR 12.341 0.000
TA, LPR TA-ROD, LPR 6.171 0.000
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Appendix B
Case Study: The Crown
Princess
B.1 General Description
The following case study refers to the Heeling Accident of the Crown Princess in the
Atlantic Ocean oﬀ of Port Canaveral, FL on July 18th, 2006 [45, 137]. The cruise ship
Crown Princess heeled at a maximum angle of about 24 degrees due to a number of factors,
chiefly being misguided input from the 2nd oﬃcer into control system that was too slow to
respond. These control inputs followed the disengagement of the ship’s autopilot, which
was operating in a regime unsuited for its operational environment. No casualties were
sustained in this accident.
The following instances of mode transitions were identified and analyzed within this case
study:
1. Transition from manual steering to heading mode in the trackpilot by the captain.
2. Change in status of the 2nd oﬃcer from monitoring to supervising.
3. Transition back to manual steering from heading mode by the 2nd oﬃcer
B.2 Transition Case 1
The NTSB report describes that on orders from the captain, the crew engaged the trackpilot
(the autopilot) function of the vessel’s integrated navigation system (INS). This is the
transition which will be considered here.
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B.2.1 The Modes
Sheridan & Verplank LOA
The mode transition being considered here is one between manual steering and autopilot
(specifically heading mode, or NACOS-1 as referred to by the Crown Princess crew). Head-
ing mode, aside from having several parameters, such as rudder limit and rudder economy,
maintained the input heading from the crew. This manual steering would be classified as
a level 1 on the Sheridan and Verplank scale [14]. Essentially, the NACOS-1 system was
functioning at level 7 on the Sheridan and Verplank scale; however, given the very slow
nature of cruise liner control, it could be considered a level 6 on the Sheridan and Verplank
scale. This mode switch is shown in Figure B.1 and Table B.1.
Figure B.1: Crown Princess Transition Case: Sheridan and Verplank Scales
Table B.1: Case 1 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Case 1 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Prior Post
1 6
Proud and Hart LOA
In terms of the levels of automation as suggested by Proud and Hart [21], the modes can be
considered in terms of four separate functions: observe, orient, decide, act. These levels of
automation can be assigned based on the descriptions provided by Schuﬀel [138] of bridge
operations in the the 1990’s.
Based on the OODA model, the following levels can be described within the transi-
tion:
Observe Phase - Prior to this transition, the system was operating at Level 7 via the NACOS
system trackpilot. Out the window information was still available, allowing for two parallel
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observing processes to be taking places; however, with respect to the navigation task, the
information which was being used as all handled at Level 7. Following the transition,
the system began to operate at Level 4, in which the human became much more heavily
involved in the observation of utilized information.
Orient Phase - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 7, in which the
result was displayed but rationale was suppressed. Following the transition, the system was
operating at Level 3, in which the computer integrated the information visually integrated
the information using displays for the human to use.
Decide Phase - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7, in which
selections were displayed but reasons were suppressed. Following the transition, the system
was operating at Level 1, in which the operator (the 2nd oﬃcer) was now in charge of all
decisions.
Act Phase - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 7, in which the
operator had override capability only. By exercising this override capability, the user
reverted to Level 1, in which they were solely responsible for all actions of the system via
gain mediation through the computer.
These OODA levels are shown in Figure B.2 and Table B.4
Table B.2: Case 1 - Proud and Hart LOA
Case 1 - Proud and Hart LOA
Observe Orient Decide Act
Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post
4 7 3 7 1 7 1 7
B.2.2 The Trigger
The major triggers seen here was the mission goals and procedures. Having cleared port
and reached open water, it was standard for the activation of the NACOS system for
autonomous navigation. This can be summarized then as follows:
• Goals and Procedures
• Environment State
• Performance of Actions
Goals and Procedures - These called for the switch to automatic navigation on reaching
open water.
Environment State - This provided the conditions which the procedures specified.
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(a) Observe (b) Orient
(c) Decide (d) Act
Figure B.2: Case 1 - Proud and Hart LOA
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Performance of Actions - While the procedures and the environment state suggested the
transition, it still fell to the human to make the transition.
See Figure B.3 for an illustration.
Figure B.3: Case 1 - Factors
B.2.3 Factors, Mechanisms, and Design Lessons
Factors in the Transition
This transition was quite graceful, in that situation awareness was not immediately or
discernibly lost, workload did not increase or decrease in excess, and performance was
maintained. Hence, all factors influencing this transition can be seen as positively influ-
encing this transition. The following are particularly noticeable and can be considered in
contrast with other ungraceful transitions:
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• Stress & Workload
• LOA Disparity
• Automation Opacity
• Mode
• General SA
• Mode SA
Stress & Workload - During this transition the stress and workload were quite manage-
able by the operator and were kept at levels that did not detrimentally aﬀect the transi-
tion.
LOA Disparity - While the transition was over a relatively large direction, it was in a
positive direction (from low automation to high automation). This directionality in the
transition is inherently easier, because the human is starting with what might be consider
and excess of involvement in maintaining SA and performance. Unless stress and workload
are suﬃciently high at the time of such a transition, it is unlikely that these will be can a
immediately loss of either of these quantities.
Automation Opacity - As the operation was manual prior to the transition, the operator
was intimately aware of how the automation was acting and what it was acting on. Hence,
in entering a new mode, there was little opacity in the “automation” prior to the transition;
the operator new on what it was acting and how it was acting.
Mode - The mode being transitioned to requires significantly less workload in operat-
ing.
General SA - The operator knew what the situation was in which they were operating.
Mode SA - The operator knew the way in which the system would behave following the
transition and had a knowledge the way in which it accomplished this (this will not be the
case in a future transition case).
See Figure B.3 for an illustration.
Mechanisms of Gracefulness
The transition, as mentioned previously, was a graceful one. Therefore it is impossible
to identify any one mechanisms as contributing significantly to the gracefulness observed.
The entire mechanisms model functioned correctly.
Design Principles and Lessons
From this transition case, the following design lessons can be learned:
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• Operator understanding of the prior mode of operation is just as important as un-
derstand the mode into which they are transitioning. In understanding the states
currently being controlled by the mode, the operator can more easily determine the
changes that will be forced during the transition and what processes he or she will
be required to drop, take on, or maintain.
• The disparity of levels of automation most likely have a more detrimental eﬀect when
the direction is negative, i.e. moving from a high level of automation to a lower level
of automation.
• Low stress and workload levels enable, but do not explicitly cause, graceful transi-
tions.
B.3 Transition Case 2
The NTSB reports that the captain turned the conn over to the second oﬃcer. While this
is not a mode transition in terms of the automation, it is a subjective mode change from
the vantage point of 2nd oﬃcer. The 2nd oﬃcer essentially switched from a fully automatic
mode where the system (ie. the ship and captain system) was performing the task to a
supervisory mode, where he was monitoring and intervening if necessary.
B.3.1 The Modes
Sheridan and Verplank LOA
This transition, as stated above, involves the switch from fully automatic (what would be
considered a Level 10 by Sheridan and Verplank) to slightly lower level of Supervisory Con-
trol, roughly being an 8 on the Sheridan and Verplank scale. This transition is illustrated
in Figure B.4 and Table B.3.
Figure B.4: Case 2 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
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Table B.3: Case 2 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Case 2 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Prior Post
10 8
Proud and Hart LOA
The following levels based oﬀ of Proud and Hart can be observed in this transition:
Observe Phase - Prior to the transition, the 2nd oﬃcer was operating, relative to the system,
at Level 6, as any information which he was made aware of was highly filtered by the system
before it presented it. When he was put in charge he assumed the LOA which the captain
had been functioning at now for some time, which was Level 7. The operator was always
immersed in the environment and had cues other than the automation.
Orient Phase - The 2nd oﬃcer before the transition is seen to have been operating at Level
7, as only context dependent summaries were being received. Following the transition, this
remained the case.
Decide Phase - The system was operating at Level 8 before the transition, as none of the
decisions were being displayed to the second oﬃcer. Following the transition, the system
was operating in the realm of Level 7, in which the computer’s solution was displayed
without any rationale.
Act Phase - Prior to the transition, the system was operating with respect to the 2nd
oﬃcer at Level 8, with absolutely no control interaction. Following the transition, the
system began to operate at Level 7 with respect to the 2nd oﬃcer, giving him override
capability.
The OODA transition levels are illustrated in Figure B.5 and Table B.4.
Table B.4: Case 2 - Proud and Hart LOA
Case 2 - Proud and Hart LOA
Observe Orient Decide Act
Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post
6 7 7 7 8 7 8 7
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(a) Observe (b) Orient
(c) Decide (d) Act
Figure B.5: Case 2 - Proud and Hart LOA
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B.3.2 The Trigger
This transition occurred on the order of the captain, who was now going oﬀ duty. The
captain, who had been acting as the supervisor called for the system now required that the
2nd oﬃcer take the conn. If the analog is drawn to the ship and captain as an automated
system, the system reached a state where it required certain amount of involvement from
the operator. Hence the following can be summarized has having been involved in triggering
this transition:
• Crew/Team Management
Crew/Team Management - The crew/team management was the major triggering mecha-
nisms of this “mode transition”. As one member of the team left the bridge the other took
over those functions, eﬀecting the transition.
See Figure B.6 for an illustration.
B.3.3 Factors, Mechanisms, and Design Lessons
Factors in the Transition
This transition was particularly graceful as well, hence only the major factors seen as
worthy of note are will be considered:
• Stress & Workload
• LOA Disparity
• System State
• Environment State
• General SA
• Mode SA
Stress & Workload - Both of these were manageable, allowing for the oﬃcer to eﬀectively
handle jumping into the loop and fulfilling his control input requirements.
LOA Disparity - The number of LOA that were traversed in this transition was relatively
low, even though it was in the negative direction. Hence, at these levels and given the
other surrounding circumstances, it can be concluded that such transitions can be accom-
plished with reasonable gracefulness. Such a conclusion would only hold for a situation of
comparable control loops: an aviation analog would be diﬃcult as there are significantly
more loops being controlled in that application.
System State - The system reaching a state which was manageable enabled this mode
transition. The bridge oﬃcer leaving would not have occurred until the system was in a
state which was able to be easily handed over to the next operator.
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Figure B.6: Factors in The Crown Princess Transition Case 2
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Environment State - In the same manner, the environment state allowed for this transition
to take place: no significant stressors were present during the transition. This is worthy
of note, as it is the habit of a human operator to obtain a graceful transition; the system
state and environment state as enablers then suggests these as major factors in allowing
for graceful transitions.
General SA - The operator knew the situation into which he was being inserted that he
was able to adequately make the transition in a graceful fashion.
Mode SA - The operator also understood the mode in which he was operating and would
be operating. This also enabled a graceful transition.
See Figure B.6 for an illustration.
Mechanisms of Gracefulness
Again, as with the first transition case, none of the mechanisms within the Endsley model
can be picked out easily. All functions in the model are functioning in an adequate capacity.
A major enabling of this is that attention resources are adequate for all process; this is
only an enabling factor and not a cause.
Design Principles and Lessons
From this transition, the following can be learned for future automation architecture de-
sign:
• The preferred method of transition by operators is when the handoﬀ takes place in
a stable situation. While this seems rather obvious at first glance, such a principle
is violated often. One such case will be seen as blatant within the STS-3 PIO case
study. Additionally, operators wait until the last minute to begin a mode transition,
when the system has already exceeded such bounds. Hence, if this were perceived as
a future possibility, beginning the transition at the early stages would improve the
gracefulness of at transition.
B.4 Transition Case 3
The NTSB report on the Crown Princess accident states that “At 1524, the 2nd oﬃcer
disengaged the trackpilot and, because he was closer to the wheel than either of the helms-
men, took manual control of the steering.” Immediately following this transition, the 2nd
oﬃcer made a control input in the wrong direction, which worsened the situation. It is this
transition that will be considered here.
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B.4.1 The Modes
Sheridan and Verplank LOA
The transition was one from a relatively high level of automation to that of manual steering,
where the 2nd oﬃcer was directly controlling the ship, albeit via hydraulics. The mode
which the operator began in was level 8 and moved directly to level 1. This can be seen in
Figure B.7 and Table B.5.
Figure B.7: Case 3 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Table B.5: Case 3 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Case 3 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Prior Post
8 1
Proud and Hart LOA
Based on the OODA model, the following levels can be described within the transi-
tion:
Observe Phase - Prior to this transition, the system was operating at Level 7 via the
NACOS system trackpilot. Out the window information was still available, allowing for
two parallel observing processes to be tak place; however, with respect to the navigation
task, the information which was being used was all handled at Level 7. Following the
transition, the system began to operate at Level 4, in which the human became much more
heavily involved in the observation of utilized information.
Orient Phase - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 7, in which the
result was displayed but rationale was suppressed. Following the transition, the system
was operating at Level 3, in which the computer integrated the information visually using
displays.
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Decide Phase - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7, in which
selections were displayed but reasons were suppressed. Following the transition, the system
was operating at Level 1, in which the operator (the 2nd oﬃcer) was now in charge of all
decisions.
Act Phase - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 7, in which the
operator had override capability only. By exercising this override capability, the user
transitioned to Level 1, in which they were solely responsible for all actions of the system
via gain mediation through the computer.
The OODA transition levels are illustrated in Figure B.8 and Table B.6.
(a) Observe (b) Orient
(c) Decide (d) Act
Figure B.8: Case 3 - Proud and Hart LOA
B.4.2 The Trigger
In this case the 2nd oﬃcer disengaged the autopilot because he needed to regain control
of a syste, which he had determined was no longer in control of itself. The NTSB report
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Table B.6: Case 3 - Proud and Hart LOA
Case 3 - Proud and Hart LOA
Observe Orient Decide Act
Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post
7 4 7 3 7 1 7 1
supports this. In reference to his decision to revert to manual control the second oﬃcer
is recorded as saying,“I just saw the rate of turn and instinct took over, I thought...we’re
going to be swinging to port really fast here and I’ve got to get hand steering... [to] try to
stop the swinging.”
Hence the following factors, based on the updated Endsley model, were identified as active
during this mode:
• System State
• Automaticity
• General SA (All Levels)
• Performance of Actions
• Automation Capability
System State - The system state going out of bounds was the origin of the transition
trigger. Had this not gone into such an extreme oﬀ-nominal state, the operator would not
have made the transition to a manual mode.
Automaticity - The reaction of the 2nd oﬃcer was an automatic response; it wasn’t ex-
tremely thought out, but was more along the lines of “any manual input is better than
this.”
General SA (All Levels) - The operator’s understanding of the overall situation, while
obviously inadequate because of his erroneous input, was adequate enough to allow for
him to sense and comprehend the states of the system and its environment as requiring
intervention.
Performance of Actions - As this was an operator implemented transition (not an scripted
control transition), the performance of actions was the active trigger of the transition (it
originated from system states and was realized by the performance of an action.
Automation Capability - The cause of the oﬀ-nominal system states was the incapability
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of the automation to deal with the state of the environment based on its current parame-
ters.
See Figure B.9 for an illustration.
Figure B.9: Factors in The Crown Princess Transition Case 3
B.4.3 Factors, Mechanisms, and Design Lessons
Factors in the Transition
Based on the updated Endsley model of factors influencing SA, the following factors were
identified as active during this transition:
• Environment States
• System States
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• General Situaitonal Awareness
• Mode Situaitonal Awareness
• Operator Automaticity
• Automation Opacity
• Stress & Workload
• Operator Decision
• Performance of Actions
Environment States - The unknown nature of the environment (shallow water eﬀect) was
what caused the automation to be incapable of eﬀectively handling the situation. This was
a significant stressor, allowing it to become uncontrollable more readily than in a nominal
environment.
System States - The system states were highly dynamic, making it all the more diﬃcult
for the operator to gain an understanding of the internal variables for proper control in-
tervention.
General SA - Aside from the ship being in a relatively extreme operating condition (shallow
water eﬀect), the operator was not aware of the this particular eﬀect on operating require-
ments. Had this been known any control inputs would most likely have been tempered
given the increased sensitivity of the system in such conditions.
Mode SA - The operator was unaware prior to the transition of why the automation was
having diﬃculty controlling the system. This lack of basic mode SA (mode operation) may
have biased the operator in a way that eﬀected his first control input immediately following
the transition.
Operator Automaticity - The operator’s only concern was making some input, whatever
that input may have been. In this case, the input was in the wrong direction, which only
exacerbated an already bad situation. The operator’s comments on his input, as well as
the action itself, suggest that the input was purely an automatic reaction requiring no
premeditation.
Stress & Workload - The stress and workload induced by the extreme operating environ-
ment and the oscillating system states in this case negatively eﬀected the operator, pushing
them to rely on “instinctual” reactions, rather than reasoned reactions.
Operator Decision - It is diﬃcult to determine where the operator error was made: either in
the decision making block or the performance of actions block. It is possible that the oper-
ator, based on inadequate situational awareness, high stress, high workload, and operator
automaticity, made the wrong decision on what the initial control input ought to be. The
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wrong decision would have then eﬀected the performance of actions block and significantly
contributed to the gracelessness seen in this transition (loss of performance).
Operator Performance of Action - Conversely, it is possible that the operator made the
correct decision but the wrong action was taken for whatever reason. This, again, would
have led to the wrong control input and would have significantly contributed to the graceless
seen here.
See Figure B.9 for an illustration.
Mechanisms of Gracefulness
Based on the updated Endsley model of mechanism in SA, the following mechanisms can
be identified making this transition less than graceful:
• Attention Resources
• Action Guidance
• Mode Setting
• Schema
• Script
• Interpretation, Comprehension, and Projection
• Action Guidance
Attention Resources - Due to the extreme environment in which this transition took place,
the operator was placed in charge of monitoring a large number of variables. This depleted
the operator’s attentional resources are removed his ability supply the transition process
completely.
Action Guidance - By some eﬀect, the wrong action was made, and this was either due to a
wrong decision or the misapplication of a script based on the operators current schema. As
this particular transition was described as an almost automatic reaction from the operator,
it is most likely the misapplication of a script feeding into the action guidance block.
Mode Setting - This block, as well as perception, feeds into the Schema construct, which in
this transition was most likely misapplied. As perception seems to have been functioning
properly (the oﬀ-nominal case was recognized enough to trigger the transitions), Mode
Setting is the most likely next source. It is quite quite possible that attention resources
were not allocated adequately to allow the user to completely comprehend the required
inputs to the computer for a particular action, suggesting a misapplication of an operator
schema.
Schema - In some way, the operator misapplied the schema to the situation. The type of
action was correct, how the direction and magnitude were incorrect.
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Script - The misapplication of schema provide an incorrect scrip for driving the operators
automatic response to the situation.
Interpretation, Comprehension, and Projection - Based on the perception of urgency of the
situation and the current schema in use by the operator, this block was, in some senses,
bypassed, allowing for an automatic reaction from the operator to be generated from the
script construct (instinctual reaction). Had this block been utilized (i.e. had time-pressure
not forced such a suppression) this transition may have been much more graceful.
Action Guidance - The flow down eﬀect from all the other blocks resulted in the wrong
action guidance.
See Figure B.10 for an illustration.
Design Principles and Lessons
From this transition case, the following design lessons can be learned
• Reduce the demands on attentional resources during any transition.
• It cases of high workload, stress, and time pressures, the decision making block can
and will be bypassed by the operator script which is derived from his or her schema
for the selected situation. This schema will be dependent upon (1) the operator,
(2), their perception, and (3) the mode setting. In eﬀect, their mental model of the
situation will react to the situation in one of three ways: wrong action, right action,
and no action. These three options are not equally weighted: the right action is
often singular, as is the no action category, whereas their are a multitude of wrong
actions. A system which can equalize the salience of these options, by highlighting
a suggested action or warning against certain control actions prior to or during the
transition would improve the gracefulness of a transition in the area of performance
and situaitonal awareness.
• Reduced automation opacity (while a good principle to strive for in general) prior to
a transition is extremely crucial. An operator who doesn’t understand the processes
which they are taking over and how the automation had been handling them to begin
with will not be able to graceful transition into a new mode. Particularly in cases
such as the one discussed here, if the automation is not able to control the situation
it is important the operator know how the automation was attempting to control the
situation so that they can adapt their control strategy accordingly.
• Large control inputs should not be required immediately at a transition, such as seen
in this case. The salience of such a requirement disposes the operator to any kind
of action, rather than first confirming control of the craft and then correcting any
errors.
146
Figure B.10: Mechanisms in The Crown Princess Transition Case 3
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Appendix C
Case Study: The Royal Majesty
C.1 General Description
As described in the NTSB report [46]:
On June 10, 1995, the Panamanian passenger ship Royal Majesty grounded on
Rose and Crown Shoal about 10 miles east of Nantucket Island, Massachusetts,
and about 17 miles from where the watch oﬃcers thought the vessel was. The
vessel, with 1,509 persons on board, was en route from St. George’s, Bermuda,
to Boston, Massachusetts.
The major cause of the accident was the result of a loss of GPS data input into the NACOS
of the ship, resulting in a transition to Dead-Reckoning. The bridge crews’ failure to observe
this mode change, which had been caused by a disconnected cable, ultimately resulted in
the NACOS steering the ship oﬀ course due to a lack of current, wind, and sea data.The
following instances of transition were identified within this case study:
1. The navigator set the navigation and command system (NACOS) 25 on the naviga-
tion (NAV) mode
2. The transition of the position data from GPS to Dead Reckoning (DR) mode
3. The second oﬃcer switched from autopilot to manual when the Royal Majesty unex-
pectedly veered to port
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C.2 Transition Case 1
The NTSB report [46] describes that “the NACOS 25 autopilot was engaged and operating
in the NAV mode from the time the vessel departed St. George’s (1400 on June 9) to
before the grounding.” Additionally, the report describes that “shortly after departure [the
navigator] set the navigation and command system (NACOS) 25 autopilot on navigation
(NAV) mode.” No direct discussion could be found of the mode prior to the setting of the
autopilot; however, if prior information on the operation of cruise liners is to be taken as
standard, this mode would have been manual steering.
C.2.1 The Modes
Sheridan and Verplank LOA
This particular transition describes one from manual to the engagement of the NACOS
25 in NAV mode. Manual steering in this case can be considered level 1, perhaps level
2 or 3 depending on the interpretation of the operator interface. The NAV mode of the
NACOS 25 automatically compensated for the eﬀect of gyro errors, wind, current, and sea,
while using programmed information (latitude and longitude of waypoints and the vessel’s
maneuvering characteristics), gyro and speed data, and position data from the GPS or
the Loran-C, to steer the vessel along a preprogrammed track. Dekker [139] gives the
explanation that the NAV mode “kept the ship within a certain distance of a track, and
corrected for drift caused by wind, sea, and current.” Such a mode would be considered a
level 8 on the Sheridan and Verplank scale. The levels of automation are shown in Figure
C.1 and Table C.1.
Figure C.1: Case 1 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Proud and Hart LOA
Based on the OODA model, the following levels can be described within the transi-
tion:
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Table C.1: Case 1 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Case 1 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Prior Post
2 8
Observe Phase - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at a Level 4, as the navi-
gation system presents a filtered picture of the environment based on the data perceived as
pertinent by the system designer. Since the operator still has access to the out the window
view, this filtering is not complete, hence this is only a level 4 and not a level 5. Following
the transition, the system was operating at level 7 essentially. Level 7 suggests is described
as “the computer gathers, filters, and prioritizes data without displaying information to
the human. Though a ‘program functioning’ flag is display.” This is not entirely true, as
the operator does have access to this information outside of just a “program functioning”;
however, this is only when the human is actively seeking the information. otherwise to
the knowledge of the human, the automation is either functioning or not. Hence, a more
descriptive characterization would be a human-driven choice between a level 7 or level 6
at any given time.
Orient Phase - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at operating at Level 3,
given that the human was responsible for all interpretation; however, there are some general
predictions displayed to the human via the display consoles. Following the transition, the
system was operating at Level 7.
Decide Phase - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 1. Following the
transition, the system was operating at system was operating at level 8.
Act Phase - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 1. Following the
transition, the system was operating at Level 7.
Thes levels are shown in Figure C.2 and Table C.2.
Table C.2: Case 1 - Proud and Hart LOA
Case 1 - Proud and Hart LOA
Observe Orient Decide Act
Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post
4 7 3 7 1 8 1 7
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(a) Observe (b) Orient
(c) Decide (d) Act
Figure C.2: Case 1 - Proud and Hart LOA
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C.2.2 The Trigger
This particular transition is almost identical to that which was described in Section B.2.
Refer to this section for a full consideration of the triggering of such a transition.
C.2.3 Factors, Mechanisms, and Design Lessons
Factors in the Transition
This particular transition is almost identical to that which was described in Section B.2.
Refer to this section for a full consideration of the factors involved in the transition.
Mechanisms of Gracefulness
This particular transition is almost identical to that which was described in Section B.2.
Refer to this section for a full consideration of the mechanisms involved.
Design Principles and Lessons
This particular transition is almost identical to that which was described in Section B.2.
Refer to this section for a full consideration of the particular lessons learned. The similarity
suggests that this transition type may be quite common. The influence of mission proce-
dures over mode transitions should not be underestimated or understated: used incorrectly
it can lead to horribly ungraceful transitions. Used correctly, mission procedures could be
large factor in enabling graceful transitions.
C.3 Transition Case 2
This NTSB report states that “the GPS receiver antenna cable connection had separated
enough that the GPS switched to DR mode, and the autopilot, not programmed to detect
the mode change and invalid status bits, no longer corrected for the the eﬀects of wind,
current, or sea.”
C.3.1 The Modes
The modes involved here are encompassed within essentially the same autopilot mode;
however, the position data source changed modes. On the surface it would appear that
there was no traverse between the levels of automation as described by Sheridan and
Verplank. The key to understanding the mode transition here lies in the report’s note that
“the mode no longer corrected for the eﬀects of wind, current, or sea.”
These corrections can be thought of as separate tasks from that of pure course navigation.
Prior to the data source change, these all were being automatically controlled via GPS
coordinates, eﬀectively placing the automation at a level 8 on the Sheridan and Verplank
scale. Following the data change, these tasks were reduced to a level near full manual.
The closest level on the Sheridan and Verplank scale that would describe this is level 2,
but this particular delineation seems to be lacking in specificity with respect to how such
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corrections are determined and made. These levels are illustrated in Figure C.3 and Table
C.3.
Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Figure C.3: Case 2 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Table C.3: Case 2 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Case 2 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Prior Post
8 2
Proud and Hart LOA
Using the Proud and Hart LOA, the following breakdown of the transition can be made:
Observe Phase - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7 within the
observe phase. Following the transition, the system, though unperceived by the operator,
was operating at Level 4 (inherent filtering of the environment). The user was immersed
in the environment and so there was a secondary source of unfiltered information.
Orient Phase - The system prior to the transition was operating at Level 7 within the
orient phase. Following the transition the system, though unbeknownst to the operator,
was operating at Level 3.
Decide Phase - The system prior to the transition was operating at Level 8 within the decide
phase. Following the transition, the system was still operating at Level 8. No ranking of
the possible option is given to the operator, as the operator feeds in the correction data
and the computer takes it from there.
Act Phase - The system prior to the transition was operating at Level 7. Following the
transition, the system was still operating at Level 7.
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These levels are shown in Figure C.4 and Table C.4.
(a) Observe (b) Orient
(c) Decide (d) Act
Figure C.4: Case 2 - Proud and Hart LOA
C.3.2 The Trigger
The trigger in this was the failure of the GPS data as an input into the system. In essence,
the loss of input disable a mode and so in order to keep functioning, the system had a
preprogrammed secondary mode to revert to. Such a transition is a prime example of an
adaptive control system.
The following can then be identified as active in triggering this transition:
• Mode
• Environment State
Mode - The adaptive control style of the automation architecture was the primary trigger
of the transition here. In the event that the GPS was somehow made inactive, the system
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Table C.4: Case 2 - Proud and Hart LOA
Case 2 - Proud and Hart LOA
Observe Orient Decide Act
Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post
7 4 7 3 8 8 7 7
would transition into a diﬀerent mode.
Environment State - As opposed to a system state changing (in the sense of state variables)
it was an variable within the surrounding environment which activated the pre-programmed
behavior from the automation. Hence, the environment state can be mapped as triggering
the mode response, which then activated the mode transition.
See Figure C.5 for an illustration of these triggering factors.
C.3.3 Factors, Mechanisms, and Design Lessons
Factors in the Transition
At the outset, this transition may not seem entirely ungraceful, as performance was main-
tained within acceptable parameters at and immediately following the transition. Addi-
tionally, workload was not increased. However, situation awareness and mode situational
awareness were both lost during this transition. As such, the following factors are identified
as contributing to ungraceful nature of this transition:
• Mode situational awareness (All Levels)
• General situational awareness (All Levels)
• Interface
• Opacity
• Information Processing Mechanisms
• Environment State
• Preconceptions
Mode situational awareness (All Levels) - This is the major descriptor of the lack of grace
in this transition. During and following the transition the operator(s) were not aware of the
new mode of operation, and were in fact operating under the assumption that no transition
had taken place.
General situational awareness (All Levels) - A lack of awareness of the state of the environ-
ment (the disconnection of the GPS) before and after the transition, as well as a general
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Figure C.5: Factors in The Royal Majesty Transition Case 2
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lack of how the system was acting following the transition is another descriptor of the lack
of gracefulness in the transition. This is particularly notable, as the dynamics of the system
are so slow that recognizing any diﬀerent in the system behavior would take a significant
amount of time to become salient enough for the operator to detect them.
Interface - The interface, which has been the subject of another independent study [140],
was completely inadequate in alerting the operator to the transition when it took place.
Opacity - The opacity of the automation is a secondary description of the poor interface
design; the operation of this automation is particularly complex or diﬃcult to understand
by the operator. The relatively unannounced mode switch, along with the operator’s
ignorance of the system’s limited adaptive capability for a GPS dropout, shows a system
which is not transparent in its operation to the operator.
Information Processing Mechanisms - The mode switch, both in its eﬀects and its an-
nouncement was too subtle for the operator to catch. Additionally, if it were to be argued
that their normal monitoring procedures should have sensed the transition, the vigilance
limits on human information processing was clearly enough to make this not feasible.
Environment State - As mentioned, the cue in the environment were extremely subtle, to
the point that the human was able to remain ignorant.
Preconceptions - The operator(s) were not expecting a mode transition. This preconception
combined with low salience of any cues from the system or the environment and the limits of
information processing due to vigilance limits ultimately resulted in the loss of situational
awareness, and by extension, grace throughout the transition.
See Figure C.5 for an illustration of these factors.
Mechanisms of Gracefulness
In examining the loss of grace in this transition, the following mechanisms can be identified
from the update Endsley situational awareness model:
• Machine Perception
• Machine Interpretation, Comprehension, and Projection
• Machine Decision Making
• Operator Schema
• Operator Perception
• Interface
Machine Perception - A failure in the machine perception (GPS failure) can be considered
as the root of the ungraceful nature of the transition. The adaptive control scheme of the
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automation essentially replaced the output of the GPS with the of the dead-reckoning sys-
tem; however, the dead-reckoning system was unable to perceive elements like current and
wind drift which can, in some sense, be considered as a failure in machine perception.
Machine Interpretation, Comprehension, and Projection - Based on the inputs to the sys-
tem, the system attempted to fulfill these functions. This was not completed adequately.
And led to a the slow drift oﬀ course experience following the transition. While SA was by
far the major descriptor of the lack of grace in this transition, a gradual loss in performance
also describes it as, though this was slow developing performance loss.
Machine Decision Making - The adaptive control decision made by the computer, though
preprogrammed, was the wrong control decision. The computer continued to operate as if
under control by the GPS while in fact operating under dead-reckoning readings. Hence,
the decision made was compromised by the faulty nature of its inputs. It can be argued
that this was a programming error and not a true automation error; however, automation
error (more specifically software error) if classified in this manner will rarely ever occur,
which is simply a false notion. An automation failure occurs when it acts in opposition to
its design’s intent, not its programming actuality.
Operator Schema - The operator’s initial schema of the situation biased the mode setting
to have little feedback to the operator’s schema, hence when the mode actually changed,
the schema did not change. This failure of schema resulted in the failure of the operator
to correctly perceive and interpret the situation.
Operator Perception - Due to the subtle nature of the cues and the bias from the operator’s
schema, the operator failed to perceive the cues which would have prompted them to change
their schema to fit the new system mode.
Interface - The automation did attempt to alert the operator to the new operating condi-
tions; however, this alert was too subtle to be detected by the operator and was ineﬀec-
tual.
See Figure C.6 for an illustration of these mechanisms.
Design Principles and Lessons
The following design lessons can be learned from this transition:
• Salience in mode transition alerts, particularly in slow systems is crucial. Nothing
in the immediate operation of the Royal Majesty would have suggested such a mode
change. While procedure did call for the monitoring for the mode change, from prior
experience the crew schema was dominated by the bias that such a transition never
occurred and did not to be guarded against. This should not be considered as entirely
a crew error: this is a reasonable (and often good) human behavior in dealing with
highly reliable systems.
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Figure C.6: Mechanisms in The Royal Majesty Transition Case 2
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• Humans will allocate attention to the systems which are more likely to fail, suggesting
that any mode in a highly reliable system due to failure will need increased salience
to alert the human.
• An adaptive control system should be used with caution, especially in a slow-dynamics
system. If it is used, the same suggestions as before hold: emphasize the salience of
the mode switch cue.
• Unless time-pressure or other limiting circumstances don’t allow for human interven-
tion and judgement in the system, the replacement of a faulty sensor system should
not be automatically made without the direct consultation and aﬃrmation of the
operator. Had such a programmed requirement been in place, situational awareness
would not have been lost at the time of the transition, nor would performance have
gradually degraded in the manner that it did.
C.4 Transition Case 3
The NTSB investigation reports the following: “The second oﬃcer testified that about
2220, the Royal Majesty unexpectedly veered to port and then sharply to starboard and
heeled to port. The second oﬃcer stated that because he was alarmed and did not know
why the vessel was steering oﬀ course, he immediately switched from autopilot to manual
steering.” This is the reversion which will be considered here.
This reversion involves the transition between the NACOS 25 NAV mode and manual
steering. However, this transition has two particular viewpoints from which it can be
considered: the autopilot’s and the operator (the 2nd oﬃcer).
C.4.1 The Modes
Sheridan and Verplank LOA
The second oﬃcer, as well as everyone else on the bridge, was unaware of the previous
mode change (see Section C.3) and was, as such, operating under the assumption that
he was dealing with a system that was functioning in NAV mode with GPS data. Thus,
the perceived mode was level 8 on the Sheridan and Verplank scale; however, this was
not the true mode of the automation system. In fact the automation was attempting
to function as a level 1 on the Sheridan and Verplank scale. These levels are shown in
Figure C.7 and Table C.5. This particular problem associated with automation has been
recognized as mode confusion and has been documented and investigated by numerous
scholars [3, 139, 141, 142, 143].
Proud and Hart LOA
Observe Phase - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 4 within the
observe phase. Following the transition, the system was operating at Level 4.
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Figure C.7: Case 3 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Table C.5: Case 3 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Case 3 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Prior Post
8 1
Orient Phase - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 3. Following the
transition, the system was still operating at Level 3.
Decide Phase - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 8. Following the
trnaistion, the system was operating at Level 1.
Act Phase - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 7. Following the
transition, the system was operating at Level 1.
These levels are shown in Figure C.8 and Table C.6.
Table C.6: Case 3 - Proud and Hart LOA
Case 3 - Proud and Hart LOA
Observe Orient Decide Act
Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post
4 4 3 3 8 1 7 1
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(a) Observe (b) Orient
(c) Decide (d) Act
Figure C.8: Case 3 - Proud and Hart LOA
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C.4.2 The Trigger
The trigger which caused the transition was specifically stated by the 2nd oﬃcer, when
he said that he “was alarmed and did not know why the vessel was steering oﬀ course.”
As such, his intention could be construed as a gut reaction to automation surprise, an
intention to gain more control over the situation, or a mix of both.
This gut reaction to the oﬀ-nominal situation follows suit with that described in Section
B.4. Refer to this section regarding a similar trigger.
C.4.3 Factors, Mechanisms, and Design Lessons
Factors in the Transition
This particular transition exhibits the same characteristics seen in the transition analyzed
in Section B.4. Refer to subsection B.4.3 for further details regarding the factors involved
in this transition.
Mechanisms of Gracefulness
This particular transition exhibits the same characteristics seen in the transition analyzed
in Section B.4. Refer to subsection B.4.3 for further details regarding the mechanisms
leading to the loss of grace in this transition.
Design Principles and Lessons
This particular transition exhibits the same characteristics seen in the transition analyzed
in Section B.4. Refer to subsection B.4.3 for further details regarding the design lessons
which are pertinent to this transition.
Additionally, this transition suggests the importance of understanding the mode of opera-
tion prior to the mode transition. In this case the transition occurred in the fashion that it
did because of the remnants of the previous mode transition. Had this mode been under-
stood and the correct schema been adopted by the user, this transition, if still necessary,
would have been more graceful as it would have occurred under less time-pressures.
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Appendix D
Case Study: Aeroflot-Nord Flight
821
D.1 General Description
The following case study investigates the transitions which took place on Aeroflot-Nord
flight 821, a Boeing 737-500 which crashed outside of the Perm Airport in Russia on
September 14th, 2008. Prior to the approach to the runway, the system experienced a large
number of mode transitions, much of which was exacerbated by a pre-existing assymetric
thrust split in the engines. On approach to Perm airport, the pilots attempted to execute
a missed approach, during which the airliner lost radio contact and impacted the ground.
There were no survivors [48].
The performance suggests that neither of the pilots had the skill or experience required to
fly such a craft, which inevitably dominates any discussion of grace in mode transitions.
Additionally, the pilot in command (PIC) was reported as being inebriated, greatly reduc-
ing his ability to cope with changes in the system. While it should be understood that no
high-performance system such as a passenger airliner be able to operate gracefully with an
impaired operator, the condition of this operator gives a unique look at the consequences
of an “oﬀ-nominal” operator case and can provide incite into how to make a system more
robust in terms of gracefulness in mode transitions.
The following cases of transition were identified in this accident base on the report by the
Russian Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK):
1. Prior to the approach, the autothrottle was disengaged at 22:59:23. The transition
was preprogrammed, classifying it an adaptive control function.
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2. In entering the approach, a switch to “Altitude Hold” (ALT HOLD) was made at
23:06:30. Prior to the transition, the aircraft had been operating in “Level Change ”
(LVL CHANGE) mode.
3. In entering the approach, a switch was made to “Lateral Navigation” (LNAV) at
23:06:44, with the report describing it as most likely mistaken input by one of the
pilots.
4. In entering the approach a transition was made from “Lateral Navigation” to Control
Wheel Steering in both roll (CWS ROLL) and pitch (CWS PITCH). This took place
at 23:06:48.
5. During the approach a transition was made to full manual control by the disengage-
ment of the autopilot at 23:07:08.
D.2 The Flying Task
When considering the flying task, it is important to define “the whole” task, particularly
because Sheridan and Verplank refer to “the whole task” in their LOA taxonomy. In
this study, the flying task refers specifically to the maintaining and pursuit of selected
states in the vehicle. As such, the selection of states (e.g. determining desired airspeed
or altitude) is not what will be considered. Instead, the “options” referred to in Sheridan
and Verplank’s scale will describe all possible options that would be considered, either
consciously or subconsciously, by the pilot.
Such an example would be seen in the case of the LEVEL CHG mode. The user specifies
the desired airspeed of the climb and the desired altitude of the climb. The selection of
these parameters is outside the scope of what is being considered within the LOA. What is
being considered is how these external parameters are achieved: does the human generate
all possible flying options, does the computer, or is there a team eﬀort involved? Manual
flying describes the case in which the human does this entirely. A full autopilot with no
display of functions to the human would be considered fully automatic (Level 10). Level 7
describes a highly automated system which necessarily requires that the human be informed
of the state of the system, its actions, and the environment.
Additionally, as the system becomes more complex, the macro-application of Sheridan and
Verplank’s LOA becomes less beneficial. Instead, it becomes necessary to break the job
down into tasks with each of these tasks then being considered on Sheridan and Verplank’s
Scale. In the case of flying an airplane, the following task set can be derived from a general
list of available inputs to the pilot as well as the goal states:
• Attitude Control
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• Thrust Control
• Lateral Flight Path Control
• Vertical Flight Path Control
• Airspeed Control
• Descent/Ascent Rate Control
The first two, attitude and thrust control, represent loops which are more internal to the
system dynamics. In essence, these loops are closed by the pilot in order to (1) aﬀect
changes in the other control domains, and (2) keep the the plane in a controllable state.
As such, these loops are included when automation modes handle the outer loops, such as
lateral flight path and airspeed; in fact, good automation design guards against these loops
not being monitored, as some of the accidents have arisen from unmonitored inner loops.
The example of the Crown Princess is a case and point: the computer sacrificed heeling
angle control for heading control, resulting in a hazardous 70 degree heeling angle.
There are other various tasks that are present in the cockpit which indirectly aﬀect the
flying task, such as communication with ATC and health and status monitoring. These
tasks do not directly relate to the modes oﬀered in modern cockpits and are neglected in
this analysis. In general, the imposition of these tasks could be assumed to raise the overall
level of workload of a pilot during any transition, as they add to the attention drain on the
pilot.
D.3 Transition Case 1
The first transition to be considered is the autothrottle disengagement at 22:59:23. This
particular transition was built into the system as a preprogrammed mode change:
...the autothrottle disengagement was as per design, as the following condi-
tions were met simultaneously at 22:59:23...: flaps less than 12.5◦, thrust split
more than 700 lbs, and spoiler on any wing deflected more than 2.5◦.
Additionally, the report explains the following:
The aircraft, being in the LVL CHG mode, was reaching the assigned flight
level of 6900 ft ( 2100 m). Laterally, HDG SEL mode was active, and the aircraft
was turning with a bank of 20◦. Both engines were operating at idle. This was
set by the autothrottle before starting descent from 2700 m. According to the
logics of the joint operation of the autopilot and the autothrottle, idle mode
is maintained until LVL CHG is changed to ALT ACQ. After the autopilot
mode was changed, the autothrottle switched to SPEED mode. To maintain
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the speed when reaching the assigned flight level, the autothrottle starts moving
the throttles synchronically to increase thrust. When both engines N1 reach
40%, the autothrottle starts automatically matching them, by staggering the
throttles. If during this matching for some reason the N1 of one engine drops
lower than 40%, the matching stops. With regard to this portion of the accident
flight, the ALT ACQ mode was activated at 22:59:09. Simultaneously, the
autothrottle SPEED mode was activated and both throttles started advancing.
At 22:59:13 the N1 of both engines reached 40% and the autothrottle started
matching them, independently moving the throttles. However, after 3 seconds
left engine N1 dropped lower than 40%, so the matching stopped. By that time
the N1 split was about 20%, which led to a significant left banking moment
(created because of right sideslip) and forced the autopilot to apply right wheel
to maintain the roll angle established during the turn. The right wheel caused
the deflection of ailerons and spoilers on the right wing. Finally, at 22:59:23,
after the spoiler deflected more than 2.5◦, the autothrottle was automatically
disengaged, which is confirmed by recording of the OnOﬀ signal on the FDR.
It should be noted that in previous flights the autothrottle was also disengaged
several times in similar conditions.
D.3.1 The Modes
Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Attitude Control - In terms of attitude control, prior to this transition, the system was
operating in HDG SEL mode. This mode is meant to control the lateral component of the
flight path. At the same time it closes the inner attitude control loop in order to do this. As
such, the vehicle was operating at Level 7 on the Sheridan and Verplank Scale. Following
the transition, the vehicle was operating at Level 7 with respect to attitude control, as the
system was still operating in HDG SEL mode and ALT ACQ.
Thrust Control - Prior to the transition, the system was operating in SPEED mode. This
mode controls an outer loop state, in this case, airspeed. Essentially, it placed the system
at Level 8, where the computer was automatically controlling the engines. This control
process was hidden from the pilots unless it was requested (the pilots may navigate to
the engine display screen in order to view the engine status). Following the transition the
system was operating at Level 2.
Lateral Flight Path Control - Lateral flight path control in multi-engine aircraft is eﬀected
by the thrust split of the engines. As such, lateral flight path control cannot be reduced
solely to a function of attitude control. With this in mind, prior to the transition the
system was operating at Level 7. Following the transition, the system was operating in a
regime that might be considered Level 4. The vagueness of this classification is a result of
the Sheridan and Verplank scale only describing cases in which either the human does the
whole job or the computer does the whole job; there is no explicit case in which the human
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and the computer aﬀect the system through distinct, but parallel, mechanisms.
Vertical Flight Path Control - Prior to the transition, the system was operating in ALT
ACQ mode, placing the system at Level 7. Following the transition, the system was still
operating in ALT ACQ mode, meaning that it was still operating at Level 7.
Airspeed Control - Prior to the transition, the system was operating in SPEED mode,
placing it at Level 7. Since airspeed is controlled jointly by attitude and thrust (one of
which was now being controlled fully manually) this placed the system at Level 4 (again,
with the same diﬃculty in that no room is made for distinctly parallel controlling processes
within Sheridan and Verplank’s LOA).
Descent/Ascent Rate Control - Prior to the transition, the system was operating in ALT
ACQ mode, which sets the desired altitude. This process controls its inner loop of de-
cent/ascent rate to acquire the desired altitude. As such, the system was operating at
Level 7 prior to the transition. Following the transition, the system was operating still at
Level 7.
These leves are shown in Figure D.1 and Table D.1.
Figure D.1: Case 1 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Proud and Hart LOA
The system can be analyzed based on Proud and Hart’s LOAs; a breakdown into the
individual tasks becomes necessary for the Orient, Decide, and Act phase.
Observe Phase - Prior to the transition, the automated system was displaying a filtered
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Table D.1: Case 2 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Case 1 - Sheridan & Verplank LOA
Control Task Prior Post
Attitude 7 7
Thrust 8 1
Lat. Flight Path 7 4
Vert. Flight Path 7 7
Airspeed 7 4
Descent/Ascent Rate 7 7
picture of the environment and the system. This information, by the vary nature of the
display and its multilayered interface is prioritized to the user. Hence, the system is
operating at Level 6, and following this transition the system is still operating at Level 6,
as the display has not changed in any appreciable way.
Attitude Control:
• Orient - Prior to the transition, the plane was operating in HDG SEL and ALT ACQ
mode, both of which control the outer loops of flight path control by controlling the
inner attitude and thrust control loops. In order to do this, the system orients itself
automatically given the information passed to it by its sensors. It then interprets this
data in context with these two modes, “predicts” future system behavior, and will
eventually provide output (given output from the Decide and Act phases) to control
the system. While the human can be doing this in parallel, this parallel orientation
process does not feed into the Decide phase, and is thus irrelevant with respect to
this analysis. Hence, the system is operating at Level 7 prior to the transition. As
the system remains in HDG SEL and ALT ACQ modes following the transition but
takes on the contingency of thrust management and delegates it to the human, the
system is operating at Level 5. The thrust split aﬀects the vehicles attitude.
• Decide - Based on the output of the Orient phase, the computer selects automatically
the desired action disregarding the human. The human is allowed to be monitoring
the system in parallel, but their decision is not factored into the automation when
linking with the Act phase. This decision is directly linked to the action phase, and
the only knowledge that the operator gains of this decision comes from its implemen-
tation during the action phase. Hence, prior to the transition the system is operating
at Level 8. Following the transition, the system is still operating at Level 4 ( HDG
SEL and ALT ACQ), but the human is handling thrust management decision tasks.
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In particular the computer control decisions outweigh the human inputs to the system
in terms of gains from each output.
• Act - Prior to the transition, the human is allowed to intervene in the system at
any time, substituting what had been his or her background orientation and decision
processes for that of the computer. However, this intervention is solely contingent on
the human, and the system will automatically execute its decision without requiring
human approval. The operator is automatically informed of this decision via the dis-
play, which will show a change using the attitude indicator. Additionally, vestibular
cues to the pilot will inform them of the action of the system. As such, prior to the
transition, the system is operating at Level 6. Following the transition the system is
still operating at Level 6, as any action from the human via thrust management can
be considered “contingent overrides”.
Thrust Control:
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system is operating in SPEED mode, which
automatically integrated the information from the engines to determine the thrust.
Additionally, based on the required thrust levels to obtain desired states, future
predictions are made in this mode which are then used to generate the eventual future
control decisions. As such, prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7.
Following the transition, the system is operating at Level 2. This can be considered
as such because with the autothrottle disengaged, the pilot was now in complete
control of the thrust system. This required that all data and information presented
to the pilot both by the automation and by external cues be integrated by the pilot
to generate the control decision and output; however, the display thrust information
does incorporate some automated interpretation and integration of information.
• Decide - Prior to the transition, the system generated its own control decision re-
gardless of the human. The only output given to the human was via the Act phase,
in which the pilot directly observed the action output. As such, the system can be
described as operating at Level 8. Following the transition, the system is operating
at Level 2, in which the human is required to weigh all of the integrated data and
the predictions made about future system states to determine the decision for the
control output, using the computer as an aid tool.
• Act - Prior to the transition, the system automatically executed its control decision
and informed the human via engine output display and other various gages. This
particular engine display is part of a multilayered display and is not necessarily always
being viewed by the pilot, and as such can be considered as a “context dependent”
display. Hence, the system is operating at Level 7. Following the transition, the
system is operating at Level 1, as the pilot is solely responsible for executing the
decision passed by the Decide phase.
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Lateral Flight Path Control:
• Orient - Prior to the transition the plane was operating in HDG SEL mode. This
means that following a heading input into the computer, the plane automatically
oriented itself using sensor input, predicted system activity, and then generated the
correct control decision and output. This first process describes a system operating
at Level 7. Following the transition, the system is operating at Level 5, since HDG
SEL was still active, but the human is responsible for the contingency of thrust
management.
• Decide - Prior to the transition, the system is operating at Level 8. Following the
transition, the system is operating in a region best described as Level 4. While HDG
SEL is still active, the thrust split is being managed by the human, and as such two
decisions are essentially being made resulting in separate control outputs during the
action phase. In some ways the system is operating at Level 7 because the computer
alone is managing raw attitude, but in some senses the system is operating at Level
1 as well. Level 4 comes the closest to describing this situation: Both the human
and the computer perform ranking tasks, and the results from the computer are
considered prime (these are always automatically passed to the act phase).
• Act - Prior to the transition, the system is operating at Level 6. Following the
transition, the system is still operating at Level 6; both the human and the computer
are aﬀecting the process through separate means. However, the human actions are
purely contingency-based because of the thrust split.
Vertical Flight Path Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition, the plane was operating in ALT ACQ mode – the
system orients and predicts future states in order to determine control decisions and
inputs. As such the system is operating at Level 7. Following the transition, the
system is still operating at Level 7, as nothing has changed in this regard.
• Decide - Prior to the transition, the system is operating at Level 8, in that all decision
are made by the computer and the human is not informed of any of the “options”
and is only aware of the automations decision following the action phase. Following
the transition, the system is still operating at Level 8, as nothing has changed in this
regard.
• Act - Prior to the transition, the system is operating at Level 6, with the computer
providing all control actions, with the human operating only as a contingency back-
up with override capabilities. Following the transition, the system is still operating
at Level 6, as this has not changed.
Airspeed Control:
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• Orient - Prior to the transition, the system was completely in charge of orienting itself
and predicting future vehicle states. Hence, it was operating at Level 7. Following
the transition, this did not change and the system is still operating at Level 7
• Decide - Prior to the transition, the system is operating at Level 8, in which is
generates its own decision without informing the human. Following the transition,
the system is still operating at Level 8.
• Act - Prior to the transition, the system implemented its own decision with the
human acting solely as a contingency. Hence, it was operating at Level 6. Following
the transition, the system is still operating at Level 6, as this has not changed.
Descent/Ascent Rate Control:
• Orient - Prior to the transition, the system is operating at Level 7 as it oriented and
predicted system states without human input. Following the transition this did not
change and the system is still operating at Level 7.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system made decision neglecting the human or the
necessity to inform the human of such decisions. Hence, the system is operating at
Level 8. Following the transition this did not change and the system is still operating
at Level 8.
• Act - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 6, with the computer
automatically implementing all control decisions with the human as a contingency.
Following the transition this did not change and the system was still operating at
Level 6.
It should be noted that in all cases of observation, the pilot(s) had access to an out-the-
window view and were also immersed in the system which was being controlled. As such,
no matter how much filtering the display of the plane provide, there was were still unfiltered
vestibular and visual cues to the pilot presenting themselves in parallel with automation’s
display.
These levels are shown in Figures D.2 - D.5 and Table D.2.
D.3.2 The Trigger
The trigger mechanism is described in great detail by the report. Given the shear verbosity
of the description, it is obvious that this trigger involves a number of diﬀerent factors.
The immediate triggers programmed into the system consisted of the following logic: if the
system to reach a state in which flaps [where] less than 12.5◦, thrust split more than 700 lbs,
and spoiler on any wing deflected more than 2.5◦ the autothrottle would disengage.
Hence, the trigger can be mapped to the following sources within the updated Endsley
model, shown in Figure D.6.
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Figure D.2: Case 1 - Proud and Hart LOA (Observe Phase)
Figure D.3: Case 1 - Proud and Hart LOA (Orient Phase)
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Figure D.4: Case 1 - Proud and Hart LOA (Decide Phase)
Figure D.5: Case 1 - Proud and Hart LOA (Act Phase)
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Table D.2: Case 1 - Proud and Hart LOA
Case 1 - Proud and Hart
Control Task
Observe Orient Decide Act
Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post
Attitude 6 6 7 5 8 4 6 6
Thrust 6 6 7 2 8 2 7 1
Lat. Flight Path 6 6 7 5 8 2 7 1
Vert. Flight Path 6 6 7 7 8 8 6 6
Airspeed 6 6 7 7 8 8 6 6
Descent/Ascent Rate 6 6 7 7 8 8 6 6
• System States
• Automation Mode
System States - The automation was programmed to revert in the event that the previously
mentioned vehicles states were achieved. As such, the system states were a primary factor
in the triggering of this transition.
Automation Mode - The programming of the automation was the specific reason why the
transition took place. If the automation had been programmed diﬀerently this transition
would not have occurred in the same manner. Hence, this was a secondary factor in the
triggering of the transition.
D.3.3 Factors, Mechanisms, and Design Lessons
Factors in the Transition
This mode was particularly ungraceful – after the transition took place control of the
aircraft was only marginally maintained and performance suﬀered. While no definitive
statements can be made about the situational awareness of the pilots at the time of the
transition, it can be reasonably be deduced that it also suﬀered, as the pilots did not
control the aircraft in a way that suggests an adequate knowledge of their system. This
conclusion is corroborated by the following quote from the accident report:
After analyzing the pilots’ actions during a flight with thrust asymmetry, the
investigation concluded that both pilots lacked basic skills for flying multiengine
planes with spaced-apart engines.
Based on Endsley’s updated model, the following factors were identified as applicable to
this transition case:
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Figure D.6: Factors in Aeroflot-Nord Flight 821 Transition Case 1
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• Operator abilities, training, and experience
• Stress and Workload
• System States
• General situational awareness
• Mode situational awareness (All Levels)
• Automaticity
Operator abilities, training, and experience - The operator in this transition was reported
in numerous places within the accident report as having inadequate skills for operating
that aircraft. As such, the abilities, training, and experience of the operator was a large
factor, if not the largest, within this transition.
Stress and Workload - Throughout this transition the stress levels and workload being
experienced by both pilots was quite high. This negatively aﬀected the transition, disposing
the operators to not being able to operate at peak eﬃciency in the particular demanding
task of mode transition.
System States - The very fact that the system state was what triggered the mode transition
makes it a factor in this transition; however, the system states are a factor beyond their
triggering of the transition. The transition was triggered by system states that were par-
ticularly problematic; hence the pilots were being handed a dynamically changing system,
increasing the demands on their ability to insert themselves into the system.
General situational awareness - As mentioned previously, little can be definitely known
regarding the siutational awareness of the pilots. However, it is likely that the pilots were
unaware of the issues leading up to the transition as well as the states relevant to controlling
the plane following the transition.
Mode situational awareness (All Levels) - The crew’s strategy of control suggests a mis-
understanding of the correct ways in which to control the plane in the mode following the
transition. Of particulate note is the neglecting by the crew of using rudder input to oﬀset
sideslip induced by the thrust split.
Mechanisms of Gracefulness
The following mechanisms were determined to be the sources within system leading to the
ungraceful transition:
• Attention resource management
• Operator Perception
• Operator Interpretation, Comprehension, and Projection
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• Operator Schema
• Machine Action Guidance
Attention resource management - Given the high amount of stress and workload, identified
in the factor as present in this transition, the demand on attention resources was extremely
high. As seen in many other cases, this has a flow down eﬀect, making the cognitive
processes less eﬀective and more prone to error.
Operator Perception - It cannot be definitively ruled out whether this was, in fact, a
mechanism of the ungraceful nature of this transition; however, the high demand of at-
tentional resource and the errors in interpretation, comprehension, and projection suggest
that something may have likely gone wrong in the pilot’s perceptions.
Operator Interpretation, Comprehension, and Projection - Following the transition, the
crew did not apply rudder as a compensation for the slip induced by the thrust split. This
eﬀect was not missed by the crew; they applied wheel inputs to compensate. Thus the
interpretation and translation of this slip into a correct counteraction was not made and
contributed to the ungraceful nature of this transition by compromising performance and
reducing the amount of control exercised over the system.
Operator Schema - Due to the lack of training (discussed in the factors related to this
transition), and what was most likely deficient perception, the wrong schema was applied
to this situation, making it particularly ungraceful.
Perhaps most crucially, this transition exemplifies the necessity of training. While it may
seem like only common sense, and indeed it is, operators must be trained in all of the modes
which they will be operating. Additionally, they should have experience in transitioning
between these modes. Had this crew been more experienced this transition would have
been much more graceful and, most likely, never have been necessary.
The graphs presented in the report surrounding this particular transition paint the picture
of a pilots who were attempting to gain control of a system with which they were unfamiliar.
Hence, situational awareness regarding control input dynamics was being gained in the
initial stages of the transition. Had this been allowed to happen prior to the transition,
or had the input of the user been guided during the transition, this ungraceful action of
the system might not have been observed. Hence, operator awareness of control input
dynamics is a key mechanism seen in this transition.
These mechanisms are illustrated in Figure D.7
Design Principles and Lessons
Based on the major factors and mechanisms seen in this transition the following design
principles and lessons can be arrived at.
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Figure D.7: Mechanism in Aeroflot-Nord Flight 821 Transition Case 2
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• Mode transitions should not happen at times when the system is in a highly dynamic
state. As a large amount of things were happening at the time of this transition
and many diﬀerent states were changing in the aircraft, the pilots were forced to
act quickly and forcefully in the system during the transition. As such, the pilots
were unable to be cautious as they entered the control-loop. Designing procedures
and systems that preferably transition between modes when system states are stable
would be a good design principle. While this may not always be achievable, it should
be suggested that in the case that the human may be required to intervene in a highly
dynamic system, it makes sense to have them enter the loop during the“calm-before-
the-storm”.
• A possible design implementation to improve operator awareness could be a flight
director or control input director, in which the operator inceptor is guided either by
a visual or tactile display to the most logical control input. Such a design implemen-
tation would allow for the human to gracefully learn the current gains of the inceptor
system.
D.4 Transition Case 2
A switch to ALT HOLD at occurred at 23:06:20. The report can be quoted as saying:“the
autopilot pitch mode changed to ALT HOLD to maintain the altitude of 600”. Prior to this
the plane had been functioning in LVL CHG, which calculates the best climb or descent rate
to get at a selected altitude with a selected speed. At the time of this transition, the system
was operating in HEADING SEL and the thrust was being controlled manually.
LVL CHG is described as a function which will calculate the best climb/descend rate to
get at the selected altitude with the selected speed.
D.4.1 The Modes
Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Attitude Control - Attitude control is the inner loop of vertical flight and lateral flight
control. Both of these were being controlled automatically at the time by the computer,
and as such, attitude was also being controlled by the computer. Hence, prior to the
transition, the system was operating at Level 7. Following the transition, the system was
still operating at Level 7.
Thrust Control - Prior to the transition, thrust control was at Level 2. Following the
transition, the system was still operating at Level 2.
Lateral Flight Path Control - Prior to and following the transition the system was operating
in HEADING SEL mode. Hence, both preceding and following the transition, the system
was operating at Level 7.
180
Vertical Flight Path Control - Prior to the transition, the system was operating in LEVEL
CHG mode. As such prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 7. Following
the transition, the system was operating at Level 7 (ALT HOLD).
Airspeed Control - This is an inner loop of the LEVEL CHG mode, and following the
transition the airspeed and it is assumed to have been maintained by the computer (this
information is not provided in the report). As such, the LOA which best characterizes this
situations is Level 4. Following the transition it was still operating a Level 4.
Descent/Ascent Rate Control - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level
7. Following the transition, the system was operating at Level 7 as well.
These levels are shown in Figure D.8 and Table D.3.
Figure D.8: Case 2 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Proud and Hart LOA
No changes in the LOA were found in this mode transition case.
Observe Phase - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 6. Following
the transition, this was still the case (the system was operating at Level 6).
Attitude Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating in LVL CHG mode, in
which the vertical flight path is controlled to the purpose of attaining certain altitude
while maintain an operator specified airspeed. Attitude is controlled in order to
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Table D.3: Case 2 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Case 2 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Control Task Prior Post
Attitude 7 7
Thrust 2 2
Lat. Flight Path 7 7
Vert. Flight Path 7 7
Airspeed 4 4
Descent/Ascent Rate 7 7
achieved these states. As such, the system is required to orient itself to and predict
system states without the human. The display of such integration, prediction, and
orientation is context dependent, and thus places the system at Level 7. Following the
transition, the system is operating at Level 7 as well, in that ALT HOLD essentially
controls attitude towards a similar end that LVL CHG did, but instead it is tracking
a stationary altitude flight path rather than a changing altitude flight path.
• Decide - The computer is responsible for all decisions made and does not involve the
human in this process. As such, the system is operating at Level 8. This does not
change following the transition.
• Act - The computer is responsible for all control action outputs; however, the hu-
man is placed in a position of contingent control input. Additionally, the human is
necessarily informed of the action output of the system based on vestibular cues and
mandatory display output on the PFD. This places the system at Level 6. This does
not change following the transition.
Thrust Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition, the system is operating at Level 2, as it requires the
human to orient, predict, and integrate all displayed information regarding the engine
thrust. A small amount of information integration an interpretation is provided
through the computer display, but the brunt of the orientation task falls on the
human and ultimately rests with the human’s interpretation of the data. Following
the transition, the system was still operating at Level 2.
• Decide - Prior to the transition, the system is operating in a manner which requires
that the human generate, evaluate, and decide all control options using the computer
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as an aiding tool only. This places the system at Level 2, or full human decision
making. This does not change after the transition.
• Act - Prior to the transition, the system is operating a Level 1, in which the human
is responsible for all control actions regarding thrust. This does not change following
the transition.
Lateral Flight Path Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 5, in which the
computer handled all orientation, integration, and prediction tasks associated with
the active information handling task. However, in this case, because of the contin-
gency of thrust management being present here, this places the system as Level 5 .
Following the transition, the system is operating at Level 5 as well.
• Decide - Prior to the transition, the computer handles all enumeration, ranking, and
decision making processes, with no output to the human. However, at the same
time, the human is making decisions regarding thrust split levels, which impacts
lateral path control. Such control is secondary to the computers decision, as it is
not the primary method of lateral flight path management. As such, this places the
system at Level 4. Following the transition, this did not change.
• Act - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 6, in which all
actions were automatically completed by the computer, with the human acting as a
contingent output. In this case, the actions in the manual thrust management that
were directed towards the ends of lateral flight path management are considered to
be contingent control inputs (they are not the primary means of lateral flight path
management). Following the transition, the system was still operating at Level 6.
Vertical Flight Path Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7, as the computer
was in charge of all data interpretation, integration, and prediction relating to the
active information processing flow. Following the transition, the system is operating
at Level 7 as well.
• Decide - The computer was directly responsible for the selection of the control out-
put, and this selection process was not displayed to the user. As such, the system
was operating at Level 8 prior to the transition. This did not change following the
transition.
• Act - The computer was completely in charge of all control actions, with the human
acting as contingency management. As such, the system was operating at Level 6.
This did not change following the transition.
Airspeed Control
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• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 5, as the computer
was directly responsible for all interpretation, integration, and state prediction tasks,
with the human acting as contingency management in the case of thrust control.
Following the transition, the system is operating at Level 5 as well.
• Decide - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 4, in that the
computer was responsible for all attitude changes which directly aﬀected the airspeed,
but the human was responsible for all thrust changes in this respect. The computers
decisions are considered prime because they are implemented disregarding the output
of the human decision process, whereas the human decision process is directly aﬀected
by the output of the computers current decision strategy. Following the transition,
this does not change.
• Act - Prior to the transition, the computer is operating a Level 6, as the it is respon-
sible for all system output with the human acting as contingency thrust management.
Following the transition, this does not change.
Descent/Ascent Rate Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the plane was operating in LVL CHG mode, which
controls the descent/ascent rate optimally based on a desired airspeed and altitude.
This mode thus requires the system to fully interpret, integrate, and predict system
states without the computer; however, given the contingency of thrust operation by
the human, this places the system at Level 5. Following the transition, the system is
operating at Level 5, as nothing changed.
• Decide - The majority of the option enumeration and decision making was done by
the computer prior to the transition, save for the thrust decision-making performed
by the human. As such,the system falls under the category of Level 4, in which the
computer options are deemed prime to the human. Following the transition, this is
still the case.
• Act - Prior to the transition the computer is directly responsible for all actions per-
taining to descent/ascent rate, save those contingent thrust inputs which are being
controlled by the human. The ascent/descent rate actions of the computer are neces-
sarily displayed to the human via the vertical speed indicator on the PFD, as well as
through vestibular cues and the out-the-window view. Hence, the system is operating
at Level 6. Following the transition, this is still the case.
These levels are shownn Figures D.9-D.12 and Table D.4.
D.4.2 The Trigger
The trigger for this mode switch was the reaching the goal state of 600 m from the LVL
CHG function. The autopilot was programmed to make this switch upon arrival at the
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Figure D.9: Case 2 - Proud and Hart LOA (Observe Phase)
Figure D.10: Proud and Hart LOA for Aeroflot-Nord Flight 821 Transition Case 2 (Orient
Phase)
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Figure D.11: Proud and Hart LOA for Aeroflot-Nord Flight 821 Transition Case 2 (Decide
Phase)
Figure D.12: Proud and Hart LOA for Aeroflot-Nord Flight 821 Transition Case 2 (Act
Phase)
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Table D.4: Case 2 - Proud and Hart LOA
Case 2 - Proud and Hart LOA
Control Task
Observe Orient Decide Act
Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post
Attitude 6 6 7 7 8 8 6 6
Thrust 6 6 2 2 2 2 1 1
Lat. Flight Path 6 6 5 5 4 4 6 6
Vert. Flight Path 6 6 7 7 8 8 6 6
Airspeed 6 6 5 5 4 4 6 6
Descent/Ascent Rate 6 6 5 5 4 4 6 6
altitude specified by LVL CHG. Hence the source of the trigger extended from the goals of
the pilot and the state of the system.
The major factors aﬀecting the trigger were as follows and are displayed in Figure D.13.
• System State
• Automation Mode
System State - The system state reaching a preprogrammed value was the precise trigger
of this transition, consistent with a scripted control automation scheme.
Mode - The mode prior to the transition was was that which was designed for adaptive
control. Therefore, it was this mode’s own inherent programming which triggered the mode
transition, making it a system triggered transition (as opposed to an operator triggered
transition).
D.4.3 Factors, Mechanisms and Design Lessons
Factors in the Transition
Based on Endsley’s updated model, the following factors were identified as applicable to
this transition case.
• System State
• Environment State
• LOA Disparity
• Mode
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Figure D.13: Factors in the Aeroflot-Nord Flight 821 Transition Case 2
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• General situational awareness (All levels)
System State - The system state was relatively stable during the transition, which re-
duced the overall workload of the crew during the transition allowing for it to occur more
gracefully.
Environment - Along the same vein as system state, the relative absence of a large mount of
dynamism form the environment kept stressors to the crew at a reasonable level, allowing
for the transition to take place more gracefully.
LOA Disparity - The transition took place between to similar modes. By making a transi-
tion between two modes closely related in terms of levels of automation, the new amount
of control loops requiring prior knowledge to control was reduced, allowing for an easier
transition between modes.
Mode - The modes being switch between were of relatively low diﬃculty, making the
end states on either side of the transition not particularly taxing on the operator. It is
conceivable that, had these modes been significantly more diﬃcult, the transition would
not have proceeded as gracefully.
General situational awareness (All Levels) - There is no indication that the pilots’ situ-
ational awareness regarding this transition was insuﬃcient. While an insuﬃciency might
just be masked by the automations own abilities, the relative ease and intuitiveness of
the modes being considered suggests the pilots’ ability to understand the actions of the
automation, thereby contributing to the grace of the transition.
Mechanisms of Gracefulness
As this transition occurred in a graceful manner, it would only be beneficial to note that
there were no particularly identifiable mechanisms of “ungracefull” transition, nor were
there any positive mechanisms of grace. Instead, all that can be deduced from this example
is that the model worked well, with the operator retaining enough attention resources
throughout to successfully and accurately process information at all four stages in the
cognitive process shown in Figure D.14.
Design Principles and Lessons
This particular transition was particularly graceful. Based on the factors identified, it
is suggested that any procedural transition be programmed to occur when system states
and environmental states are relatively calm. This reduces the overall workload of the
operators, reducing stressors and increasing the amount of attention that they can devote
to the transition. Additional attention provided for the transition then allows them to
quickly understand the internal state variables associated with any new control loops into
which they are being inserted.
Probably the most eﬀective means of ensuring the gracefulness in this transition was the
low disparity between the levels of automation between both of the modes. By keeping
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Figure D.14: Mechanisms of grace in Aeroflot-Nord Flight 821 Transition Case 1
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these modes close relative to this measure, the system was able reduce the number of loops
that the operator had to take on during the transition (zero in this case).
While the modes were extremely close together, it is conceivable that such a transition could
become ungraceful had the pilot’s not understood the logic or the actions of the system;
however, as far as can be discerned from the MAK report, no situational awareness was
lost during this transition, retaining the inherent gracefulness associated with such a minor
mode transition.
It is thus suggested that the disparity between levels of automation be reduced to a mini-
mum during any mode transition. Additionally, the pilot’s understanding of the automa-
tion needs to be ensured by keeping them in the programming loop of the automation.
For example, the “assigned altitude” here was 600 m, which suggests that the pilots had
preprogrammed this and thus had knowledge of the future mode of the automation.
D.5 Transition Case 3
The transition considered here is the switching of the system into the LNAV mode at
23:06:44. The report details the transition as follows:
At 23:06:44 one of the pilots selects the LNAV mode. Most probably it
was done by mistake, when trying to select the VOR/LOC mode (the mode
pushbuttons are next to each other), which was actually selected a bit later.
The LNAV mode is described as mode whose function is to fly the preprogrammed route in
the FMC. It is unknown what this would have eﬀected in the system (FMC programming
unknown); however, this is not necessary to know as the next transition considered hap-
pened directly following this “inadvertent shift.” Prior to this, the aircraft had been oper-
ating in ALT HOLD and HEADING SEL. Throttles were being manually controlled.
D.5.1 The Modes
Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Attitude Control - Prior to the transition, the system was operating in HEADING SEL. As
discussed in prior transition cases, this mode is primarily concerned with the control of the
lateral flight path. It accomplishes this control via lateral attitude control. Additionally,
the use of ALT HOLD also control the vertical flight path through attitude (and thrust).
Either rate, attitude is being fully controlled as the inner loop of these other control
processes. As such, prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7. Following
the transition, the system was still operating at Level 7.
Thrust Control - Prior to the transition, the throttles were being controlled manually with
the computer only oﬀering assistance through display automation. As such, the system
191
was operating at Level 2. Following the transition, the system was still operating at Level
2.
Lateral Flight Path Control - Prior to the transition, as discussed earlier, the system was
operating in HEADING SEL. As such, the system was operating tat Level 7. Following the
transition, the system was still operating at Level 7. The only significant diﬀerent between
these two modes is the method of goal input.
Vertical Flight Path Control - Prior to the transition, the system was operating in ALT
HOLD, which can be considered Level 7. This did not change during the course of the
transition, and so the mode following the transition was still Level 7.
Airspeed Control - The airspeed is highly coupled with thrust control, which was being
operated manually and attitude control, which was highly automated. Again, the issue
arises of multiple inputs into a single controlled-variable. This mode of operation can be
most nearly described as Level 4. This was also the case following the transition.
Descent/Ascent Rate Control - As the vertical flight path control was being handled by
the mode ALT HOLD, so was the descent/ascent rate being controlled. As such, prior to
the transition the system was operating at Level 7. Following the transition the system
was still operating at Level 7.
It is worth noting that in all controlled tasks, there was not change in the LOA. These
modes of operation are virtually identical when considered in this way.
These levels are shown in Figure D.15 and Table D.5.
Table D.5: Case 3 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Case 3 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Control Task Prior Post
Attitude 7 7
Thrust 2 2
Lat. Flight Path 7 7
Vert. Flight Path 7 7
Airspeed 4 4
Descent/Ascent Rate 7 7
Proud and Hart LOA
The breakdown according to the LOA suggested by Hart and Proud mirrors that described
in transition Case 2. In the case of both lateral flight path control and attitude control,
192
Figure D.15: Case 3 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
the two modes most relevant to the LNAV mode change, the only change made was the
source of the goal states, which falls outside the realm of the LOA classification based on
the description provided earlier of the flying task. As such, no LOAs are traversed in this
transition.
It should be noted that the pilots had access to an out the window view as well as unfiltered
vestibular cues. As such, particularly concerning the observe phase, any filtering and
highlighting specifically refers to the automation display of the environment and/or state
of the vehicle.
These levels are shown in Figures D.16 - D.19.
D.5.2 The Trigger
The trigger for this mode is the most interesting facet. The report suggests the most
probably reason for this mode change was a slip by the operate: they meant to press the
VOR/LOC button, but instead hit the LNAV button.
As such factors involved in the mode change were the pilot’s own automaticity and the
interface of the autopilot which caused this slip. Additionally, these factors influenced the
performance of the final action by the operator. These can then be mapped to the blocks
within the updated Endsley SA Factors Model:
• Operator Automaticity
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Figure D.16: Case 3 - Proud and Hart (Observe Phase)
Figure D.17: Case 3 - Proud and Hart (Orient Phase)
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Figure D.18: Case 3 - Proud and Hart (Decide Phase)
Figure D.19: Case 3 - Proud and Hart (Act Phase)
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• Performance of Actions
• Decision
• Automation Interface
Operator Automaticity - The operator’s automaticity in pressing that button allowed him
to place less attention on that action. While this is a legitimate coping mechanism employed
by operators to successfully allocate attention in a high-demand situation, in this case it
led to a mistaken mode transition. Had the action not been so automatic, the mode switch
never would have been triggered.
Performance of Actions - Operator automaticity, as shown in the model, feeds directly
into the Performance of Actions block, which is where the failure took place. In this
transition, this block serves to represent the melding of two major factors, automaticity
and automation interface, which led to the supposed slip by the user.
Decision - The operator’s decision to VOR/LOC was, by virtue of the other cumulative
factors mentioned in this section, the root trigger of the mode transition. This is an
important occurrence: the compounding eﬀects in the operator and the automation served
to alter a correct action decision into a faulty action.
Automation Interface - The automation interface was set up in a way which allowed for
the operator slip to occur, and thus was a factor in the triggering of the transition.
These triggering factors are shown in Figure D.20.
D.5.3 Factors, Mechanisms and Design Lessons
Factors in the Transition
This transition took place in the midst of a large amount of activity by the crew, and due
to the transition being triggered by a mistaken input, it must be classified as ungraceful.
While situational awareness was maintained with respect to this particular transition (or
at least as far as can be deduced from the accident report), performance was suﬀering due
to the close proximity to other control tasks that were occurring as well as other mode
transitions. Hence, the following factors were deemed as contributing to the lack of grace
in this transition:
• System State
• Stress & Workload
• Operator Abilities, Experience, and Training
• Mode situaitonal awareness (Level 1)
System state - The system was actively turning at the time and ,when reviewing the report,
one will see that this transition was closely followed by a transition into the CWS modes.
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Figure D.20: Factors in Aeroflot-Nord Flight 821 Transition Case 3
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This next transition was a result of the highly active state of system, which was giving rise
to a high stress and workload.
Stress & Workload - These factors were key in making this transition less graceful than it
ought to have been. Due to the highly dynamic state of the system, the large amount of
functions which needed to be performed, and the lack of the operator abilities, experience,
and training, stress and workload were extremely high. This factor has a compounding
eﬀect due to its interconnection with these other factors: as stress and workload increased
the pilots became less able to deal with the situation, which led to more stress and workload,
somewhat like an unstable feedback loop.
Operator Abilities, Experience, and Training - The lack of abilities, as discussed just pre-
viously, did not allow for the operators to control the system in a way which would have
led to a graceful transition.
Mode siutuaitonal awareness (Level 1) - The fact that the transition happened by mistake
suggests that the situational awareness of the current mode of the system was incomplete
immediately following the transition. Hence, by the definition of grace this transition was
ungraceful due to this lack of situational awareness.
These factors eﬀecting the gracefulness of the transition are shown in Figure D.20.
Mechanisms of Gracefulness
Based on the update version of Endsley’s SA mechanisms model, the following mechanisms
were identified as relevant to this mode transition:
• Mode Setting
• Attention Resources
• Action Guidance
• Operator Schema
• Automation Interface
Mode Setting - The mode setting was faulty as not enough attention resources were able
to be allocated to this process to maintain its full functionality. As such, this flowed down
to the the schema temporarily selected by the pilot. While this schema didn’t particularly
eﬀect the performance of the system, it does represent an ungraceful transition: a graceful
transition would have seen the correct schema applied throughout the transition.
Attention Resources - Due to the large workload at the time, attention resources were
scarce during the transition. As such, this directly aﬀected the mode setting process. This
also had a direct flow down to the action guidance block.
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Figure D.21: Mechanisms in Aeroflot-Nord Flight 821 Transition Case 3
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Action Guidance - This process was aﬀected by the interaction of attention resources and
the requirements of the automation interface. Think in terms of quotas, the automation
interface was requiring that a certain amount of attention be allocated to it, attention
which was not available. As such, this lack of attention resulted in the mis-application of
the action guidance block, resulting in the triggering of the transition. Since the system
was already in a compromised state, the transition could be anything other than ungrace-
ful.
Operator Schema - Since the trigger of the transition was a mistake, it is impossible for this
to have been perfectly applied throughout the transition. While performance was relatively
maintained, given the surrounding circumstances, this schema conflict represents a loss of
situational awareness, and thus a lack of transition grace.
Automation Interface - The requirements of the automation interface given its design re-
quired a certain level of attention allocation and performance from the action guidance
block which could not be met. This deficiency was the root of the initial problems in the
transition.
These mechanisms of gracefulness are shown in Figure D.21.
Design Principles and Lessons
The major design lesson here is to follow good display design principles: design the display
to reduce the possibility of such slips occurring. A larger readout panel, more separation
between buttons, following Gestalt grouping principles, and customized tactile cues for
the buttons all might have prevented this mistake from occurring. All of these principles
provide a means for better human-to-computer communication.
Additionally, the recurrence of attentional resources suggests this to be a major part of a
graceful transition. If attentional resources are not available, this has a direct flow down
for the rest of the transition. Therefore, making transitions which require less attentional
resources, either by improving the circumstances in which they occur or structuring them
in a way that spreads attentional demands over time should make a transition more grace-
ful.
D.6 Transition Case 4
The transition considered here is the switching of the system from LNAV into both CWS
ROLL and CWS PITCH Mode. The report details the transition as follows:
Only at 23:06:48, when the left bank reached 32◦, the Co-pilot applied more
right wheel, switching the autopilot to the CWS ROLL mode....
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Probably the Co-pilot was not familiar with the CWS mode, as he also inad-
vertently applied force in the pitch channel, switching the autopilot also to the
CWS PITCH mode.
D.6.1 The Modes
Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Attitude Control - Prior to this transition, the system was operating at Level 7 (see previous
transition Cases for further explanation). Following the transition, the system had switched
to CWS ROLL and CWS PITCH mode.
The CWS modes do not fit particularly well into the Sheridan and Verplank Levels of
Automation. The CWS modes, CWS standing for Control Wheel Steering, work by holding
a particular aircraft attitude upon the release of the control wheel, provided that it outside
a specified dead zone (6 degrees bank in the 737). The attitude can be changed in this
mode if the pilot provides a specific amount of force with his or her input. This mode
of operation best fits in the“execution by approval” LOA described by Sheridan. Hence,
following this transition, the system is operating in at Level 5.
Thrust Control - Prior to the transition, the human had been was fully in charge of thrust
management, and the system was operating at Level 2 (see previous transition cases).
Following the transition this did not change.
Lateral Flight Path Control - Prior to the transition, the system had been operating in
the LNAV mode, and in HDG SEL mode just prior to that. Both of these modes seek to
control, primarily, the lateral flight path by aﬀecting the attitude of the aircraft. Hence,
before the transition the system was operating at Level 7. Following the transition, the
system was operating in the CWS modes, which are only concerned with vehicle attitude
and do not consider lateral (or vertical) flight path. Hence, the system was now operating
at Level 2, as only minor trend holding is provided in this mode.
Vertical Flight Path Control - Prior to the transition, the system had been operating in
ALT HOLD mode (see the previous transition case). This placed the system at Level
7. Following the transition, the system had switched into CWS PITCH mode, which
disregards the vertical flight path (although it will eventually attain some form of a constant
path) and only seeks to control pitch by holding constant unless the human intervenes. As
such, the system was operating at Level 2.
Airspeed Control - Airspeed prior to the transition, was being managed (see previous
transition cases regarding this assumption) by the computer partially, as attitude control
eﬀects on the airspeed were being mediated by the computer, but the human was in direct
control of thrust. As As such, the system was operating in a regime that most closely
resembles Level 4. Following the transition into the CWS ROLL and CWS PITCH modes,
this control was not present, and the system was now operating at Level 2 with respect
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to airspeed control. The transition is not to Level 1 because the computer still oﬀers
assistance through display automation.
Descent/Ascent Rate Control - Prior to the transition, descent/ascent rate control was
being handled by the ALT HOLD function, which placed the system at Level 7. Following
the transition to CWS PITCH mode, this was no longer the case, and descent/ascent rate
was being set by the user via the commanded pitch. The holding of pitch still did provide
some descent/ascent rate control, in that it would hold constant if left alone. Hence, the
system was operating at Level 2.
These levels are shown in Figure D.22 and Table D.6.
Figure D.22: Case 4 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Proud and Hart LOA
Observe Phase - Prior to this transition, the system was in charge of all data that was
presented to the human. The inherent limits of electronic displays means that this displayed
data was filtered, and the multilayer nature of the PFD and the other displays in the cockpit
describe this information as being both prioritized and highlighted. As such, the system
was operating at Level 6. Following the transition, this was still the case.
It is worth noting that there were vestibular cues as well as an out-the-window view avail-
able to the pilot. In some was this can be considered either as a parallel data gathering
system, or as an eﬀective way to reduce the Level of Automation.
Attitude Control
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Table D.6: Case 4 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Case 4 - Sheridan & Verplank LOA
Control Task Prior Post
Attitude 7 5
Thrust 2 2
Lat. Flight Path 7 2
Vert. Flight Path 7 2
Airspeed 4 2
Descent/Ascent Rate 7 2
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating in LNAV mode and as
such was operating at Level 5 (see previous transition cases). Following the mode
transition, the system was now operating at in CWS ROLL and CWS PITCH modes.
These modes still directly control the attitude of the aircraft and require that the
computer interpret, integrate, and project sensor data in order to control the system;
however, the human is placed in a position contingency operation still. As such, the
system is still operating at Level 5.
• Decide - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 4 (see previous
transition studies). Following the transition, the human decision making process was
now considered to be of higher priority, and as such the system was now operating
at Level 3.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition, the system was operating in a regime
that closely resembles an authority to proceed (the human sets the roll or pitch angle
and the computer holds this command). As such, the system is now operating at
Level 3.
Thrust Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 2 (see previous
transition cases). This did not change following the transition.
• Decide - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 2 (see previous
transition cases). This did not change following the transition.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 1 (see previous
transition cases). This did not change following the transition.
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Lateral Flight Path Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 5 (see previous
transition cases). When the system switched to CWS ROLL, the human was now
placed in charge of a majority of the integration tasks, placing the system at Level 2
following the transition.
• Decide - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 4 (see previous
transition cases). Following the switch to CWS ROLL, the system began to operate
in at Level 2, with the computer only being used as an assistant in the control decision
process.
• Act - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 6 (see previous
transition cases). With the switch to CWS ROLL, the system was now operating
at Level 2 with respect to lateral flight path control. It is important to note that
while the computer was only handling attitude and only handled lateral flight path
management to the point that a held bank angle controls this.
Vertical Flight Path Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system operating at Level 7 (see previous transition
cases). Following the transition, the system was operating in CWS PITCH mode.
This places the human in charge of most interpretation, integration, and prediction
tasks related to vertical flight path control. The computer still acts as an assistant
in this respect. Hence, the system was operating at Level 2.
• Decide - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 8 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition, the system was operating at Level 2.
This is because the computer now began to only be used as an assistant in the pilot’s
decision process.
• Act - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at operating at Level 6 (see
previous transition cases). Following the transition, the system began operating at
Level 2, in which the human was responsible for major task executions, but used the
computer as a backup control system.
Airspeed Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 5 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition, the system was operating at Level 2, in
which the human is responsible for all interpretation and prediction of data. The
display still helps with integration as an assistant.
• Decide - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 4 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition the human is now primarily in charge of
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all major control inputs, with the computer being used as an assistant in this respect.
As such, the system is operating at Level 2.
• Act - Prior to the transition, the system is operating at Level 6 (see previous transition
cases). Following the transition, the system is now operating in a way that has the
human executing all major control actions and the computer acting as back up by
maintaining the inner loops of attitude control. Hence, the system is operating at
Level 2.
Descent/Ascent Rate Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition, the system is operating at Level 5 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition, the system is now operating at Level 2,
in which the computer only acts as an assistant in the integration of the data from
the Observe phase.
• Decide - Prior to the transition, the system is operating at Level 4 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition, the system shifted to Level 2, in which
the computer is now only being used a tool to assist in the enumeration and selection
of control options.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition, the system shifted to Level 2, with human
handling major control inputs regarding ascent/descent rate. The computer, through
the handling of attitude played the role of a backup system in the control of this
parameter.
Table D.7: Case 4 - Proud and Hart LOA
Case 4 - Proud and Hart LOA
Control Task
Observe Orient Decide Action
Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post
Attitude 6 6 5 5 4 3 6 3
Thrust 6 6 2 2 2 2 1 1
Lat. Flight Path 6 6 5 2 4 2 6 2
Vert. Flight Path 6 6 7 2 8 2 6 2
Airspeed 6 6 5 2 4 2 6 2
Descent/Ascent Rate 6 6 5 2 4 2 6 2
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Figure D.23: Case 4 - Proud and Hart (Observe Phase)
Figure D.24: Case 4 - Proud and Hart (Orient Phase)
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Figure D.25: Case 4 - Proud and Hart (Decide Phase)
Figure D.26: Case 4 - Proud and Hart (Act Phase)
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D.6.2 The Trigger
The trigger for this transition was the input of the human into the system which exceeded
a preset threshold; any control wheel inputs beyond the said threshold would automatically
transition the plane into these modes.
The surrounding circumstances describe the plane as entering into a bank at a steady 2
deg/sec rate. The pilot input into the control wheel was an attempt at arresting this
motion. Hence, the trigger source was the pilot’s detection of an oﬀ nominal state in the
system. Additionally, the transition into CWS PITCH was most likely inadvertent, as the
the threshold was exceeded while the pilot was manipulating the control wheel in the CWS
ROLL mode.
Hence the following factors in the trigger were as follows:
• System State
• General SA (All Levels)
• Automaticity
• Performance of Actions
• Interface
System State - As described earlier, the system reached a state which triggered the oper-
ator to make an action input into the system. In this case, that particular system state
was one which the operator perceived to be suﬃciently out of control that it warranted
intervention.
General SA (All Levels) - The general SA of the operator describes his comprehension,
perception, and prediction of the system. In this case, a full understanding of the system
states in this fashion was the trigger for his action.
Automaticity - In perceiving the motion of the system and in attempting to arrest that
motion, the operator’s first and automatic reaction was to move the wheel in a direction
opposite this motion. Had the operator fully understood what this action would accomplish
(namely the transition to CWS modes), a diﬀerent set of actions would have taken place.
Hence, the automaticity of the operator in response to his understanding of the situation
was a direct contributor to the triggering of this transition.
Performance of Actions - This was, again, the culmination of all the other trigger factors
and was the final triggering mechanism of the transition. The movement of the control
stick (an action that can be interpreted in separate ways based on context) was the direct
trigger of this transition.
Interface - The user interface mechanism, as just mentioned, was the control stick which
has diﬀerent eﬀects based on context. In normal flight operations its deflection would result
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eﬀectively in the manual control of the rate of attitude change; however, in this case, the
switch triggered the activation of the CWS mode, which controlled the system similarly
but also in a subtly diﬀerent way.
These factors in trigger the transition are shown in Figure D.27.
Figure D.27: Factors in Aeroflot-Nord Flight 821 Transition Case 4
D.6.3 Factors, Mechanisms, and Design Lessons
Factors in the Transition
This transition was ungraceful in multiple ways: the high workload involved at the time (not
necessarily all of this was because of the mode transition), the lack of mode awareness, and
the loss of performance in the system. Based on the updated Endsley model, the following
factors were identified as aﬀecting the gracefulness of the transition:
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• Operator Preconceptions & Expectations
• Operator Abilities, Experience, and Training
• Opacity
• System State
• Environment State
• Mode Situational Awareness
• Stress & Workload
Operator Preconceptions & Expectations - The operator’s preconceptions of the control
stick eﬀects was condition based on the context of normal flight operations. Hence, these
masked the subtle diﬀerences of the new mode and allowed for the operator to remain
ignorant of these changes. Only if the operator had been looking or expecting these changes
would they have been picked up.
Operator Abilities, Experience, and Training - The lack of training in the CWS mode
allowed enabled the operator’s preconceptions and expectation to play such a detrimental
role. Had experience and training existed in the CWS modes, it is possible that these subtle
diﬀerences between normal operations and CWS may have been noticed by the operator
even though the transition was unintentional.
Opacity - The subtle diﬀerence between the modes is a type of opacity in the system, in
which the operation of one mode masks the understanding of another mode. In this case,
normal operation is so often experienced and so similar in many operations to CWS mode
that the use of CWS modes is not directly obvious. Hence, with little experience and a
preconception of how the aircraft would fly, this transition was doomed to be ungrace-
ful.
System State - The system states were in quite a dynamic state, splitting the operator’s
attention. Hence, when the transition took place, the operator relied on his preconcep-
tions of the new flying mode and was not looking for his mode confusion but was instead
attending to other matters.
Environment State - The environment of operation was quite hectic at the time, creating
an additional drain on the operators attention resources.
Mode Situational Awareness - The lack of understanding of the new mode’s control strategy
was a key element in the lack of grace in this transition.
Stress & Workload - Both of these were high during the time that the transition took place.
The presence of this factor fits the observed trend that this quantity has a significant eﬀect
on the gracefulness of the transtion.
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These factors in the graceulfness of the transition are shown in Figure D.27.
Mechanisms of Grace
Looking again at the mechanisms model, the deficient mechanisms in this transition leading
to a lack of grace can be summarized as follows:
• Attention Resources
• Mode Setting
• Operator Schema
• Operator Scripts
• Interpretation, Comprehension, and Projection
• Automation Interface
Attention Resources - Due to the large workload, associated mostly with tasks secondary
to the transition, attention resources were scarce for focusing on the transition. This had a
flow down eﬀect on the Mode Setting block, as well as the Interpretation, Comprehension,
and Project Block.
Mode Setting - The correct processing of the mode setting block did not occur due to
the lack of attention resources. While a transition was triggered, it was not completely
understood by the operator. This flowed directly into the Schema Selection.
Operator Schema - By applying the improper schema to the new mode, the operator
controlled the system in a way that was not appropriate for the new mode. This eﬀect
is subtle because much of the strategies between full manual and CWS Pitch/Roll can be
used; however, this is not completely the case as was apparent here. In addition to having
flow down eﬀect to the applied script, this eﬀected the Interpretation, Comprehension, and
Projection Block, which were already operating at suboptimal levels due to the lack of
attentional resources.
Operator Scripts - Because the improper schema was applied, this allowed for improper
decisions to be made and thus incorrect actions. Nothing suggests that these blocks not
functioning properly; there feeding processes were faulty.
Interpretation, Comprehension, and Projection - In applying the wrong schema to the
situation, any information passed to this block by the perception block was misinterpreted.
As such, this would result in wrong decisions and actions in context of the true system
state but in correct actions in context of the interpreted system.
Automation Interface - The diﬃculty in delineating modes as an artifact of the automation
interface was a major mechanism is making this transition not graceful. Additionally, the
subtle way in which this mode was activated did also did not provide adequate feedback to
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Figure D.28: Mechanisms in Aeroflot-Nord Flight 821 Transition Case 4
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the operator for them to understand that they were operating in a mode which they were
not expecting.
Design Principles and Lessons
The coupled nature of the modes via the control wheel made was the main cause of the full
transition into both CWS modes. Hence, the design of the interface is yet another major
mechanism seen in a transition.
The trigger in this transition eﬀected more transitions that it bargained for. In attempting
to arrest the banking movement of the plane, the pilot transition to a new level of au-
tomation in not only attitude control, but also in vertical and lateral flight path control.
The pilot had only been interested in making sure that the plane did not bank any further
than it was already banking, but in doing so was burdened with the tasks of navigating as
well. Designing the automation to react to the pilots input only in a way that would aﬀect
attitude control would have lessened the workload associated with this transition.
The following design features might be considered useful in light of this transition:
• In the case of a modes that are very similar, make sure that any trigger is not a
subtle switch but requires a conscious switch by the user. If this is not possible
or undesirable, both modes should be thoroughly trained by operators so that an
understanding of the subtle diﬀerence is second nature.
• Decoupling of mode change triggers by using only buttons for mode switching.
• If the previous suggestion is rejected based on the desire for quick and intuitive mode
switching, make sure there is a salient alert to the mode switch and allow for a quick
“undo” feature that will return the aircraft to the previous mode. For example,
an “undo” button here would have allowed the pilot to have reverted back to ALT
HOLD mode instead of remaining in CWS PITCH.
• Allow outer loop modes that deal with such functions as navigation, to dynamically
interact with user inputs into the lower order modes. For example, in the case of this
transition such a design feature would have updated the LNAV mode to modify the
lateral path of the vehicle so that, while the rate of turn was reduced, the programmed
waypoint was still the goal state of the computer. Essentially, the user would have
been modifying in an indirect way the flight path, but the total navigation task
would have still been handled by the computer. Such a design feature would have
significantly reduced the workload of the pilot in this case.
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D.7 Transition Case 5
The transition considered here is the disengagement of the autopilot to manual control
which happened at 23:07:08. The report gives the following explanation:
As the Co-pilot was controlling the flight in the CWS ROLL and PITCH modes,
concentrating on the roll control (by 23:07:21 he had managed to recover from
the bank) and the increasing speed (up to 160 knots by 23:07:08), the aircraft
started climbing (which was assisted by a significant nose-up moment from the
engines operating at 85-90% N1) and 20 seconds after switching to the CWS
mode (at 23:07:08), the Co-pilot applying manual stabilizer trim (most likely
inadvertently) disengages the autopilot. Neither of the pilots made a relevant
callout though one of them switched oﬀ the alert that was activated.
D.7.1 The Modes
Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Attitude Control - Prior to transition, the system was operating at Level 5 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition, the system was operating at Level 2, in which
the pilot was manually controlling the flight.
Thrust Control - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 2 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition, this did not change.
Lateral Flight Path Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2
(see previous transition cases). Following the transition this did not change.
Vertical Flight Path Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2
(see previous transition cases). Following the transition this did not change.
Airspeed Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition this did not change.
Descent/Ascent Rate Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level
2 (see previous transition cases). Following the transition this did not change.
These levels are shown in Figure D.29 and Table D.8
Proud and Hart LOA
Observe Phase - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 4 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition this is still the case.
Attitude Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 5 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition, the system reverted to a Level 2, in which
the human was not solely responsible for interpretation and prediction of attitude
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Figure D.29: Case 5 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Table D.8: Case 4 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Case 4 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Control Task Prior Post
Attitude 5 2
Thrust 2 2
Lat. Flight Path 2 2
Vert. Flight Path 2 2
Airspeed 2 2
Descent/Ascent Rate 2 2
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states. The computer was used as a integration tool to the extent that the PFD
provides.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 3 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition, the system was operating at Level 2, with
human providing all the decisions using the computer as an aiding tool.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 3 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition, the system was operating at Level 1,
in which the human was responsible for all control inputs.
Thrust Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition, this did not change.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition, this did not change.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 1 (see previous cases).
Following the version, this did not change.
Lateral Flight Path Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition this did not change.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition this did not change.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition the system was operating a Level 1, as
there was no computer assistance in the implementation of action (this is neglecting
computer mediated control inputs to the hydraulic system, ie. control gains).
Vertical Flight Path Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition this did not change.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition this did not change.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition the system was operating a Level 1, as
there was no computer assistance in the implementation of action (this is neglecting
computer mediated control inputs to the hydraulic system, ie. control gains).
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Table D.9: Case 5 - Proud and Hart LOA
Case 5 - Proud and Hart LOA
Control Task
Observe Orient Decide Act
Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post
Attitude 6 6 5 2 3 2 3 1
Thrust 6 6 2 2 2 2 1 1
Lat. Flight Path 6 6 2 2 2 2 2 1
Vert. Flight Path 6 6 2 2 2 2 1 1
Airspeed 6 6 2 2 2 2 2 1
Descent/Ascent Rate 6 6 2 2 2 2 2 1
Airspeed Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition this did not change.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition this did not change.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition the system was operating a Level 1, as
there was no computer assistance in the implementation of action (this is neglecting
computer mediated control inputs to the hydraulic system, ie. control gains).
Descent/Ascent Rate Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition this did not change.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition this did not change.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see previous
transition cases). Following the transition the system was operating a Level 1, as
there was no computer assistance in the implementation of action (this is neglecting
computer mediated control inputs to the hydraulic system, ie. control gains).
These levels are shown in Figures D.30-D.33 and Table D.9.
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Figure D.30: Case 5 - Proud and Hart (Observe Phase)
Figure D.31: Case 5 - Proud and Hart (Orient Phase)
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Figure D.32: Case 5 - Proud and Hart (Decide Phase)
Figure D.33: Case 5 - Proud and Hart (Act Phase)
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D.7.2 The Trigger
This transition was triggered by the manual input of the pilot into the system in a way
which was automatically programmed to turn oﬀ the autopilot.
These factors are then summarized as:
• System States
• Automaticity
• General SA (All Levels)
• Performance of Actions
• Interface
System States - The state of the system was what prompted the operator to make the
control action which triggered the mode transition.
Automaticity - The control action which the user took is a very common one for pilots,
who all learn how to trim a plane as a basic skill the first time they fly a plane). As
in the previous transition case, this was an automatic reaction by the pilot and was not
a rigorously thought out control action; there was not enough attention to warrant such
caution.
General SA - The operator was aware enough of the state of the system to make this
control input. Hence, this partial SA (partial as his mode awareness and comprehension
was insuﬃcient to prevent the mistaken mode change) was a direct factor in making this
transition.
Performance of Actions - This was the direct factor in the triggering of the transition: the
operator triggered the transition by trimming the airplane.
Interface - The automation interface was setup to make this transition based on a user
input. This was not a directly commanded transition, it was an implied transition (i.e. the
operator made an input so the computer should switch to a mode that can handle that
input).
These triggering factors are shown in Figure D.34.
D.7.3 Factors, Mechanisms, and Design Lessons
Factors in the Transition
The following factors, based on the updated Endsley SA model, were identified as active
during this transition:
• Opacity
• Mode
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Figure D.34: Factors in Aeroflot-Nord Flight 821 Transition Case 5
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• Stress & Workload
• Abilities, Experience, and Training
• System States
• Environment State
• Mode situational awareness (Level 3)
Opacity - The operator did not realize that his control action in the previous mode would
cause that particular transition. Hence, this opacity in the automation architecture led to
an unintentional mode transition, which compromised the immediate situational awareness
of the pilot (he was not able to predict future mode activation).
Mode - The mode into which was transition was fully automatic. Additionally, the prior
mode was also a fairly taxing mode to be operating in. These most likely had an eﬀect on
the operator’s ability to transition gracefully.
Stress & Workload - At the time of the transition, the operator stress & workload was high,
creating a drain on the attention resources (discussed in the Mechanisms section) and also
reduced his capacity in other regard. Hence, this had an eﬀect on the grace seen in the
transition.
Abilities, Experience, and Training - Both operators were lacking in this area, hence making
this transition less graceful.
System State - The system was in a highly dynamic state at the time of the transition,
making it all the more diﬃcult to achieve by demanding quick action on part of the opera-
tors. The operators, who, at the time did not have enough knowledge of the system states,
were forced to make inputs into the system with incomplete information.
Environment State - The dynamism of the environment was a major source of the high
workload and stress that the operators were experiencing.
Mode situational awareness (Level 3) - As the mode change was unintentional, it follows
that the operator did not maintain Level 3 Mode situational awareness at the time. This
is direct loss in the gracefulness of the transition.
These factors aﬀectingv the gracefulness of the transition are shown in Figure D.34.
Mechanisms of Gracefulness
This particular transition did not traverse across LOAs in a majority of the major tasks.
The only traverse was seen in attitude control. This is particularly because the prior
transition to CWS had already placed the other tasks at low levels of automation. At
this time in the report the performance of the system can be seen to be deviating form
what would be optimal. Additionally, the description of the Co-pilots activity at this
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time suggests an inordinate amount of work, creating a very high task load which in
turn was increasing his workload. All of these describe a system that was not gracefully
reverting.
Because very few LOAs were actually traversed in this particular transition, it is important
to look at the context. In looking at this context, a very important mechanism can be
seen: prior transition activity. The amount of mode transitions that took place prior to
this transition were significant and in quick succession. Additionally, a few of these mode
transitions were inadvertent, meaning that the pilot had not necessarily desired or planned
to have entered that mode.
Hence, the following mechanisms from the update Endsley situational awareness mecha-
nisms model were identified:
• Attention Resources
• Mode Setting
• Automation Interface
Attention Resources - As in the past transition cases, these were in short supply which had
a flow down eﬀect.
Mode Setting - This again was aﬀected by the lack of the attention resources. Fortunately,
the transition was hard-coded with an annunciation which helped the operator to adopt
the correct schema, eliminating the domino eﬀect seen in previous transition cases. The
problems seen in the mode setting process were not only aﬀected by the lack of attention
resources: the previous mode schema having been incorrectly applied (a previously un-
graceful transition) led to a faulty setting for the next mode. All of this suggests that a
high amount of prior transition activity reduces the gracefulness of subsequent mode tran-
sitions. This is probably due to a number of mechanisms within these prior transitions,
chief among which would be the reduction of situational awareness of the current system
mode, as well as high workload carry over from each previous transition.
Automation Interface - The interface yet again did not suﬃciently facilitate proper user
interaction at the outset. It did function well in announcing the new mode to the operator,
thereby forcing a certain amount of gracefulness into the system which would have otherwise
been lost by the subtle triggering mechanism observed here.
These mechanisms are shown in Figure D.35.
Design Principles and Lessons
The following design implementations could have helped improve the gracefulness in this
mode transition:
• Reducing the number of modes available is one way to reduce the amount of prior
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Figure D.35: Mechanisms in Aeroflot-Nord Flight 821 Transition Case 5
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mode activity. This would reduce the number of changes necessary to perform a
particular function and would also reduce the changes of inadvertent mode switches
or mode confusion.
• Having “implied” mode transitions, such as the switch to manual based on a trimming
action, are a double edged sword and should be treated accordingly. While they
do allow for quick access to certain modes, the probability that the computer will
misinterpret the human’s intent to transition dramatically increases.
• The addition of an “undo” function onto any autopilot which will revert to the last
system configuration would allow for the user to escape from any inadvertent mode
switches.
• Preview displays showing the immediate eﬀects of a transition prior to implementa-
tion.
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Appendix E
Case Study: TNT Airways
Limited Cargo Flight 325N
E.1 General Description
On June 15th, 2006, a cargo flight (Boeing 737-300) run by TNT Airways limited attempted
a CAT IIIA approach at the East Midlands airport. On approach the aircraft autopilot
was disengaged by mistake. In attempted to reengage the autopilot the pilot failed to
accurately judge his proximity to the ground and execute the TOGA procedure before
the airplane landing gear impacted the ground, nor did he ever successfully re-engage the
autopilot. In the impact the nose gear was broken oﬀ. After regaining altitude, the crew
made an emergency landing at Birmingham Airport (BHX).
The following transitions were identified in the case study:
1. The accidental transition to manual when the pilot attempted to respond to ATC.
2. The attempted transition by the commander to re-engage both autopilots immedi-
ately following the first transition case.
3. The last minute re-engagement of the autopilot in approach mode.
4. The final transition into TOGA mode just before ground impact.
E.2 Transition Case 1
The first transition being considered is described in the report [43] as follows:
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Meanwhile, the co-pilot had been monitoring the instrument annunciations. He
heard the aircraft automatic call of “Five Hundred’ and made the SOP “five
hundred feet” call to the commander, but he did no register the call from ATC.
With no response from the co-pilot, the commander was not sure whether the
ATC message was for his aircraft and, if so, what it meant. He attempted to
respond to ATC himself but he inadvertently pressed the autopilot disconnect
button as he started to speak so that both autopilots disconnected and the
autopilot disconnect warning sounded.
Given the description in the report, the aircraft had been configured for a CAT IIIA
landing, which is a method of all weather, ILS landing. The report [43] explains (emphasis
added by this report):
For a CAT IIIA automatic approach and landing, dual autopilot operating in
APP (Approach) mode is required. Both VHF NAV receivers must be tuned
to the ILS frequency and both autopilot channels must be selected to the CMD
position, prior to 800 ft RA height. After localiser and glideslope capture,
APP mode may only be disengaged by sing an autopilot disengage switch, by
pushing a TOGA switch, or by returning a VHF/NAV receiver. If disengaged,
the paddle switches will drop back rom the CMD position to the OFF position,
a flashing red warning light on the FMA panel will activate and a warning tone
will sound. If below approximately 800 ft RA, it is not possible to re-engage
both autopilots; one may be re-engaged, but the automatic land function is
disabled.
Hence, prior to the transition, the system is operating in APP mode using a glideslope and
a localizer.
E.2.1 The Modes
Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Attitude Control - Prior to the transition, attitude was being controlled as the inner loop of
the lateral flight path control. This was fully automated, with a mandatory readout from
the pilot’s attitude indicator. As such, the system was operating at Level 7. Following the
transition, the system had disengaged the autopilot completely, and so the system revert
to Level 2, in which the human was in complete control of the attitude with only analog
display aids.
Thrust Control - Prior to the transition, the thrust was being controlled in APP mode by
the autothrust SPEED mode. This was fully automated, with a manual readout of the
engine status to the pilot. As such, the system was operating at Level 7. Following the
transition, the system was still operating in SPEED mode with analog display aids. Hence,
the system was operating at Level 7.
Lateral Flight Path Control - Prior to the transition, the system was operating in APP
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mode, which controls the lateral flight path of the plane using a localizer. This is highly
automated, and is only displayed to the user in the contextual basis of a heading indicator
(there is no flight path trend display or future path display. Hence, this mode can be
considered Level 8. Following the transition, the human was in complete control of this
with only the heading display as an aid, hence this can be considered to be at Level 2.
Vertical Flight Path Control - Prior to the transition, the system was operating in APP
mode, which controls the vertical flight path of the plane using a glideslope track. This is
highly automated and is only displayed to the user in the contextual basis of the altitude
indicator as well as the vertical speed indicator (VSI) in the main panel. Hence, this mode
of operation can be considered to be at Level 8. Following the transition the plane was
operating at Level 2, as these same indicators were aiding the pilot, but the pilot was in
complete charge of the control inputs.
Airspeed Control - Prior to the transition, the system was operating in APP mode, which
was used alongside the autothrust SPEED mode to control airspeed. Airspeed is directly
displayed to the user, and as such, this can be considered to be Level 7. Airspeed is both a
function of engine thrust as well as attitude. Since the plane was still in SPEED mode it was
able to compensate for any attitude changes made by the human and maintain the desired
airspeed. Hence, while number of ways in which the computer could aﬀect the airspeed
changed, the LOA didn’t, and the system was at Level 7 following the transition.
Descent/Ascent Rate Control - Prior to the transition, the system was operating in APP
mode, which used a glideslope lock to set the vertical flight path of the plane and, as
follows, the descent/ascent rate. The controlled process was directly displayed to the user
through the the VSI, which places the system operating at Level. Following the transition
the pilot was in direct control of this variable with these same readouts, placing the system
at Level 2.
These levels are shown in Figure E.1 and Table E.1
Proud and Hart LOA
The system can be analyzed based on Proud and Hart in the following manner. A break-
down into the individual tasks becomes necessary for the Orient, Decide, and Act phase.
Such a breakdown is unnecessary for the Observe phase because this phase is concerned
with raw data which had not yet been sorted by task relevance.
The display within the cockpit is particularly static, making the phase of Observation
stationary when considered with respect to LOA. While an out the window view is always
available to the pilot, to include this option would make the analysis overly complex and
impossible by requiring that every shift of attention by the user be a mode change. In
fact, this is precisely what is happening when the pilot switches his or her gaze to the
out-the-window view and away from the analog display dials (at least in consideration of
the OODA breakdown). Instead of analyzing such “mode” changes, this ability will only
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Figure E.1: Case 1 - Sheridan & Verplank LOA
Table E.1: Case 1 - Sheridan & Verplank LOA
Case 1 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Control Task Prior Post
Attitude 7 2
Thrust 7 7
Lat. Flight Path 8 2
Vert. Flight Path 8 2
Airspeed 7 7
Descent/Ascent Rate 7 2
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be considered a dynamic process that can for the most part be considered in the realm of
Level 6, in which the computer is responsible for gathering, filtering, and prioritizing all
data.
Filtering of data is inherent to any automated sensory system other than perhaps a re-
altime video and sound display, as such displays do not filter our a negligible amount of
information. Prioritization, while not directly apparent, is inherent to the display layout,
in which displays such as the attitude indicator take priority over other display readouts
(e.g. coolant levels, turn coordinator, etc.)
Attitude Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition, the computer was in charge of all interpretation,
integration, and prediction in order to control the plane. Any data from this process
is then necessarily submitted to the human for review in the movement of the displays;
however, no prediction of states is provided. Still, this places the system at Level
6. Following the transition, the system was operating at Level 2, with the computer
only providing aid through display integration of data.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 8, with no decisions
or action options being displayed to the human. Following the transition, the system
began operating at Level 2, with the computer providing aid through the display of
data. No computational assistance was being given.
• Act - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 6, in which the
computer acted automatically, informed the human necessarily (displays, visual, and
vestibular cues), and allowed for human override in the form of a mode transition.
Following the exercise of this override ability, the system began operating at Level 1.
With these levels classified, the following understanding of the active mode prior to and
following the transition can be mapped on an updated version of Endsley’s model of situ-
ational awareness which includes the implementation of automation:
Thrust Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition, the computer was in charge of all interpretation,
integration, and prediction regarding thrust control. Any data was necessarily shown
to the pilot through the engine output dial. As such, the system was operating a
Level 6. Following the transition, the system remained at this level.
• Decide - Prior to the transition, all decision options and selections were done com-
pletely independent of the human. The pilot was only made aware of such decisions in
the act phase. Hence, the system was operating at Level 8. Following the transition
this remained true.
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• Act - Prior to the transition, all actions were handled by the autothrust system
and necessarily displayed to the human through displays, visual cues, and vestibular
cues. Hence, the system was operating at Level 6. Following the transition, the
system remained at Level 6..
Lateral Flight Path Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the computer was in charge of all integration, inter-
pretation, and prediction directly involved with the controlling process. This data
was displayed contextually with the mechanical compass (analog heading readout),
which places the system at Level 7. Following the transition the pilot was replaced
the computer completely, using the dials only as a aiding tool. This placed the system
at Level 2.
• Decide - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 8, with the
computer determining all control options and data selection. Following the transition,
these processes were turned over to the human, with the displays serving as tools in
this process. Hence, the system was operating at Level 2.
• Act - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 7, with the actions
being automatically executed by the computer and then contextually informing the
human of this action through the mechanical compass (as well as the magnetic com-
pass, but this isn’t used by pilots nearly as regularly as the mechanical version).
Following the transition, all control in this process was turned over to the human,
placing the system at Level 1.
Vertical Flight Path Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating in APP mode, which requires
the computer to completely orient itself. The human is informed of a portion of this
data integration, interpretation, and prediction through the displays, but is only
being informed of this process in a contextual way. Hence, the system is operating
at Level 7. Following the transition the system is operating at Level 2, where these
same displays are being used by the human to perform the active orientation task.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating in at Level 8, where the
computer was in charge of all option enumeration and selection and ignored the
human. Following the transition, this process was completely turned over to the
human, with the displays acting as tools in the selection process. This placed the
system at Level 2.
• Act - Prior to the transition to the system was operating at Level 7, with the pilot
being contextually informed of the output of the system using the altimeter and VSI.
Following the transition, the human was responsible for all control outputs, placing
the system at Level 1.
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Airspeed Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the computer is charge of all interpretation, integra-
tion, and predictions of vehicle states. The human is necessarily informed via the
airspeed indicator, hence placing the system at Level 6. Following the transition, the
system turned over attitude control, which is coupled to airspeed control. Hence, the
human became partially involved in the orientation process regarding airspeed, plac-
ing the system at Level 5 (the human handling orientation regarding contingencies:
in this case the attitude management).
• Decide - Prior to the transition, the computer handles all option enumeration and
decision processes related to airspeed control and ignores the human in this processes,
placing the system at Level 8. Following the transition, the system reverts to Level 4,
placing the attitude decision making in regards to thrust in the hands of the human.
However, the SPEED mode still attempted to obtain the desired airspeed regardless
of human decisions or input, so the computer decisions are considered prime.
• Act - Prior to the transition, the computer handles all actions, with the human being
directly informed of the action through the airspeed indicator. This places the system
at Level 6. Following the transition the system continues to operate at Level 6, with
the human handling the contingency of attitude management and control.
Descent/Ascent Rate Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition, the computer is in charge of the active orientation
process, with the human being necessarily informed of this process through the VSI.
This places the system at Level 6. Following the transition, the system was operating
at Level 2.
• Decide - Prior to the transition, the computer was in charge of the enumeration of
all options and decisions pertaining to the descent/ascent rate of the plane. The
computer ignored the human in fulfilling this role, placing the system at Level 8.
Following the transition, the system was operating a Level 2.
• Act - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 6, with the human
being informed of all actions of the system via the VSI. Following the transition, the
human was placed in complete control of all descent/ascent rate control, setting the
system at Level 1.
These levels are shown in Figures E.2-E.5 and Table E.2.
E.2.2 The Trigger
Using an updated model developed for describing Situational Awareness and its mecha-
nisms, the courses and mechanisms involved in this transition can be identified. Mecha-
233
Figure E.2: Case 1 - Proud and Hart (Observe Phase)
Figure E.3: Case 1 - Proud and Hart (Orient Phase)
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Figure E.4: Case 1 - Proud and Hart (Decide Phase)
Figure E.5: Case 1 - Proud and Hart (Act Phase)
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Table E.2: Case 1 - Proud and Hart LOA
Case 1 - Proud and Hart LOA
Control Task
Observe Orient Decide Act
Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post
Attitude 6 6 6 2 8 2 6 2
Thrust 6 6 6 6 8 8 6 6
Lat. Flight Path 6 6 7 2 8 2 7 1
Vert. Flight Path 6 6 7 2 8 2 7 1
Airspeed 6 6 6 5 8 4 6 6
Descent/Ascent Rate 6 6 6 2 8 2 6 1
nisms boxed in red refer to those which caused the system to revert ungracefully. Mecha-
nisms boxed in black refer to those which triggered the transition.
The trigger for the mode change in this case was a pilot slip which occurred while the
pilot was performing communications operations. This slip could be sourced to faulty
information processing mechanisms (the pilot just didn’t see where he was putting his
finger) and/or automaticity (he just wasn’t thinking about what he was doing because
he’d done it so often).
The trigger mechanisms are mapped using an updated model of SA from Endsley. As
these transition studies continue this model is being updated to map more mechanisms
seen in transition. As can be seen in this model, the following mechanisms were identified
as sources of the trigger of the transition:
• Operator Automaticity
• Stress & Workload
• Automation Interface
Operator Automaticity - The presence of a slip suggests that the operator was just not
thinking about the action which was being performed. This is exactly what automaticity
refers to.
Stress & Workload - At the time of the transition, the pilot was engaged in communication
with ATC, which is part of the reason why automaticity was so likely here. The high stress,
but mostly the high workload, of the system caused had shifted the attention of the user
so input into the computer was not as precise. Reduction of the workload very well may
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have prevented this trigger from occurring.
Automation Interface - The design of the interface allowed for this slip to occur by placing
the controls for communications and the autopilot in a configuration that could be confused
by the operator.
These triggering factors are shown in Figure E.6.
Figure E.6: Factors in TNT Airways Cargo Flight 325N Transition Case 1
E.2.3 Factors, Mechanisms, and Design Lessons
Factors in the Transition
Regarding the factors which made this transition particularly ungraceful, these mechanisms
have been mapped using the same updated Endlsey model (Figure E.6). These factors are
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as follows:
• Environment State
• System State
• Performance of Actions
• Mode situational awareness (Level 3)
• Stress & Workload
• LOA Disparity
Environment State - The environment required a CAT IIIA landing due to bad weather.
These less than ideal conditions made the error tolerance of the system much less. Addi-
tionally, this made the monitoring job of the pilot much higher, leading to a high work-
load.
System State - This transition occurred when the system was operating in a very specialized
regime, namely landing (CAT IIIA). Aside from just the diﬃculty of the environment in
which it was operating, the system was in a particular regime of states which did not allow
for any large amount deviation.
Performance of Actions - The transition trigger was ultimately a mistake. There is no
reason to believe that there as an error in any of the pilots processing of the information
outside of the mistaken action (definition of a slip). The very fact that this mode was
unexpected because of the mistake in the human’s performance of a control action was a
large part of the subsequent ungraceful transition.
Slips have been the trigger and cause of other transition in some of the other case studies
that have been looked at; however, the major diﬀerence between this transition and the
others is the dramatic change caused here. Previous studies which contained slips as
triggers only resulted in minor mode changes, this slip caused the complete (an irreversible)
switch to full manual. The fact that such a drastic change could be triggered by a slip
input should raise a red flag.
Mode situational awareness (Level 3) - Because the mode transition was a slip, there was
a deficiency in the pilot’s Level 3 situational awareness, namely his expectations of future
mode actions. He was not projecting that such a transition would occur, and as such he
was not ready to insert himself into the control, nor did he want to.
Stress & Workload - The high workload and stress placed upon the pilot in this transition
directly impacted his ability to maintain control of the system. Prior to the transition
the pilot had been engaged in communication with ATC, now with the system reverted
he was also in charge of the entire flying task of the plane, a significant increase in his
taskload.
238
LOA Disparity - A major characteristic of this transition was the disparity between the
modes that were switched between. The pilot reverted from a mode at a very high LOA to a
mode at a very low LOA. Additionally, the LSC were very diﬀerent, causing an appreciable
change not only in the magnitude of the taskload on the pilot, but also the major diﬀerence
in the types of tasks being handled by the pilot.
These factors in the gracefulness of the transition are shown in Figure E.6.
Mechanism of Gracefulness
By using Endsley’s 1988 model of mechanisms in situational awareness augmented with a
4-stage model of automation, the mechanisms which led to the lack of graceful transition
can be better understood. This model is shown in Figure E.7, with the mechanisms of
interest circled in red.
As can be seen in Figure E.7, the mechanisms of interest regarding the gracefulness of this
transition are:
• Attention Resources
• Mode Setting
• Operator Perception
• Operator Interpretation, Comprehension, and Projection
• Operator Schema
Attention Resources - As suggested by the factors related to this transition, there was
a significant attention drain on the operator at the time, give the environment, system
state, stress, and workload associated with the tasks at hand. In particular, this reduced
the amount of attention that the operator had to devote to the particular processes of
perception, interpretation, comprehensions, and projection.
Mode Setting - Additionally, the attention deficiency had a cascade aﬀect to the mode
selection process, particularly in reference to the operators proper selection of a new oper-
ating schema. While the operator was aware of the mode change and the new active mode
of the automation, the lack of attention resources caused the operator to select a particular
schema which was not capable of maintaining nominal vehicle states.
Operator Schema - The operator’s adopted schema following this transition is seen in
the next transition case as attempting to revert back to the mode prior to this current
transition. This schema was aﬀected both by the current mode setting of the plane as well
as the pilot’s perception of the states. These two influences on the schema selection are
discussed in the following paragraphs. What should be noted is that the schema helps to
determine the users own perception, a loop describing a phenomenon known as continuation
bias. Interestingly with the introduction of automation as shown in Figure E.7, this closed
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loop becomes easier to break out of because of the outside influence of automation on
schema selection.
Operator Perception - The lack of attention resources also aﬀected the first two phases of
the operator’s information processing, but it is diﬃcult to determine which of these was
most at fault. As the plane began to drift from centerline and deviate from the glideslope it
is apparent that the pilot was not fully aware of the states of the plane. Had he been fully
aware, as the model in Figure E.7 suggests, this would have positively aﬀected his schema
selection, which would have then positively aﬀected his interpretation, comprehension, and
projection of the current states of the system. Had this ideal flow been accomplished, it
is conceivable that the pilot would have reverted to a state in which he was maintaining
more of the planes states than trying to revert again (see the next case).
Operator Interpretation, Comprehension, and Projection - It could be argued that the
pilot did in fact perceive the states of the system and the environment to the point where
it positively aﬀected the selection of his schema for the situation; however, the mode
setting was enough of an influence to oﬀset this positive influence. Regardless, the lack of
attention can be seen aﬀecting particularly the projection abilities of the pilot, as had this
mechanism been functioning correctly the pilot would have taking preventative actions at
once, of which would have included regaining control of the aircraft instead of neglecting
that control while trying to revert (see next the next case).
Design Principles and Lessons
The following possible designs could have been implemented to provide a more graceful
transition:
• Concerning the eﬀect that the extreme environmental conditions at the time of the
transition, it is suggested that systems be designed to require as few transitions as
possible when operating under extreme conditions.
• Placing safeguards on such transition would be advisable. This would eﬀectively (1)
reduce the possibility of a slip resulting in such a drastic mode transition and (2)
increase the chances that the pilot will be aware of future mode behavior.
• Reduce the disparity between levels of automation in between modes.
• Develop the cockpit interface to remove the autopilot panel from any proximity to a
frequently used panel in order to remove the chances of a slip.
• Require an more interactive mode change to remove the possibility of automaticity
setting in. Additionally, this interaction can help aﬀect the correct selection of schema
by the operator through the learning/storing loop.
• Place a default time delay (one which can be overridden by the pilots in case of
emergency) with a count down before a transition and a salient warning to minimize
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Figure E.7: Mechanisms in TNT Airways Cargo Flight 325N Transition Case 1
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unexpected transitions. For example, in this particular case a warning would have
sounded indicating that in 3 seconds the plane would be reverting to manual control.
• In the event that the previous design suggestion is implemented, provide a transition
cancel button.
• Do not allow such a large transition unless absolutely necessary. Such a large change
in level of automation necessarily brings with it a large change in the operator’s
schema. The less change required for the operator the better. Additionally, such
large changes, as shown by the model, place a significant demand on the operator’s
attention resources in a very limited amount time, reducing the operators overall
performance. A flight director would provide an intermediate level of automation
which could reduce the attention demand on the pilot and reduce workload.
• Including a preview display and/or trend display could improve the operator’s predic-
tion of the future states of the vehicle, regardless of his or her own schema selection,
improving decision and action performance.
E.3 Transition Case 2
The second transition being considered is the attempt of the commander to re-engage the
autopilots following the transition described in Case 1. The report describes this transition
as follows:
A short time later, Channel B was re-engaged in Command mode. Channel
A was then re-engaged, but this resulted in Channel B dropping out. When
Channel B was re-engaged, Channel A dropped out. For most of the remainder
of the approach, the autopilot was left with Channel B engaged and CWS P
(pitch) and CWS R (roll) mods were active. At this point, the aircraft pitch
trim had been adjusted by the autopilot and the aircraft’s pitch attitude had
become slightly more nose high than during the earlier part of the approach.
The aircraft also adopted a slight left wing down roll attitude, with its heading
diverging slowly to the left, towards the runway extended centreline.
Channel A and Channel B refer to the two autopilot computers. In all cases other than
APP mode, there is only one active. It is required that both be active for the plane to enter
APP mode, hence, the switching back and for shows the pilots intention of moving back
to APP mode. The report oﬀers the following description of the autopilot as well:
Whenever an autopilot engage paddle switch is selected, but without a pitch
or roll mode begin selected, then the switch will latch in the CMD position.
In this circumstance, the autopilot mode will default to CWS and the CWS R
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and CWS P legends will illuminate on the status panel. When the autopilot is
operating in CWS mode with the paddle switch in the CMD position, and the
APP mode is armed, the autopilot can intercept a localiser. As the localiser
course is intercepted, the autopilot status annunciation CWS ROLL disappears
and VOR/LOC appears.
E.3.1 The Modes
Sheridan and Verplank LOA
While there were multiple phases in this transition, there is no discernible diﬀerence in the
operation of the system when operating in Channel A or Channel B. The main purpose
of activating both autopilot channels was to allow for the transition back into APP mode,
which was theoretically not allowed below 800 ft.
Attitude Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the
previous transition case). Following the transition, the system was operating with CWS
ROLL and CWS PITCH active. In this case, this particular mode holds the current
attitude of the aircraft unless the human inputs a control wheel input larger than a preset
threshold. While this doesn’t map particularly easy to Sheridan and Verplank’s Levels,
the most applicable is the execution on approval, placing the system at Level 5.
Thrust Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7 (see the previ-
ous transition case), with the SPEED mode handling all thrust related control. Following
the transition this was still case.
Lateral Flight Path Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level
2 (see the previous transition case). Following the transition the system was operating
in CWS ROLL mode which, while it partially handles the attitude (roll) control of the
aircraft, it only partially aids the human in the management of the lateral flight path. As
such, the system can still be considered as operating at Level 2.
Vertical Flight Path Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level
2 (see the previous transition case). Following the transition the system was operating at
Level 2 for similar reasons as discussed in for lateral flight path management.
Airspeed Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7 (see the
previous transition case). Following the transition this did not change.
Descent/Ascent Rate Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level
2 (see the previous transition case). Following the transition, while CWS PITCH was
helping in the management of the vehicle attitude, in consideration of descent/ascent rate
control the human was in charge of the main control task. As such, the system can still be
considered as operating at Level 2.
These levels of automation are shown in Figure E.8 and Table E.3.
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Figure E.8: Case 2 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Table E.3: Case 2 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Case 2 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Control Task Prior Post
Attitude 2 5
Thrust 7 7
Lat. Flight Path 2 2
Vert. Flight Path 2 2
Airspeed 2 2
Descent/Ascent Rate 2 2
244
Proud and Hart LOA
The system can be analyzed based on Proud and Hart in the following manner. A break-
down into the individual tasks becomes necessary for the Orient, Decide, and Act phase.
Such a breakdown is unnecessary for the Observe phase because this phase is concerned
with raw data which had not yet been sorted by task relevance.
Attitude Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition, the system was operating in both CWS
ROLL and CWS PITCH modes, which places human in the position of constantly
checking the computers own orientation, acting as contingency control in the case that
the current action of the system is not satisfactory. Hence, the system is operating
at Level 5.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the system left the computer making control
decisions for the most part; however, if the human decided on a control action, this
was considered the prime to the computer’s decision. As such, the system was now
operating at Level 3.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 1 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the system left the computer making a
majority of the control inputs; however, the fact that the human is constantly able
to make control inputs with based on a fairly tight control loop with the computer,
the system resembles an authority-to-proceed structure. This places the system at
Level 3.
Thrust Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6 (see the previous
transition case). Following this transition, since the system was still operating in
SPEED mode, there was not shift in LOA.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 8 (see the previous
transition case). This did not change following the transition.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6 (see the previous
transition case). This did not change following the transition.
Lateral Flight Path Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the previous
transition case). Following this transition, the system remained at this level, as the
human was still in charge of all orientation tasks using the computer as an aid.
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• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition this did not change.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 1. With CWS ROLL
mode engaged, the computer began to aid the human in the action task, but only
slightly (hold the current attitude). Hence, the system can be considered as operating
at Level 2.
Vertical Flight Path Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the previous
transition case). Following this transition the system remained at this level.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the previous
transition case). Following this transition there was not change.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 1 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the CWS PITCH mode provided some
aid in the Act phase; however, this was very small amount of aid, with the human
primarily in charge controlling the system with respect to the vertical flight path.
Hence, the system can be considered as operating at Level 2.
Airspeed Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 5 (see the previous
transition case). This did not change following the transition.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 4 (see the previous
transition case). This did not change following the transition.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6 (see the previous
transition case). This did not change following the transition.
Descent/Ascent Rate Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the previous
transition case). This did not change following the transition.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the previous
transition case). This did not change following the transition.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 1 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition, the CWS PITCH mode provide a very
small amount of aid in the action phase of this control task, placing the system at
Level 2.
These levels are shown in Figures E.9-E.12 and Table E.4.
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Figure E.9: Case 2 - Proud and Hart (Observe Phase)
Figure E.10: Case 2 - Proud and Hart (Orient Phase)
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Figure E.11: Case 2 - Proud and Hart (Decide Phase)
Figure E.12: Case 2 - Proud and Hart (Act Phase)
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Table E.4: Case 2 - Proud and Hart LOA
Case 2 - Proud and Hart LOA
Control Task
Observe Orient Decide Act
Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post
Attitude 6 6 2 5 2 3 1 3
Thrust 6 6 6 6 8 8 6 6
Lat. Flight Path 6 6 2 2 2 2 1 2
Vert. Flight Path 6 6 2 2 2 2 1 2
Airspeed 6 6 5 5 4 4 6 6
Descent/Ascent Rate 6 6 2 2 2 2 1 2
E.3.2 The Trigger
The report suggests the following in regards to these mode transitions:
During his short period of distraction, while he was responding to ATC, he at-
tempted to reinstate the autopilot. A natural and automatic human response to
a problem, particularly when under stress, is to reverse actions associated with
an unwanted eﬀect, in an attempt to re-establish a status-quo. Thus, the com-
manders action of re-engaging the autopilot was probably an (inappropriate)
automatic rather than a considered action.
Hence, the main source for this transition was the automaticity of the user. Additionally,
we can suggest that the trigger for the user was his desire to revert back to the previous
mode.
Mapping the trigger sources to the updated Endsley mode suggests the following factors
were involved in the triggering:
• Individual Goals & Objectives
• Operator Preconceptions
• Operator Automaticity
Individual Goals & Objectives - The operator’s goal at the time of the transition was to
continue to the descent and land. Instead, given the operating constraints suggested by a
CAT IIIA landing, this goal should have turned towards regaining control and executing a
go-around. Hence, by the goal of landing remaining active, the trigger towards reverting
modes was enabled. This trigger would not have been considered had the goal changed
correctly.
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Operator Preconceptions - Operator knowledge concerning the structure and restrictions
in the autopilot system were another factor. Had the pilot known that this transition
was impossible, the transition would not have been attempted in the first place, most
likely.
Operator Automaticity - The major factor seen here is the automaticity the pilot in at-
tempting to aﬀect a mode change. As the prior transition was obviously not intended by
the user, the natural “gut reaction” of the pilot was to try and regain the control of the
system by reverting back to the previous mode. As such, prior mode transition success
and intentions were factors aﬀecting this mode transition.
These triggering factors are shown in Figure E.13.
Figure E.13: Factors in TNT Airways Cargo Flight 325N Transition Case 2
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E.3.3 Factors, Mechanisms, and Design Lessons
Factors in the Transition
Regarding the ungraceful nature of this transition, the following factors were deemed sig-
nificant at the time of the transition:
• System State
• Environment State
• Mode SA (Level 1)
• Stress & Workload
• Automation Capability
System State - The states of the system were operating in the context of landing, placing a
super-normal amount of performance requirements on the system and the operator. This
contributed to the high workload and stress seen during the transition.
Environment State - As discussed in prior transition, the operating environment consisted
of severe weather conditions. This environmental state contributed directly to the workload
placed on the pilot, but it was also responsible for reducing the boundary of safe operation
for the pilot.
Mode SA (Level 1) - The pilot was unaware of the 800 ft aal. APP mode activation
restriction, hence he continued to try and gain control of a system through an impossible
means. This lack of awareness enabled a significant attention drain as he attempted to
undo his mistake instead of directing these eﬀorts towards controlling the system.
Stress & Workload - With the previous mode being almost fully manual the workload on
the pilot was considerable. Additionally, the CWS modes still required a large amount of
pilot interaction. These conditions elevated the stress and workload of the pilot, decreasing
the eﬃciency with which the operator was able to allocate attention resources.
Automation Capability - The automation was unable to make the intended transition
to APP mode due to the programmed 800 ft aal. limit to the implementation of that
mode.
These factors concerning the gracefulness of the transition are shown in Figure E.13.
Mechanisms of Gracefulness
As this transition case happened in such quick succession with the previous transition case,
it is not surprising to see that the same mechanisms of gracefulness are at work here as
well. As can be seen in Figure 2.6, the mechanisms identified as active in inhibiting the
gracefulness were:
• Attention Resources
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• Mode Setting
• Operator Perception
• Operator Interpretation, Comprehension, and Prediction
• Operator Schema
Attention Resources - Given the factors discussed previously, attentional resources were
scarce for the operator while this transition was taking place, as well as following the
transition. This scarcity of resources impacted the other mechanisms within the operator’s
information processing, in general leading to ungraceful nature of the transition.
Mode Setting - The way in which the mode setting process was occurring was particularly
problematic in this transition. In some senses, this transition was ungraceful because this
process was never able to accomplish the intent of the pilot, which was to revert back to the
previous mode of operation. As such, the diﬃculties in the mode setting process allowed
the pilot to retain an inappropriate schema for the given circumstances.
Operator Perception - This process was aﬀected in a similar way as it was in the previous
transition. The scarcity of attention resources interfered with the ability of the pilot to
perceive the environment around him, which in turn aﬀected the correct application of
schema to the current situation.
Operator Interpretation, Comprehension, and Prediction - As the correct application of
schema was impacted by deficient perception phase, this in turn aﬀected the operator’s
interpretation, comprehension, and prediction of the current situation. This is seen in
the operator’s determination that the system could recover back to the previous mode
(while this may have been theoretically possible the architecture of the automation made
this infeasible, a fact which should have been recognized by a correctly perceiving pilot).
This interpretation of a system still operating within acceptable parameters led to the
incorrect (objectively incorrect; subjectively, based on the interpretation, correct) decision
of attempting re-engage the autopilot on APP mode.
Operator Schema - The incorrect schema was applied to the current situation based on a
faulty perception of the system and environment, as well as an incorrect understanding of
the available modes with the mode setting process.
These mechanisms of gracefulness are shown in Figure E.14.
Design Principles and Lessons
The major design lessons from this transition are as follows:
• The obvious implementation that would have aﬀected a more graceful transition here
would have been the “undo” design option mentioned in the previous transition case.
The pilot’s intention was to re-engage this mode, but this eﬀort was hampered by
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the inability of the system to complete his wishes. Such a desire is not by any stretch
unreasonable and represents an intuitive design function for the user.
• Intuitive mode design is crucial. While the “undo” function is the obvious answer in
this case, there may arise other cases in which a very simple end state is desired by
the pilot but is unattainable because a complex and unworkable procedure must be
followed to access it. Prior to automation design, a simple user desire survey would
help identify those modes of operation which the user just wants to be able to “switch
on”; however, at the same time it cannot be disregarded how one mode will switch to
another. Gross changes in goal states with little regard to how the system will switch
to these goal states can leave some states uncontrolled and prone to unsatisfactorily
high deviations.
• Indication of what modes are available and which are unattainable should be dis-
played to the user in some way, especially in the case of modes demonstrating the
same unique qualities as the APP mode being analyzed here. The pilot’s repeated
attempts re-engaging the APP mode show a fundamental lack of knowledge concern-
ing the 800 ft aal limit on this re-engagement. In colloquial terms: don’t dangle a
carrot in front of the operator’s face if they can never reach it.
• Set apart modes which aren’t used in everyday flight, such as APP (this is theoreti-
cally only used once throughout the entire flight), with mode transition procedures.
Such procedures would then allow for the further informing of the pilot of such mode
limits, like the 800 ft aal one observed here.
E.4 Transition Case 3
The third transition to be considered is the last minute reengagement of the autopilot into
APP (Approach) mode. The report describes the transition as follows:
AT 250 ft aal, the co-pilot state that they were “ONE DOT HIGH”. The con-
trol column then went slightly forward and the pitch attitude of the aircraft
started to decrease. Shortly afterwards, the approach mode was re-armed; this
was done as the co-pilot expressed in French “we need to descend”. The control
column then moved further forward pitching the aircraft nose down at a rate
of 2 degrees/sec. It was then brought back, such that the aircraft’s pitch atti-
tude stopped at 4◦ nose-down. The co-pilot then gave the “APPROACHING
MINIMUMS” callout but, by this time, the aircraft was 130 ft aal, 1.5 dots
above the glideslope slope and descending at an increasing rate of descent of
more than 1,500 fpm.
At the time the localizer was reacquired:
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After the APP mode became active, the aircraft re-acquired the localiser and
began a gentle roll to the right.
At not time did the FDR record that the glideslope was re-captured by the
autopilot or that there was any attempt by the aircraft to reduce its rate of
descent as it approached the glideslope from above. It passed through the
glideslope, at approximately 45 ft aal and with a rate of descent in excess of
1,500 fpm.
The recorded pitch and roll inputs made during the final stages were almost
certainly made by the commander as the PF.
It is unknown how the APP mode was re-engaged below the 800 ft minimum described
earlier.
E.4.1 The Modes
Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Attitude Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 5 (see the
previous transition case). Following the transition, the system was still operating at Level
5; however, the method by which this was happening was operationally diﬀerent. Lateral
attitude (roll) was being handled completely by the computer, which were attitude not
being considered as all three axes, would be considered to be operating at Level 7. Pitch
is still operating in CWS PITCH mode, and as such is still at Level 5.
These levels can be seen in Figure E.15 and Table E.5
Figure E.15: Case 3 - Sheridan and Verplank Attitude LOA
Thrust Control - Prior to the version the system was operating at Level 7 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition this did not change.
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Table E.5: Case 3 - Sheridan and Verplank Attitude
Case 3 - Sheridan and Verplank Attitude
Control Task Prior Post
Lateral 5 7
Vertical 5 5
Combined 5 5
Lateral Flight Path Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2
(see the previous transition case). Following the transition the localiser was reacquired,
placing the lateral path control loop under the jurisdiction of the computer again. Hence
the system was now operating at Level 7.
Vertical Flight Path Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2
(see the previous transition case). Following the transition the system was still operating
in CWS PITCH mode as the glideslope was never reacquired. Hence the system remained
(although technically in APP mode) at Level 2.
Airspeed Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7 (see the
previous transition case). Following the transition this did not change, as the two modes
of influencing airspeed had not changed (vertical attitude and thrust control).
Descent/Ascent Rate Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level
2 (see the previous transition case). Following the transition this did not change.
These levels are shown in Figure E.16 and Table E.6.
Table E.6: Case 3 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Case 3 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Control Task Prior Post
Attitude 2 5
Thrust 7 7
Lat. Flight Path 2 7
Vert. Flight Path 2 2
Airspeed 7 7
Descent/Ascent Rate 2 2
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Figure E.16: Case 3 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Proud and Hart LOA
The system can be analyzed based on Proud and Hart in the following manner. A break-
down into the individual tasks becomes necessary for the Orient, Decide, and Act phase.
Such a breakdown is unnecessary for the Observe phase because this phase is concerned
with raw data which had not yet been sorted by task relevance.
Attitude Control (Roll)
As seen in the LOA breakdown based on Sheridan and Verplank’s LOA, this particular
transition benefits from the analysis of attitude split into two components: lateral (roll)
and longitudinal (pitch). Hence, this breakdown is continued here, with attitude being
considered in both the pitch and roll components, as well as a combined analysis for
continuity in analysis.
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 5 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the system was operating at Level 6, as
the computer now was in charge of all active lateral data integration, interpretation,
and prediction. The human, while able to perform this process himself, was only in a
position to override the system base on the mandatory display of the roll information
via the attitude indicator.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 3 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the system was operating at Level 8, in
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which the computer was in charge of all option enumeration and decision making
regarding lateral attitude control.
• Act - Prior to the version the system was operating at Level 3 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the system was operating at Level 6.
Attitude Control (Pitch)
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 5 (see the previous
transition case). This did not change following the transition.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 3 (see the previous
transition case). This did not change following the transition.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 3 (see the previous
transition case). This did not change following the transition.
Attitude Control (Combined)
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 5 (see the previous
transition case). This did not change following the transition.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 3 (see the previous
transition case). This did not change following the transition.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 3 (see the previous
transition case). This did not change following the transition.
Thrust Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6 (see the previous
transition case). This did not change following the transition.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 8 (see the previous
transition case). This did not change following the transition.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6 (see the previous
transition case). This did not change following the transition.
Lateral Flight Path Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the computer had reacquired the localiser,
placing it control of the later flight path. Hence, the system was operating at Level
7, with the computer handling all data integration, interpretation, and prediction
related to control of the lateral flight path.
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• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the system was operating at Level 8, with
the computer responsible for the enumeration and selection of all control actions.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the system was operating at Level 7, in
which the computer was responsible for the implementation of all control decisions.
Human interaction is through control override.
Vertical Flight Path Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition this did not change.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition this did not change.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition this did not change.
Airspeed Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 5 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition this did not change.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 4 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition this did not change.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition this did not change.
Descent/Ascent Rate Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition this did not change.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition this did not change.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition this did not change.
These levels are shown in Figures E.17-E.20 and Table E.7.
E.4.2 The Trigger
The reacquiring of the localiser by the computer which cause the switch back into APP
mode (albeit partial). This search for the localiser was a left-over of the previous transition,
in which the pilot had been attempting to return to APP mode. Thus, the source of this
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Figure E.17: Case 3 - Proud and Hart (Observe Phase)
Figure E.18: Case 3 - Proud and Hart (Orient Phase)
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Figure E.19: Case 3 - Proud and Hart (Decide Phase)
Figure E.20: Case 3 - Proud and Hart (Act Phase)
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Table E.7: Case 3 - Proud and Hart LOA
Case 3 - Proud and Hart LOA
Control Task
Observe Orient Decide Act
Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post
Att. - Lat. 6 6 6 5 3 8 3 6
Att. - Ver. 6 6 5 5 3 3 3 3
Att. - Comb. 6 6 5 5 3 3 3 3
Thrust 6 6 6 6 8 8 6 6
Lat. Flight Path 6 6 2 7 2 8 2 7
Vert. Flight Path 6 6 2 2 2 2 2 2
Airspeed 6 6 5 5 4 4 6 6
Descent/Ascent Rate 6 6 2 2 2 2 2 2
trigger is comes from the internal architecture and logic of the automation design; however,
previous mode activity by the user also set the stage for this to occur.
Using the updated Endsley model, the following factors can be can be identified as involved
in the triggering the transition:
• Automation Mode
• Performance of Actions
• System State
Automation Mode - The architecture of the automation led to this particular mode switch
directly, as the mode in which the system was operating was actively searching for the
localiser and the glide slope.
System State - The achievement of a particular system state allowed for the reacquisition
of the localiser, which was the substance of this mode change.
Performance of Actions - The past actions of the pilot of attempting to switch back to APP
mode, as well as all control actions of to the point of this transition placed the automation
into a state in which the localiser was able to reacquire.
These triggering factors are shown in Figure E.21.
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Figure E.21: Factors in TNT Airways Cargo Flight 325N Transition Case 3
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E.4.3 Factors, Mechanisms, and Design Lessons
Factors in the Transition
Based on the Endsley’s updated model of the human decision making, the following factors
can be identified as particularly relevant in this case of transition as it pertains to the
manner in which the system reverted:
• System State
• Environment State
• Stress & Workload
• Automation Capability
System State - The achievement of a particular system state was a factor in the triggering
of this transition; however this was also a major factor in the way in which the system
reverted. Prior to the transition the system states were deviated from the centerline. In
acquiring the localiser and changing modes, the system states were controlled to reduce this
error. Hence, as soon as this mode engaged the system immediately experienced proactive
control input.
Additionally, the plane states were operating within the overall context of landing, placing
significant constraints on performance requirements and acceptable deviation.
Environment State - As described before, the system was operating in bad weather, which
increased the stress and workload of the pilot involved.
Stress & Workload - This was negatively impacted by the environmental state and system
state. With these increased attention resources were not a peak eﬃciency and were also
being exhausted.
Automation Capability - The automation was only capable of reacquiring the localiser; the
glideslope was never reacquired. This additional transition, which though not intended by
this particular transition case, was originally intended by the pilot. It was outside of the
automation’s capability.
These factors in the gracefulness of the transition are shown in Figure E.21.
Mechanisms of Gracefulness
Using the mechanisms model that was originally developed by Endsley for explaining sit-
uational awareness and augmenting with automation processes, an understanding of the
mechanisms inhibiting the gracefulness of the transition in this system can be determined.
In particular this system was ungraceful because the operator did not maintain the state of
the vehicle within acceptable parameters to achieve the mission object (ie. landing).
The mechanism responsible for the ungraceful nature of this transition were identified as
follows:
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• Attention Resources
• Mode Setting
• Operator Perception
• Operator Interpretation, Comprehension, and Projection
• Operator Schema
These identified mechanisms are acting similar to the way in which they aﬀected the two
previous transition studies. Specifically in this case:
Attention Resources - The operator is still suﬀering from a high workload, which is placing
insatiable demands on his attention resources.
Mode Setting - The mode setting prior and following this transition do not optimally fit
the situation. As such, in order to reconcile this problem with the current schema of the
pilot to still land the plane an additional amount attention resources are required.
Operator Perception - Perceptual errors are occurring, reflected in the improper selection
of schema for the current situation, due to attention deficiency.
Operator Interpretation, Comprehension, and Projection - Improper schema and incom-
plete perception result in poor interpretation, comprehension, and projection of the current
state of the system and its future states.
Operator Schema - An improper schema is still being applied to current situation (contin-
uation bias): the pilot is still trying to maintain the prior system goal of landing instead
of modifying the plan to a go-around.
These mechanisms of gracefulness are shown in Figure E.22.
Design Principles and Lessons
Based on these observations and the particulars of this transition the following design
lessons can be learned and applied:
• Reducing the attention demands on the operator would have improved the graceful-
ness of the transition. This could have been done by reducing the taskload on the
pilot, such as communication with ATC.
• Salient mode cues, particularly in such bounded operational environments as that
encountered during take-oﬀ and landing of aircraft. Such cues should provide for the
correct transition of operators into schema appropriate for the given situation (in this
case a go-around).
• Enhanced perception during mode transitions using augmented reality displays would
hopefully reduce the attention demand for the perceptual block and improve the
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functioning of this block.
• Enhanced integration displays during mode transition using information integration
displays could reduce the attention requirements of the perception block.
• Reduce the attention demands of the perception and interpretation blocks by revert-
ing to intermediate levels of automation which still retain these functions. Only as a
last resort should these be completely bypassed during a transition to a lower level
of automation.
E.5 Transition Case 4
The fourth transition to be consider is the final transition into TOGA mode. The report
describes the transition as follows:
The co-pilot then gave the “APPROACHINGMINIMUMS” callout but, by this
time, the aircraft was 130 ft aal, 1.5 dots above the glideslope and descending
at an increasing rate of descent of more than 1,500 pfm. At an RA of between
87 ft and 59 ft an EGPWS “SINK RATE PULL UP” warning was recorded.
Almost immediately, the autopilot and autothrust modes went to TOGA mode.
Between 1.5 and 2.5 seconds before impact, the autothrust dropped out of MCP
speed mode and entered GA mode. AS TOGA mode was activated, the control
column was brought back, the pitch of the aircraft increased, the wings leveled
and the audible autopilot disconnect warning was triggered. After the autopilot
was disengaged for the go-around, it was not re-engaged for the rest of the flight.
When the TOGA mode is activated, the throttles advance to a takeoﬀ thrust. At the same
time, this mode automatically rolls the wings to level to maintain the current heading and
pitches the plane up in order to establish a positive rate of climb at 2000 fpm.
E.5.1 The Modes
Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Attitude Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 5 (see the pre-
vious transition case). With the implementation of the initial TOGA mode, the computer
was essentially operating at Level 7 in implementing the action and informing the human
necessarily. During the secondary TOGA phase the system was operating at near manual
mode, with the pilot in charge of attitude management.
Thrust Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7 (see the
previous transition case). With the activation of the TOGA button, this continued to be
the case. TOGA is a mode which commands the autothrottle to gradually advance the
throttle until takeoﬀ thrust is achieved.
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Lateral Flight Path Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7
(see the previous transition case). With the activation of the TOGA button the wings are
rolled to level. Lateral path was being controlled to the extent that the computer was set
to maintain the current heading. This places the system still at Level 7.
Vertical Flight Path Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2
(see the previous transition case). With the activation of the TOGA button the airplane
automatically sought to achieve a rate of climb of 2000 fpm. Hence, the vertical path was
being controlled to an extent, but only as a side eﬀect of the descent/ascent rate. This
places the system at Level 7.
Airspeed Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7 (see the
previous transition case). This did not change throughout the transition.
Descent/Ascent Rate Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2
(see the previous transition case). With the activation of the TOGA mode the computer
sought to establish a positive rate of climb. As such, the system was operating at Level
7.
These levels are shown in Figure E.23 and E.8.
Figure E.23: Case 4 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Proud and Hart LOA
The system can be analyzed based on Proud and Hart in the following manner. A break-
down into the individual tasks becomes necessary for the Orient, Decide, and Act phase.
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Table E.8: Case 4 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Case 4 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Control Task Prior Post
Attitude 5 7
Thrust 7 7
Lat. Flight Path 7 7
Vert. Flight Path 2 7
Airspeed 7 7
Descent/Ascent Rate 2 7
Such a breakdown is unnecessary for the Observe phase because this phase is concerned
with raw data which had not yet been sorted by task relevance.
Attitude Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 5 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the system was operating at Level 7, in
which the computer was completing these tasks with the human as backup.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 3 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the system was operating at Level 8, as
control decisions regarding attitude were being made by the computer.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 3 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the system was operating at Level 7, in
which the human was informed of system actions on a contextual basis.
Thrust Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the orientation task regarding thrust was being con-
trolled at Level 6 (see the previous transition case). This did not change throughout
this transition.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 8 (see the previous
transition case). This did not change following the transition.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6 (see the previous
transition). This did not change following the transition.
Lateral Flight Path Control
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• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7 (see the previous
transition case). This not change following the transition.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 8 (see the previous
transition case). This did not change following the transition.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7 (see the previous
transition case). This did not change following the transition.
Vertical Flight Path Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the computer assumed the task of orienta-
tion in regard to vertical flight path, with the human as contingency back up, placing
the system at Level 7.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the computer assumed all active decision
making tasks regarding flight path control, placing the system at Level 2.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the system began operating at Level 7, in
which the human was informed contextually of the system actions.
Airspeed Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 5 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the system began to operate ate Level 7, in
which the computer assumed the main responsibilities regarding airspeed, with the
human as a backup.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 4 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the system began operating at Level 8, with
the computer making all control decisions while disregarding the human.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the computer was in charge of all airspeed
related control actions while contextually informing the human of any actions, placing
the system at Level 7.
Descent/Ascent Rate Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the system began operating at Level 7,
with the computer handling all orientation tasks regarding the descent/ascent rate
in order to achieve 2000 fpm ascent. The human was kept as a backup.
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• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the system was operating at Level 8, with all
control decisions being enumerated and determined by the computer while ignoring
the human.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 2 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the system was operating at Level 7, with
the computer in charge of all control output and saving the human for emergency
override.
These levels are shown in Figures E.24-E.27 and Table E.9.
Figure E.24: Case 4 - Proud and Hart (Observe Phase)
E.5.2 The Trigger
The trigger was an audio alert from the EGPWS alert at an altitude of between 87 and
59 ft aal. which presented the pilot with the words “SINK RATE PULL UP.” As the
report details, the autothrust and autopilot modes almost immediately went to TOGA
mode. Hence from this trigger can be sourced to two major places on Endsley’s updated
model:
• System State
• Automation Mode
• Automation Interface
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Figure E.25: Case 4 - Proud and Hart (Orient Phase)
Figure E.26: Case 4 - Proud and Hart (Decide Phase)
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Figure E.27: Case 4 - Proud and Hart (Act Phase)
Table E.9: Case 4 - Proud and Hart LOA
Case 4 - Proud and Hart LOA
Control Task
Observe Orient Decide Act
Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post
Attitude 6 6 5 7 3 8 3 7
Thrust 6 6 6 6 8 8 6 6
Lat. Flight Path 6 6 7 7 8 8 7 7
Vert. Flight Path 6 6 2 7 2 8 2 7
Airspeed 6 6 5 7 4 8 6 7
Descent/Ascent Rate 6 6 2 7 2 8 2 7
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System State - The EGPWS alert was itself triggered by the system reaching a particularly
unsafe state as determined by the automation mode.
Automation Mode - The Automation Mode encompasses the logic of the particular mode
being used throughout the system and as such includes the logic which determined the
EGPWS alert. Hence, the automations design, and hence its mode, was a primary factor
in triggering the operator to revert to TOGA.
Automation Interface - While the system state and automation mode could have been
alerting each other, the job of triggering the user ultimately fell to the automation’s audio
interface. Had the interface been poorly designed or malfunctioned, no trigger would have
been presented to the user (perhaps until ground contact).
The triggering factors are shown in Figure E.28.
E.5.3 Factors, Mechanisms, and Design Lessons
Factors in the Transition
The following factors, based on Endley’s updated model played a part in this transi-
tion:
• Stress and Workload
• Environmental State
• Operator Experience & Training
• Operator Automaticity
• General SA (Level 2 & 3)
Stress and Workload - This transition took place under high stress and a large amount of
workload. Hence, this aﬀected the allocation of attention by the operator.
Environmental State - The environment was not ideal for operating in and, as such, was a
source of the high workload and stress of the pilot
Operator Experience & Training - The operator’s experience and training was extensive
enough to have “programmed” this mode transition response to the trigger described above.
Hence, the training and experience were a factor in this transition.
Operator Automaticity - This was more of a factor in the sense that the pilot’s reaction
time, as described by the report, suggests an almost automatic reaction time. Additionally,
it is reasonable to assume that the pilot was spring-loaded to execute a Go-Around if the
EGPWS audio alert went oﬀ during a landing.
General SA (Level 2 & 3) - The trigger was able to, in some senses, inject a certain amount
of Level 2 & 3 awareness into the system. In hearing the EGPWS alert, the pilot was
immediately made aware of a pertinent piece of information and what, if left unchecked,
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Figure E.28: Factors in TNT Airways Cargo Flight 325N Transition Case 4
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that would mean for the future states of the plane. Hence, while Level 1 SA was arguably
quite poor, and even Level 2 SA was still quite poor, this trigger was able to inject a
suﬃcient amount to elicit the correct response (initiation of a Go-around). This injection
only suﬃced to initiate the transition; it did not aid in its gracefulness.
These factors in determining the gracefulness of this transition are shown in Figure E.28.
Mechanisms in Gracefulness
This transition was particularly ungraceful as the states of the vehicle were not being
maintained prior to, during, or following the transition. This is evidenced prior to the
transition by the very fact that the trigger was based on the sensing of an unsafe system
state. During and following the transition the plane impacted the ground, which is most
decidedly not a controlled system. Hence, the following mechanisms were identified using
Endsley’s updated model mechanisms in situational awareness:
• Operator Perception
• Operator Interpretation, Comprehension, and Projection
• Operator Decision Making
• Operator Action Guidance
• Operator Attention Resources
• Operator Schema
Operator Perception - The lack of perception of the current situation was a hang over from
the previous transition and did not become resolved until a significant amount of time had
passed since the transition being considered here.
Operator Interpretation, Comprehension, and Projection - Additionally, the lack of in-
terpretation, comprehension, and projection were a hang over as well; however; this was
briefly aided by the EGPWS, which infused a comprehension of the emergency at hand an
the required fix. This was a very temporary fix, as the pilot is recorded as making sure he
had “recovered his senses” following the transition.
Operator Decision Making - Decision making was invariably aﬀected by the lack of at-
tentional resources. Not only this, but the inherent lag time required for human decision
making, coupled with just moving to act took longer than was required to regain and
maintain system control in the new mode.
Operator Action Guidance - The operator was not able to react quickly enough with the
transition and within the transition to maintain adequate control of the system. This is
shown in the presence of the ground impact.
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Operator Attention Resources - Attention resources, in like manner to the rest of the
transitions considered in this study, was quite poor. As this deficit piled up through
the course of all these transitions, the eﬀect spread to the entirety of the pilot’s working
memory, aﬀecting perception, interpretation, decision making, and action guidance.
Operator Schema - At this point the operator was finally made aware of his improper choice
of schema in dealing with the situation, which ultimately led to complete discard. This, as
the mechanisms model would suggest, left a void which needed to be filled in, which was
done quickly by the EGPWS, which had him briefly adopt a schema that suggested the
mode switch to TOGA. This schema, while eliciting the correct control output, was largely
incomplete, and the pilot had to spend some time completing his picture of the current
situation (described in the report).
These mechanisms of gracefulness are shown in Figure E.29.
Design Principles and Lessons
The following lessons can be learned from this transition case:
• Warning systems can briefly infuse a temporary eleveated situational awareness,
which may be used to elicit the correct mode response; however, this is only a stop-
gap. Measures need to be taken to help quickly fill-in an operator’s schema of the
situation.
• In emergency situations where the response is standard (Go-around in this case),
the automation should aid the human in order to increase response times. In some
cases, this might mean altogether removing the human from the triggering loop, and
placing the computer in charge (if the EGPWS goes oﬀ, execute a go-around).
• Understanding the current situation is key to executing a graceful transition. Intro-
ducing displays to help keep the user informed, such as trend displays or glideslope
deviation readouts, is important.
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Appendix F
Case Study: STS-3 Pilot Induced
Oscillations
Throughout the initial missions of the space shuttle, a major portion of operations was
devoted to final validation of the shuttle’s systems. In particular, the autoland system
capabilities and its interaction with the pilot was of particular concern to designers and
operational managers. In STS-3, a scheduled transition to CSS mode (manual mode)
resulted in a pilot-induced-oscillation (PIO) which, while it didn’t cause a mission failure,
led to a reevaluation of the ability of pilots to re-engage themselves in the control loop
task.
F.1 The Transition
The only transition being studied in this particular case study is that procedural transition
which took place between autoland to manual.
The two modes that were switched between were autoland and manual. The autoland took
care of all landing operations, apart from the lowering of the landing gear and braking
operations. Aside from these two functions, pitch, roll, yaw, etc. were all controlled by
the computer, and this process was monitored by the human. The manual mode provided
the pilot with superaugmented vehicle dynamics, essentially meaning that control for the
pilot was not fully manual, but was mediated through computer-closed control loops. The
manual mode was RCAH, in which the pilot directly commanded attitude rates.
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F.1.1 The Modes
Sheridan and Verplank LOA
According to Sheridan and Verplank, the autoland system would be classified as Level
7, on the whole. Following the transition, the system began operating at Level 1. This
breakdown does not describe the requirement of the pilot to extend the gear and apply the
braking in the autoland mode. These levels is shown in Figure F.1 and Table F.1.
Figure F.1: STS-3 Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Table F.1: STS-3 Sheridan and Verplank LOA
STS-3 Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Prior Post
7 1
Proud and Hart LOA
Breaking the Levels of Automation into the OODA phases suggests the following lev-
els:
Observe Phase - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 3, as information
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was still being presented to the user while in autoland mode, but this information was not
being implemented by the user. Following the transition, the system was still operating at
Level 3.
Orient Phase - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 7, with the
computer analyzing, predicting, and interpreting data in order to fly the craft. Following
the transition, the system was operating at Level 1, with the human predicting all of the
craft responses and integrating all information.
Decide Phase - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 8. Following the
transition, the system was operating at Level 1.
Act Phase - Prior to the transition, the system was operating at Level 7. Following the
transition, the system was operating at Level 1.
These levels are shown in Figures F.2-F.5 and Table F.2.
Figure F.2: STS-3 Proud and Hart LOA (Observe Phase)
F.1.2 The Trigger
The trigger involved here was solely mission procedure. The mission plan called for the pilot
to switch to manual flight at 125 ft elevation. While there were extenuating circumstances
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Figure F.3: STS-3 Proud and Hart LOA (Orient Phase)
Table F.2: STS-3 Proud and Hart LOA
STS-3 Proud and Hart LOA
Observe Orient Decide Decide
Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post
3 3 7 1 8 1 7 1
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Figure F.4: STS-3 Proud and Hart LOA (Decide Phase)
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Figure F.5: STS-3 Proud and Hart LOA (Act Phase)
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that may have resulted in an ungraceful switch for the pilot, the source and trigger for the
transition were from the mission and the pilot’s execution of the procedure.
Hence, the following were identified as active in the triggering of this transition:
• Procedures
• System State
• Performance of Actions
Procedures - This particular transition occurred due to a condition set by the mission
procedure: switch to manual at 125 ft elevation.
System State - The achievement of a particular system state was the condition upon which
the mission procedural requirement was founded.
Performance of Actions - The operator, while governed by their adherence to the procedures
and perception of the system states, was ultimately in charge of triggering this transition.
As such, this transition would not have taken place were in not for their physical triggering
of the mode transition.
These triggering factors are shown in Figure F.6.
F.1.3 Factors, Mechanisms, and Design Lessons
Factors in the Transition
Due to the loss of a performance, manifest by the PIO immediately following touchdown,
this mode transition cannot be considered as graceful. The following factors are seen as
aﬀecting this transition:
• Stress and Workload
• System State
• Environment State
• Mode situational awareness (Level 3)
• Automation Complexity
• Mode
• LOA Disparity
Stress and Workload - The moment at which this transition took place was one in which
the operator was under a high workload. This negatively aﬀected the amount of attentional
resources the operator had to devote to making this transition.
System State - The system was in a highly dynamic state at the time of the transition, which
made it more diﬃcult for the operator to gain a knowledge of the internal system states.
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Figure F.6: Factors in the STS-3 PIO Transition Case Study
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Due to this, it was much easier for performance to degrade even with active involvement
from the operator; not enough lead had been generated yet.
Environment State - In a NASA contractor report, Myers, Johnston, and McRuer [49]
suggested that part of the diﬃculty in this transition may have stemmed from the unusual
environment that surrounded the orbiter while landing. STS-3 landing on a sand-strip,
on which there was an interesting visual distraction of blowing sand that may have been
obscuring the pilot’ss judgement of the runway surface.
Mode situational awareness (Level 3) - This describes the phenomenon generated by the
dynamic system state. While the operator knew what the future mode would be, the
behavior of the future mode was not entirely known (i.e. the proper control gains and
inputs were not known). Had these been known, the transition would have been graceful
because performance would most likely have been maintained.
Automation Complexity - The modes which was the operator was transitioning from and
to were both highly complex in their operation, with a large number of processes requiring
monitoring and controlling actions.
Mode - The mode into which was transitioned is not an easy mode to control in and
of itself. This is diﬀerent than the complexity, this describes the sensitivity required in
controlling the shuttle in flight. Complexity can be managed, but the ease with which a
particular process within that complexity is a separate dimension, and in this case was quite
diﬃcult to control; in some senses this describes the amount of lead that was required to
be generated by the operator, a task that was already made diﬃcult by the highly dynamic
system states.
LOA Disparity - The disparity between the modes was quite high, meaning that the num-
ber of states which the user was required to gain knowledge and control over was quite
high.
These factors in determining the gracefulness of the transition are shown in Figure F.6.
Mechanisms of Gracefulness
Based on the update Endsley model of SA, the following mechanisms were identified as
negatively aﬀecting the grace with which the transition occurred:
• Attention Resources
• Operator Schema
• Operator Perception
• Operator Scripts
• Action Guidance
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Attention Resources - Due to the high workload and time-pressure encountered in this
situation there was a high demand of attentional resources which most likely was pushed
slightly more than it should have been. This was not as drastic a problem as in other
transition case studies, but this is most likely because of the high amount of training
that the operator had in this case, training which improved his ability to allocate limited
attentional resources.
Operator Schema - The operator was aware of the new mode setting; however, a complete
awareness did not develop in an instantaneous manner. The mode was changed, but the
rate at which the operator’s schema was updated (i.e. the rate at which they generate
control lead) was not suﬃcient to make this transition completely graceful.
Operator Perception - Due to the time pressures and demand on attentional resources, the
perception of the operator was not able to adequately update the operators schema with
the new mode setting. This is not to say that this block malfunctioned: it was not able to
provide enough information to the operator for them to update their schema in a timely
enough manner.
Operator Scripts - Due to the slowly evolving schema, the control scripts were also slow
to update. This was suggested by the pilot when he remarked that he saw the nose
dropping faster than he like and pulled back on the stick to correct. This control reaction
is characteristic of an instinctual reaction that was only informed of direction but not of a
correct input magnitude, such as might occur from an underdeveloped user script.
Action Guidance - Ultimately, the ungraceful nature of the transition was manifested in the
action guidance block, which resulted in the over correction by the pilot and the PIO.
These mechanisms of gracefulness are shown in Figure F.7.
Design Principles and Lessons
This particular transition was seen to be ungraceful because of the operator’s inability to
re-enter the control loop. The diﬃculties encountered which made this a problem were
threefold:
• Environmental states which may have cause perceptive illusions that resulted in
wrongly timed inputs
• Time and performance pressures which made the pilot more sensitive to system de-
viations
• Unfamiliarity of the pilot with system response to control inputs
These issues might have been mitigated had the following been considered and imple-
mented:
• Improving display fidelity might have improved operator trust in the displays and
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Figure F.7: Mechanism in STS-3 PIO Transition Case Study
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led them to have relied on their instrumentation more. This reliance on the instru-
mentation would have mitigated any perceptual illusions that were a result of the
blowing sand, as this would not have entered the visual field of the pilot.
• Augmented visual reality display. Such a display might have removed the illusion
created by the blowing sand.
• As this transition was triggered by mission procedures, it could have conceivably
happened earlier with less time and performance pressure. This particular fix was
implemented in future flights. To be fair, the reason this transition happened so late
was for experimental purposes.
• Transitioning to a slightly higher level of automation or supervisory control, instead
of going to full manual, would have reduced the knowledge disparity and may have
allowed the pilot gain control of the system quicker. An example might be the take
over of only the pitch or only the roll axes. Another option might have been the use
of a Flight Director.
• If full manual is required, beginning in a semi-manual mode, such as single axis
pitch control would allow the pilot not only to generate lead into one of the axes
in which he would normally be transitioning, but it would also give incite into the
rough magnitude of any roll inputs being required in a transition to full manual. In
this way, the disparity in LOA could be reduced during the transition as well.
• A trend display, overlaid on a desired trajectory, could vary well have informed the
pilot of the context of his situation more, and thus have reduced the confusion in the
magnitude or time of input.
• Of particular note, the report detailing the circumstances of the STS-3 PIO suggests
that at some point, the control of the craft becomes proprioceptive, or open-loop.
This implies that the pilot gains a suﬃcient amount of knowledge of the current
situation to project the eventual action of the system and adopt a control strategy
without regard to additional system feedback. This is a double-edged sword: it allows
the operator to control at a much higher bandwidth, but it also partially deafens the
operator to any hazardous feedback from the system. It is, therefore, imperative
that this initial picture gained by the operator (before an open-loop control strategy
is adopted) is of the highest fidelity. In essence, extremely high level 3 situational
awareness is crucial. The design suggestions previously mentioned (most notably the
trend display) seek to aid in this acquisition of situational awareness.
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Appendix G
Case Study: Apollo 11
The Apollo 11 Mission report describes the transition(s) as follows: At about 5000 feet, the
Commander switched his control mode from automatic to attitude-hold to check manual
control in anticipation of the final descent.
After the pitch over at high gate, the landing point designator indicated that the
approach path was leading into a large crater. An unplanned redesignation was
introduced at this time. To avoid the crater, the Commander again switched
from automatic to attitude-hold control and manually increased the flight-path
angle by pitching to a nearly vertical attitude for range extension. Manual
control began at an altitude of approximately 600 feet. Ten seconds later,
at approximately 400 feet, the rate-of-descent mode was activated to control
descent velocity. In this manner, the spacecraft, the spacecraft was guided
approximately 1100 feet downrange from the initial aim point.
Armstrong reported in the technical debriefs regarding the reversion:
In the early phases of P64, I did find time to go out of AUTO-control and
check the manual control in both pitch and yaw and found its response to be
satisfactory. I zeroed the error needles and went back into AUTO. I continued
descent in AUTO. At that point, we proceeded on the flashing 64 and obtained
the LPD availability, but we did not use it because we really weren’t looking
outside the cockpit during this phase. As we approached the 1500-foot point,
the program alarm seemed to be settling down ad we committed ourselves to
continue. We could see the landing area and the point at which the LPD was
pointing, which was indicating we were landing just short of a large rocky crater
surrounded with the large boulder field with very large rocks covering a high
percentage of the surface. I initially felt that that might be a good landing area
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if we could stop short of that crater, because it would have more scientific value
to be close to a large crater. Continuing to monitor LPD, it became obvious
that I could not stop short enough to find a safe landing area.
We then went into MANUAL and pitched the vehicle over to approximately zero
pitch and continued...I then proceeded to look for a satisfactory landing area
and the one chosen was a relatively smooth area between some sizable craters
and a ray-type boulder field. I first noticed that we were, in fact, disturbing
the dust on the surface when we were at something less than 100 feet; we were
beginning to get a transparent sheet of moving dust that obscured visibility a
little bit. As we got lower, the visibility continued to decrease. I don’t think
that the altitude determination was severely hurt by this blowing dust, but the
thing that was confusing to me was that it was hard to pick out what your
lateral and downrange velocities were, because you were seeing a lot of moving
dust that you had to look through to pick up the stationary rocks and base
your translational velocity decisions on that. I found that to be quite diﬃcult.
I spent more time trying to arrest translational velocities more than I though
would be necessary. As we got below 30 feet or so, I had selected the final
touchdown area. For some reason that I am not sure of, we started to pick
up left translational velocity and a backward velocity. That’s the thing that
I certainly didn’t want to do, because you don’t like to be going backwards,
unable to see where you’re going. So I arrested the backward rate with some
possibly spastic control mosts, but I was unable to stop the left translational
rate. As we approached the ground, I still had a left translational rate which
made me reluctant to shut the engine oﬀ while I still had that rate. I was also
reluctant to slow down my descent rate anymore than it was or stop because
we were close to running out of fuel. We were hitting our abort limit.
As was the case for control in the aircraft systems, the major control tasks being considered
here are as follows:
• Attitude
• Thrust
• Lateral Flight Path
• Vertical Flight Path
• Translational Velocity
• Vertical Velocity (Descent/Ascent Rate)
Hence, this transition can be analyzed in a way similar to the studies of the Aeroflot-Nord
accident and the TNT Airways Accident.
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G.1 Transition Case 1
The first case of transition to be considered will be the commander’s initial transition from
AUTO (P64) into attitude-hold manual and then back to P64. This was described above,
but will be reproduced here:
At about 5000 feet, the Commander switched his control mode from automatic
to attitude-hold to check manual control in anticipation of the final descent.
Additionally, the technical debrief describes it as such:
In the early phases of P64, I did find time to go out of AUTO-control and
check the manual control in both pitch and yaw and found its response to be
satisfactory. I zeroed the error needles and went back into AUTO. I continued
descent in AUTO.
G.1.1 The Modes
Hence, this is a multi-phased transition, with the following phases:
1. Prior (to the transition)
2. Manual (attitude-hold mode)
3. Post (back in P64)
Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Attitude Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7, in which
the computer was controlling the attitude and necessarily informing the human through
the attitude indicator. In transitioning to “manual” mode, the commander entered into a
Rate Control Attitude Hold (RCAH) mode. This system is most aptly described within the
Sheridan and Verplank levels as Level 4, as this describes a system in which the computer
selects an option (attitude hold), but the human may select a diﬀerent action (rate control).
Following this the commander transitioned back to Level 7.
Thrust Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7, as the
computer handled the throttling of the engines with a mandatory readout to the human.
This did not change throughout the course of the transition.
Lateral Flight Path Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level
6, in which the lateral flight path was automatically being controlled by the computer
with only contextual readouts to the human (window etchings, out-the-window view, etc.).
The human was aﬀorded the ability to update the landing point through incremental stick
inputs, hence this mode of operation can be likened to computer action with time-to-veto
for the human. Once operating in manual, the human was now in complete control of
the lateral flight path, with very little computer aid. Hence, this can be considered a full
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transition to Level 1 with respect to lateral flight path control. In transitioning back to
P64 the system went back to Level 6.
Vertical Flight Path Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6
in respect to vertical flight path, with same aﬀordances for human input as described for
lateral flight path control. Following the transition to manual, the system transitioned to
Level 1 in this respect. In transitioning back to P64, the system was back at Level 6.
Lateral Velocity Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7,
with contextual readouts of the lateral velocities to the commander by the LMP as well as
access through the displays. Once in manual, these were being controlled at Level 2, with
automation only providing sensory help. The transition back to P64 reset the system to
Level 7.
Vertical Velocity Control - Vertical velocity control followed the same LOA transition
sequence as was seen in lateral velocity control.
These levels are shown in Figure G.1 and Table G.1.
Figure G.1: Case 1 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Proud and Hart LOA
Observe Phase - Prior to the transition the computer handled most of the active informa-
tion processing, and hence the system was operating at Level 6. Following the transition to
manual they computer was still involved in presenting the human with information, how-
ever, the system was much more reliant on the human preprocessing of the information,
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Table G.1: Case 1 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Case 1 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Control Task Prior Manual Post
Attitude 7 4 7
Thrust 7 7 7
Lat. Flight Path 6 1 6
Vert. Flight Path 6 1 6
Lat. Velocity 7 2 7
Vert. Velocity 7 2 7
and hence it was operating at Level 3. Following the transition the system was back at
Level 6.
Attitude Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition system was operating at Level 6, with the computer
in charge of all active orientation process; however, all of these processes were exten-
sively monitored by the human. Once in manual, the human was responsible for all
orientation tasks with minimal help from the computer, placing the system at Level
2. Following this the system reverted back to Level 6.
• Decide - Prior to transition the system was operating at Level 8, with all decisions
being made without the human’s knowledge except through feedback from the action
phase. Once in manual the human was placed in charge of all decision tasks with the
computer operating as a tool for assistance, setting the system at Level 2. Following
this the system reverted back to Level 8.
• Act - Prior to the transition the computer was in charge of all major control inputs,
save for the human incremental control in LPR (landing point redesignation). This
places the system at Level 6. Once in manual the system was operating at Level 1,
with the human in charge of all attitude actions. The system then reverted back to
level 6.
Thrust Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6, as the human
extensively monitored the orientation process in thrust control and was placed in
the a position to potentially override if needed. This did not change throughout the
course of the transition.
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• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 8, as all control
decisions happened without the human being informed, save through feedback from
the action phase. This did not change through the course of the transition.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7, with override
ability retained and output being contextually provided for the operator. This did
not change throughout the transition.
Lateral Flight Path Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6, as the human
extensively monitored the lateral flight path through the computer and incoming
data. Once in manual, the system was operating at Level 2, with the computer only
serving as a tool when needed. The system then reverted back to Level 6.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 8, with the com-
puter making all control decisions without regard to the human. It should be noted
that the human was performing ranking tasks in parallel; however, to include this
would place the system at Level 4; however, this level suggests that the rankings of
the computer were displayed to the human, which was not the case. Once in manual,
the human was placed in charge of all decision tasks in this regard with the computer
providing limited assistance as a tool. Hence, the system was operating at Level 2.
The system then reverted back to Level 8.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was completely in charge of all action output,
with the human given override capability following control output from the computer.
This places the system at Level 7. Once in manual the system was operating at Level
1. Following this the system reverted back to Level 7.
Vertical Flight Path Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6, as the human
extensively monitored the lateral flight path through the computer and incoming
data. Once in manual, the system was operating at Level 2, with the computer only
serving as a tool when needed. The system then reverted back to Level 6.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 8, with the com-
puter making all control decisions without regard to the human. Once in manual,
the human was placed in charge of all decision tasks in this regard with the computer
providing limited assistance as a tool. Hence, the system was operating at Level 2.
The system then reverted back to Level 8.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was completely in charge of all action output,
with the human given override capability following control output from the computer.
This places the system at Level 7. Once in manual the system was operating at Level
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1. Following this the system reverted back to Level 7.
Lateral Velocity Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6, with the computer
handling all orientation tasks with the human extensively involved in monitoring and
positioned for override. Once in manual the system was operating at Level 2, with
the computer only providing limited display support. Following the transition the
system was operating at Level 6 again.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 8, with all control
decisions being made by the computer. Once in manual, the human was in charge of
all decisions with the computer being used in a limited way as decision support tool,
placing the system at Level 2. Following this the system was operating at Level 8
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7, with the human
being informed contextually of the computer’s actions and being placed in a position
for override. Once in manual the human was fully in charge of all control actions,
placing the system at Level 1. Following this the system reverted to Level 7.
Descent/Ascent Rate Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6, with the computer
handling all orientation tasks with the human extensively involved in monitoring and
positioned for override. Once in manual the system was operating at Level 2, with
the computer only providing limited display support. Following the transition the
system was operating at Level 6 again.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 8, with all control
decisions being made by the computer. Once in manual, the human was in charge of
all decisions with the computer being used in a limited way as decision support tool,
placing the system at Level 2. Following this the system was operating at Level 8
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7, with the human
being informed contextually of the computer’s actions and being placed in a position
for override. Once in manual the human was fully in charge of all control actions,
placing the system at Level 1. Following this the system reverted to Level 7.
These levels are shown in Figures G.2-G.2 and Table G.2.
G.1.2 The Trigger
The trigger in this transition was a result of the commander’s intention to gain familiarity
with the control response of the vehicle. Hence, there was no external trigger in this system,
it was internal to the pilot.
The following were relevant to the triggering of this transition:
297
Figure G.2: Case 1 - Proud and Hart LOA (Observe Phase)
Figure G.3: Case 1 - Proud and Hart LOA (Orient Phase)
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Figure G.4: Case 1 - Proud and Hart LOA (Decide Phase)
Figure G.5: Case 1 - Proud and Hart LOA (Act Phase)
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Table G.2: Case 1 - Proud and Hart LOA
Case 1 - Proud and Hart LOA
Control Observe Orient Decide Act
Task Prior Man. Post Prior Man. Post Prior Man. Post Prior Man. Post
Attitude 6 3 6 6 2 6 8 2 8 6 1 6
Thrust 6 3 6 6 6 6 8 8 8 7 7 7
Lat. F.P. 6 3 6 6 2 6 8 2 8 7 1 7
Vert. F.P. 6 3 6 6 2 6 8 2 8 7 1 7
Lat. Vel. 6 3 6 6 2 6 8 2 8 7 1 7
Vert. Vel. 6 3 6 6 2 6 8 2 8 7 1 7
• Mode situational awareness (Level 3)
• System State
• Stress and Workload
Mode situational awareness (Level 3) - The main trigger in this transition was a desire
to understand the future modes of the craft, particularly the handling characteristics that
the pilot would phase in a future transition into P66. Hence, a desire for increased Mode
situational awareness (Level 3) and a recognition of deficient awareness in that respect was
the main trigger.
System State - The system was in a controlled and known state, which allowed for the
operator to take the time to make this transition. Had not the system states been in an
acceptable place, the previous factor in the triggering would not have been suﬃcient.
Stress and Workload - While in general the stress and workload encountered throughout
this mission was rather high, the relatively low amount at this phase of the mission also
enabled the triggering of this mode in like manner to the system states.
These triggering factors are shown in Figure G.6.
G.1.3 Factors, Mechanisms and Design Lessons
Factors in the Transition
The following factors were identified as relevant in determining the gracefulness of this
transition:
• General situaitonal awareness (All Levels)
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Figure G.6: Factors in Apollo 11 Transition Case 1
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• Mode situational awareness (Levels 1 & 2)
• Operator Abilities, Experience, and Training
• Stress and Workload
General situational awareness (All Levels) - The operator at the time of the transition had
a very high situational awareness in all three levels. The state of the vehicle was known,
comprehended, and were being projected correctly. As such, this allowed for a greater
understanding of the vehicle states and how they would be aﬀected (their initial states)
given a mode switch.
Mode situational awareness (Levels 1 & 2) - The operator understood the current mode as
well as its functioning capabilities, further providing a better understanding of the initial
states from which a mode switch would begin from.
Operator Abilities, Experience, and Training - The high abilities, experience, and training
of the operator aﬀected the ability of the operator to anticipate the changes of the system
as well as maintain control of the system through the transition. A pilot with less ability,
experience, and training would most likely have not made such a graceful transition.
Stress and Workload - The stress and workload at the time of the transition were at levels
that enhanced the performance of the pilot by stimulating them in a reasonable fashion.
Had the workload and stress increased, as will be seen in transition Case 2, this transition
would not have been as graceful.
These factors in the gracefulness of the transition are shown in Figure G.6.
Mechanisms of Gracefulness
This particular transition is an example of an ideal transition, in which the commander
maintain control of system without sacrificing goals. As such, the ideal flow occurred, and
no faulty mechanisms can be identified. Attention resources were not overwhelmed, schema
were changed correctly, and the operator interacted with the system in an appropriate
manner. Hence, the mechanisms model functioned perfectly, as seen in G.7.
Design Principles and Lessons
The following design lessons can thus be learned from this graceful transition:
• High levels of situational awareness can mitigate large jumps in levels of automation.
Using displays which promote situational awareness, such as trend displays and pre-
view displays, as well as highlighting the of pertinent information can help improve
the gracefulness of a system which requires or contains drastic transitions.
• Large amounts of user training and experience can greatly improve the gracefulness of
a system, as they will be more informed of the available modes, the possible respon-
siveness or functioning of those modes, and prepare them to handle any contingencies
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Figure G.7: Mechanisms in Apollo 11 Transition Case 1
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that might arise.
• Moderate levels of workload prior to a transition can place a user in a state that
is more ready to respond to mode changes and any contingencies that may arise.
Designing systems which engage the user prior to transition would be advisable.
• Keep the operator informed regarding the current mode of operation, not just the
eventual mode of operation.
• Time transitions to take place when system states are not drastically changing when
possible. This only applies to procedurally triggered transitions or non-emergency
situations – it is obvious that this will rarely be possible in an emergency.
G.2 Transition Case 2
The transition being considered here is the transition from P64 into manual mode. This
transition is described in the report as follows:
An unplanned redesignation was introduced at this time. To avoid the crater,
the Commander again switched from automatic to attitude-hold control and
manually increased the flight-path angle by pitching to a nearly vertical attitude
for range extension. Manual control began at an altitude of approximately 600
feet. Ten seconds later, at approximately 400 feet, the rate-of-descent mode
was activated to control descent velocity.
Additionally, the technical debrief quotes Neil Armstrong as saying:
We then went into MANUAL and pitched the vehicle over to approximately zero
pitch and continued...I then proceeded to look for a satisfactory landing area
and the one chosen was a relatively smooth area between some sizable craters
and a ray-type boulder field... I don’t think that the altitude determination was
severely hurt by this blowing dust, but the thing that was confusing to me was
that it was hard to pick out what your lateral and downrange velocities were,
because you were seeing a lot of moving dust that you had to look through
to pick up the stationary rocks and base your translational velocity decisions
on that. I found that to be quite diﬃcult. I spent more time trying to arrest
translational velocities more than I though would be necessary... For some
reason that I am not sure of, we started to pick up left translational velocity
and a backward velocity. That’s the thing that I certainly didn’t want to do,
because you don’t like to be going backwards, unable to see where you’re going.
So I arrested the backward rate with some possibly spastic control mosts, but
I was unable to stop the left translational rate.
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G.2.1 The Modes
Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Attitude Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7 (see the pre-
vious transition case). Following the transition the commander entered into a Rate Control
Attitude Hold (RCAH) mode. This system is most aptly describe within the Sheridan &
Verplank context as a Level 4, as this describes a system in which the computer selects an
option (attitude hold), but the human may select a diﬀerent action (rate control).
Thrust Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7 (see the pre-
vious transition case). This did not change throughout the course of the transition.
Lateral Flight Path Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6 (see
the previous transition case). Following the transition the human was in complete control
of the lateral flight path, with very little computer aid. Hence, this can be considered a
full transition to Level 1 with respect to lateral flight path control.
Vertical Flight Path Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level
6(see the previous transition case). Following the transition, the system reverted to Level
1 in this respect.
Lateral Velocity Control - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7
(see the previous transition case). Following the transition, the lateral velocity was being
controlled at Level 2, with automation only providing sensory help.
Vertical Velocity Control - Vertical velocity control followed the same LOA transition
sequence as was seen in lateral velocity control.
These levels are shown in Figure G.8 and TAble G.3
Table G.3: Case 2 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Case 2 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Control Task Prior Post
Attitude 7 4
Thrust 7 7
Lat. Flight Path 6 1
Lat. Flight Path 6 1
Lat. Velocity 7 2
Vert. Velocity 7 2
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Figure G.8: Case 2 - Sheridan and Verplank LOA
Proud and Hart LOA
Observe Phase - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition to manual they computer was still involved in
presenting the human with information, however, the system was much more reliant on
the human preprocessing of the information, and hence it was operating at Level 3.
Attitude Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition system was operating at Level 6 (see the previous tran-
sition case). Following the transition the human was responsible for all orientation
tasks with minimal help from the computer, placing the system at Level 2.
• Decide - Prior to transition the system was operating at Level 8 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the human was placed in charge of all
decision tasks with the computer operating as a tool for assistance, setting the system
at Level 2.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the system was operating at Level 1, with
the human in charge of all attitude actions.
Thrust Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6 (see the previous
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transition case). This did not change throughout the course of the transition.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 8 (see the previous
transition case). This did not change through the course of the transition.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7 (see the previous
transition case). This did not change throughout the transition.
Lateral Flight Path Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the system was operating at Level 2, with
the computer only serving as a tool when needed.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 8 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the human was placed in charge of all
decision tasks in this regard with the computer providing limited assistance as a
tool. Hence, the system was operating at Level 2.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the system was operating at Level 1.
Vertical Flight Path Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the system was operating at Level 2, with
the computer only serving as a tool when needed.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 8 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the human was placed in charge of all
decision tasks in this regard with the computer providing limited assistance as a
tool. Hence, the system was operating at Level 2.
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the system was operating at Level 1.
Lateral Velocity Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the system was operating at Level 2, with
the computer only providing limited display support.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 8 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the human was in charge of all decisions
with the computer being used in a limited way as decision support tool, placing the
system at Level 2.
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• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the human was fully in charge of all control
actions, placing the system at Level 1.
Descent/Ascent Rate Control
• Orient - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 6 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the system was operating at Level 2, with
the computer only providing limited display support. Following the transition the
system was operating at Level 6 again.
• Decide - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 8 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the human was in charge of all decisions
with the computer being used in a limited way as decision support tool, placing the
system at Level 2. Following this the system was operating at Level 8
• Act - Prior to the transition the system was operating at Level 7 (see the previous
transition case). Following the transition the human was fully in charge of all control
actions, placing the system at Level 1. Following this the system transitioned to
Level 7.
These levels are shown in Figures G.9-G.12 and Table G.4.
Figure G.9: Case 2 - Proud and Hart LOA (Observe Phase)
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Figure G.10: Case 2 - Proud and Hart LOA (Orient Phase)
Figure G.11: Case 2 - Proud and Hart LOA (Decide Phase)
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Figure G.12: Case 2 - Proud and Hart LOA (Act Phase)
Table G.4: Case 2 - Proud and Hart LOA
Case 2 - Proud and Hart LOA
Control Task
Observe Orient Decide Act
Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post
Attitude 6 6 6 2 8 2 6 1
Thrust 6 6 6 6 8 8 7 7
Lat. Flight Path 6 6 6 2 8 2 7 1
Vert. Flight Path 6 6 6 2 8 2 7 1
Lat. Velocity 6 6 6 2 8 2 7 1
Vert. Velocity 6 6 6 2 8 2 7 1
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G.2.2 The Trigger
The trigger in this transition was the commander’s assessment that they were headed
towards a hazardous landing area and his decision that the automation would not suf-
ficiently be able to cope with this. Hence, he pressed the button which transferred the
system to “manual” control (P65). The following factors were key in the triggering of this
transition:
• Environmental State
• System State
• Automation Capabilities
• Operator Abilities, Experience, and Training
Environmental State - The major trigger in this transition was the pilot’s observation that
the environment in which he was going to be operating in the future was hazardous. This
was done through an integration of the state of the environment and a projection of the
current system states.
System State - In projecting the system states (good Level 3 General SA) the pilot was
triggered to perform this transition, as it was necessary given the current trust in the
automation’s capability to deal with the current contingency.
Automation Capabilities - The automation’s capabilities, and to some extent the pilot’s
own conceptions of the automation’s capabilities enabled this trigger to call for a mode
transition. Had the automation been deemed capable of handling this situation a transition
may have never taken place. Most decidedly any level of trust regarding the automation’s
capabilities would have triggered transition to a diﬀerent mode if at all.
Operator Abilities, Experience, and Training - The high level of confidence of the user in
his own abilities, given the experience and training that he possessed aﬀect the trust in
the automation to be capable of handling this situation. As such, the level of abilities,
experience, and training enabled this trigger to eﬀect this mode transition.
These triggering factors are shown in Figure G.13.
G.2.3 Factors, Mechanisms, and Design Lessons
Factors in the Transition
This particular transition was ungraceful in the sense that there was an appreciable increase
in the workload experienced by the operator in order to maintain system states and achieve
the mission goal. This transition is unlike those in the past, as the mission goal was still
retained; however, this was at a very high workload cost. The following factors were
identified as contributing to the ungraceful nature of this transition:
• Environmental State
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Figure G.13: Factors in Apollo 11 Transition Case 2
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• System State
• Automation Mode
• Stress & Workload
• LOA Disparity
• General situational awareness (All Levels)
Environmental State - The relative unfamiliarity of the operator with the environmental
state was a factor in the way this transition took place. Had more familiarity been present
this transition would have been more graceful as it would have increased the General
SA of the operator, allowing for more informed control inputs toward the desired goal
(landing).
It is also quite possible that novel vestibular and visual eﬀects were aﬀecting the user in a
way that was not conducive to maintaining control of the vehicle.
System State - The fact that this transition took place within the context of the final stages
of lunar landing placed high performance constraints, which increased the sensitivity of the
operator to any perturbations in the control of the craft.
Automation Mode - The automation mode (P66) which was was active following the tran-
sition was notoriously diﬃcult to control, and was such was a large factor in the ability
of the operator to maintain control of the system without increased workload and stress.
Due to the diﬃculty in controlling with this mode, there was an understandable increase
in the workload. Due to the extended nature of this transition (the last transition case
only saw a momentary switch), this also required a higher amount of vigilance from the
operator.
Stress & Workload - The situation itself was highly stress. Additionally, other system
factors, such as the 1200 errors that plagued the landing (5 total) increased the workload
and stress of the operator while reverting to this mode.
LOA Disparity - As can be seen from the pervious LOA analysis, there were a significant
amount of LOAs skipped in this transition. Because of this, the relative workload increase
from the prior mode was greater.
General siutiatonal awareness (All Levels) - As in the past transition case, General situ-
aitonal awareness of the pilot was high, which was proactive in achieving a more graceful
transition.
These factors in ungracefulness are shown in Figure G.13.
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Mechanisms of Gracefulness
In this particular transition, while the pilot did mostly maintain control over the system
and ultimately achieve the mission objectives, the size of the workload increase for the
operator was considerable. As the Neil Armstrong described in the technical debrief there
were particular system behaviors which arose that he was unable to completely control,
which also suggests a system that was just exceeding the operator’s ability to control iwthin
satisfaction (he was uncomfortable with the level of control he was maintaining).
The particular diﬃculties in this transiton stemmed from the following mechanisms:
• Attention Resources
• Operator Decision Making
• Operator Action Guidance
Attention Resources - The attention demand that was required of the pilot during this
reversions was extremely high and, had it been any other non-expert user, this would have
most likely had a flow down similar to that seen in the TNT Airways accident.
Operator Decision Making - The phase of the human processing which suﬀered greatest
from the attention deficit was the decision making and action guidance block, in the sense
that the system required very quick reaction times and precise guidance commands. This
maps particularly to the these two blocks. Had the attention drain not been so high, the
performance of these blocks might have increased.
Operator Action Guidance - The action guidance was greatly aﬀected as well by the at-
tention deficit, as mentioned previously.
These mechanisms are shown in Figure G.14.
Design Principles and Lessons
The following design lessons can be learned from this reversion case:
• In high workload situations which increase the demands on the attention, employ
transions which do not traverse as many LOAs.
• Employ the use of some form of a flight director in such an instance, as this might free
up attention resources being used by the perception and interpretation blocks. This
attentioned could then be used in the decision making and action guidance blocks.
• Reduce the diﬃculty of such manual modes to control by improving or augmenting
the dynamics. Instead of using a rate control, position control might have reduced
the attention resources required to operate the decision and/or the action guidance
blocks.
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Figure G.14: Mechanisms in Apollo 11 Transition Case 2
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• Isolate the operator from other tasks so that attention resources can be completely
devoted to dealing with the new mode and the information required by that mode.
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Appendix H
Experimental Protocol
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Introduction:  
Slide  1  
Hello,  my  name  is  <NAME  OF  yWZ/DEd>/^dхĂŶĚ/͛ůůďĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚƚŽĚĂǇ͘ĞĨŽƌĞǁĞďĞŐŝŶ͕/͛ůůƐƚĂƌƚďǇĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌŝǌŝŶŐǇŽƵǁŝƚŚŽƵƌ
system.    This  is  the  Draper  fixed-­‐ďĂƐĞĚůƵŶĂƌƐŝŵƵůĂƚŽƌ͕ĂŶĚǁĞ͛ůůďĞƵƐŝŶŐŝƚƚŽĚĂǇ
to  simulate  ĂůĂŶĚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞůƵŶĂƌƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ͘/͛ůůpause  after  each  slide  to  give  you  a  
ĐŚĂŶĐĞƚŽƌĞĂĚĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ͘>ĞƚŵĞŬŶŽǁǁŚĞŶǇŽƵ͛ƌĞƌĞĂĚǇƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĂĨƚĞƌ
each  slide.  
Slide  2  
A  typical  lunar  landing  has  three  phases:  a  braking  phase,  an  approach  phase,  
ĂŶĚĂƚĞƌŵŝŶĂůĚĞƐĐĞŶƚƉŚĂƐĞ͘zŽƵ͛ůůďĞŽƉĞƌating  within  the  terminal  descent  
phase  today.    >ĞƚŵĞŬŶŽǁǁŚĞŶǇŽƵ͛ƌĞƌĞĂĚǇĨŽƌƚŚĞŶĞǆƚƐůŝĚĞ(WAIT  TO  
CONTINUE).  
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During  the  terminal  descent,  the  astronaut  has  to  confirm  the  final  selection  of  a  
landing  location,  referred  to  as  the  landing  aimpoint.    In  Apollo,  these  landing  
aimpoints  were  identified  and  confirmed  visually.    In  the  future,  these  landing  
aimpoints  will  be  recommended  by  the  Autonomous  Landing  and  Hazard  
Avoidance  Technology,  or  ALHAT,  system.    However,  the  astronaut  will  still  need  
to  use  his  or  her  own  judgment  in  the  final  selection  of  a  landing  aimpoint.    Let  
ŵĞŬŶŽǁǁŚĞŶǇŽƵ͛ƌĞƌĞĂĚǇƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ(WAIT  TO  CONTIUE).  
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Your  task  today  will  be  to  guide  the  lander  to  the  lunar  surface  in  a  simulated  
terminal  descent.    Several  displays,  both  a  Primary  Flight  Display  and  a  Landing  
Aimpoint  Display,  will  be  available  to  you.    Flight  director  needles  will  assist  you  
ŝŶƚŚĞĨůǇŝŶŐƚĂƐŬĂƚĂůůƚŝŵĞƐ͘/͛ůůĞǆƉůĂŝŶƚŚĞĚŝƐƉůĂǇƐĂďŝƚůĂƚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ͘    
tĞ͛ůůďĞĚŽŝŶŐĂƚŽƚĂůŽf  48  different  runs,  including  training  trials.    Let  me  know  
ǁŚĞŶǇŽƵ͛ƌĞƌĞĂĚǇƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ(WAIT  TO  CONTINUE).  
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  In  addition  to  these  displays,  the  astronaut  will  also  have  access  to  a  variety  of  
different  control  modes.    The  uses  of  these  control  modes  and  the  way  in  which  an  
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astronaut  switches  between  these  modes  is  the  ƐƵďũĞĐƚŽĨƚŽĚĂǇ͛ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚ.    
zŽƵ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶ  each  run  in  a  fully  automatic  mode,  in  which  the  computer  will  
perform  all  the  necessary  control  inputs  for  you.    At  a  particular  point  in  the  
trajectory,  the  computer  will  perform  a  transition  to  a  manual  control  mode.    
zŽƵ͛ůůŶĞĞĚƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽƚŚĞŵŽĚĞĂŶŶƵŶĐŝĂƚŽƌƚŽƐĞĞǁŚĂƚŵŽĚĞǇŽƵ͛ƌĞŝŶ͘zŽƵ͛ůů
get  a  chance  to  train  in  these  modes  before  you  fly  them.    During  some  trials  a  re-­‐
designation  will  accompany  the  mode  transition.    This  re-­‐designation  will  be  
made  by  the  computer,  simulating  the  real-­‐time  rejection  of  the  current  landing  
point.  >ĞƚŵĞŬŶŽǁǁŚĞŶǇŽƵ͛ƌĞƌĞĂĚǇƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ͘  (WAIT  TO  CONTINUE)  
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Your  primary  goal  is  to  null  the  error  in  the  flight  director  in  the  roll,  pitch,  and  
descent  axes.    You  do  not  need  to  null  the  yaw  flight  director.    Try  to  keep  on  to  
the  flight  director  needles  within  less  than  1  degree  in  roll  and  pitch,  about  the  
width  of  the  attitude  indicator  pip,    and  the  errors  in  the    descent  rate  below  .5  
feet  per  second.    Your  secondary  task  will  be  to  respond  to  the  comm.  light  which  
will  illuminate  at  particular  points  throughout  the  trajectory.    Your  response  time  
to  this  light  is  being  used  to  measure  how  much  spare  attention  you  have  while  
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĂŝŶĨůǇŝŶŐƚĂƐŬ͕ƐŽŝƚŝƐŝŵƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƚŚĂƚǇŽƵĚŽŶ͛ƚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚŝs  as  
a  primary  task.    Never  sacrifice  the  flying  task  to  respond  to  this  light.    
Remember:  aviate,  navigate,  communicate.    /͛ůůĞǆƉůĂŝŶŚŽǁǇŽƵƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽƚŚŝƐ
light  a  bit  later  in  your  training.      
I  ŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƐĂǀĞƚŝŵĞ/͛ůůďĞĐƵƚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŽƌƚduring  the  mode  transition  
trials.    >ĞƚŵĞŬŶŽǁǁŚĞŶǇŽƵ͛ƌĞƌĞĂĚǇƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ(WAIT  TO  CONTINUE).  
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/͛ůůŶŽǁƚĂŬĞĂŵŽŵĞŶƚƚŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶǇŽƵƌĨůŝŐŚƚĚŝƐƉůĂǇƐ͘dŚĞƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĨůŝŐŚƚĚŝƐƉůĂǇ͕
or  PFD,  provides  information  about  vehicle  states  and  flight  director  cues  overlaid  
on  a  simulated  horizon.    This  is  not  an  out-­‐the-­‐window  view.    /͛ůůǁĂůŬǇŽƵƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
the  elements  of  this  display  in  just  a  bit.  
  
The  Landing  Area  Display  provides  information  about  hazards  and  the  
recommended  aimpoints  using  a  top-­‐down  view.    ŐĂŝŶ͕/͛ůůďĞƚĂŬŝŶŐǇŽƵ
through  each  element  of  this  display  shortly.    Let  me  know  when  you  are  ready  to  
continue.    (WAIT  TO  CONTINUE)  
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
Page  |  4  
Slide  8  
/͛ůůŶŽǁĞǆƉůĂŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĨůŝŐŚƚĚŝƐƉůĂǇƚŽǇŽƵ͘ŽŶ͛ƚǁŽƌƌǇĂďŽƵƚ
ƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌŝŶŐĂůůŽĨƚŚŝƐ͘zŽƵ͛ůůhave  time  to  practice  flying,  at  which  time  many  
of  these  functions  will  become  much  clearer  to  you.  
The  PFD  is  shown  here.    The  first  thing  you  might  have  noticed  is  the  blue  and  
brown  background.    These  represent  a  simulated  horizon,  with  the  brown  
indicating  the  ground  and  the  blue  indicating  the  sky.    This  is  a  simulated  horizon:  
it  is  not  an  out  the  window  view.  
The  center  of  the  screen  shows  a  standard  attitude  indicator  (INDICATE  PITCH  
LADDER)  right  here.    This  will  move  up  and  down  and  rotate  based  on  the  attitude  
of  the  space  craft.    The  purple  lines  here  (INDICATE  FLIGHT  DIRECTOR  NEEDLES)  
represent  the  guidance  cues.    These  particular  lines  indicate  a  fly-­‐to  display,  which  
means  you  need  to  generate  inputs  that  center  the  attitude  indicator  on  these  
lines.    
dŚĞƚŚƌĞĞŶƵŵďĞƌƐůĂďĞůĞĚ͞R,  P,  Y͕͟ƌŝŐŚƚŚĞƌĞ͕  (INDICATE  DIGITAL  ATTITUDE  
INDICATOR)  show  you  digital  readouts  of  your  roll,  pitch,  and  yaw  angles.  
  
  This  (INDICATE  HEADING  INDICATOR)  is  the  heading  display.    This  is  a  standard  
heading  display,  with  the  degrees  representing  various  compass  headings.    For  
example,  North  is  represented  by  360,  south  is  shown  as  180.    You  may  have  
noticed  the  purple  indicator  on  the  circumference  of  the  heading  display  
(INDICATE  YAW  GUIDANCE  INDICATOR),  right  here.    This  is  the  yaw  guidance  
value.    You  do  not  need  to  null  any  errors  with  respect  to  this  indicator.    In  the  
center  of  the  heading  display  is  a  small  triangle  (INDICATE  TRIANGLE).    A  green  
line  extending  from  this  triangle  represents  your  current  horizontal  velocity  
vector,  both  magnitude  and  direction  (INDICATE  sdKZͿ͘zŽƵ͛ůůǁĂŶƚƚŚŝƐǀĞĐƚŽƌ
ƚŽƉŽŝŶƚŝŶƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞůĂŶĚŝŶŐĂŝŵƉŽŝŶƚ͞ĚŽŐŚŽƵƐĞ͟ŝĐŽŶ  (INDICATE  DOG  
HOUSE  ICON).    This  icon  shows  you  the  position  of  the  landing  aimpoint  in  
relation  to  your  craft.    As  you  get  closer  to  the  landing  aimpoint  this  icon  will  
move  from  the  edge  toward  the  triangle  and  should  ideally  enclose  the  triangle.    
Below  the  triangle  is  a  text  box  (INDICATE  BOX).    The  top  number  shows  you  a  
digital  read  out  of  the  magnitude  of  your  velocity  vector.    The  bottom  number  
shows  you  a  digital  readout  of  your  range  from  the  selected  landing  aimpoint.  
:ƵƐƚƚŽƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚŽĨƚŚĞŚĞĂĚŝŶŐĚŝƐƉůĂǇǇŽƵ͛ůůƐĞĞƚŚƌĞĞŶƵŵďĞƌƐůĂďĞůĞĚ͞ǆĚŽƚ͕Ǉ
ĚŽƚ͕ĂŶĚǆďĂƌ͘͟͞z  ĚŽƚ͟ŝƐĂĚŝŐŝƚĂůƌĞĂĚŽƵƚŽĨǇŽƵƌǀĞůŽĐŝƚǇĞŝƚŚĞƌůĞĨƚŽƌƌŝŐŚƚ͘
negative  value  is  a  velocity  to  the  left,  a  positive  value  is  a  velocity  towards  the  
ƌŝŐŚƚ͘͞y  ĚŽƚ͟ŝƐĂĚŝŐŝƚĂůƌĞĂĚŽƵƚŽĨǇŽƵƌĨŽƌǁĂƌĚǀĞůŽĐŝƚǇ͘ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞǀĂůƵĞ
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ŵĞĂŶƐǇŽƵ͛ƌĞƚƌĂǀĞůůŝŶŐĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ͕ĂŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞǀĂůƵĞŵĞĂŶƐǇŽƵ͛ƌĞƚƌĂǀĞůůŝŶŐ
ďĂĐŬǁĂƌĚƐ͘͞yďĂƌ͟is  the  magnitude  of  your  velocity  vector  in  general,  so  this  
will  read  the  same  as  the  digital  velocity  readout  in  the  heading  display.  
dŽƚŚĞůĞĨƚŽĨƚŚĞĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌǇŽƵ͛ůůƐĞĞǇŽƵƌĨƵĞůŐĂƵŐĞ;/E/d&h>
'h'Ϳ͘^ŝŶĐĞǇŽƵ͛ůůďĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂůĚĞƐĐĞŶƚƉŚĂƐĞ͕ǇŽƵ͛ƌĞĨƵĞů
will  be  already  very  low,  around  8%.    A  digital  readout  below  shows  the  
percentage  of  the  maximum  fuel  capacity.    This  value  is  floored,  meaning  that  as  
soon  as  your  ĨƵĞůƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŐŽĞƐďĞůŽǁϭйŝƚǁŝůůƌĞĂĚϬ͘zŽƵ͛ůůƐtill  have  fuel  left,  
but  the  meter  will  turn  red  to  indicate  the  criticality  of  your  fuel  level.  
ďŽǀĞƚŚĞĨƵĞůŐĂƵŐĞŝƐǇŽƵƌ͞ƚŝŵĞƚŽŐŽ͟ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌ,  right  here  (INDICATE  TGO  
BOX).    This  box  calculates  the  remaining  time  until  touchdown  based  on  your  
range  from  the  target.  
To  the  immediate  right  of  your  attitude  indicator  is  your  altimeter  (INICATE  
ALTIMETER).    A  scrolling  list  will  show  your  altitude  as  you  descend.    This  is  
accompanied  by  a  digital  read  out  just  below  (INDICATE  DIGITAL  ALTIMETER).  
To  the  right  of  the  altimeter  is  your  vertical  speed  indicator  or  VSI  (INDICATE  VSI).    
The  bar  in  the  center  will  move  to  show  your  current  descent  rate.    The  purple  
indicator,  here  (INDICATE  GUIDANCE  TARGET),  shows  the  desired  guidance  
target.    Below  this  meter  is  a  digital  readout  of  your  current  descent  rate.    The  
purple  number  below  this  is  a  digital  readout  of  the  desired  guidance  descent  
ƌĂƚĞ͘zŽƵ͛ůůƵƐĞƚŚŝƐŝĨƚŚĞĂŶĂůŽŐŐƵŝĚĂŶĐĞŚŝƚƐƚŚĞĞĚŐĞof  the  analog  VSI  and  
ĐĂŶ͛ƚŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĂŵŽƌĞĞǆƚƌĞŵĞǀĂůƵĞ͘  
Directly  above  the  VSI  and  the  altimeter  is  the  contact  light  (INDICATE  CONTACT  
LIGHT).    This  will  illuminate  to  show  that  your  landing  sensors  have  contacted  the  
ground,  meaning  that  you  will  be  completing  your  landing  soon  following.  
To  the  left  of  the  contact  light  is  the  mode  annunciator  (INDICATE  MODE  
EEhE/dKZͿ͘zŽƵ͛ůůƌĞĨĞƌƚŽƚŚŝƐŵŽĚĞĂŶŶƵŶĐŝĂƚŽƌƚŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞǁŚĂƚŵŽĚĞ
ŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǇŽƵ͛ƌĞŝŶĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐŵŽĚĞƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶ͘zŽƵ͛ůůŬŶŽǁ
ǇŽƵ͛ǀĞĐŚĂŶŐĞĚŵŽĚĞƐǁŚĞŶǇŽƵŚĞĂƌĂďĞĞƉfrom  the  system.    The  beep  only  
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĞƐĂŵŽĚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞĂŶĚŶŽƚŚŝŶŐĞůƐĞ͕ƐŽǇŽƵĚŽŶ͛ƚŶĞĞĚƚŽǁŽƌƌǇĂďŽƵƚ
getting  confused  about  what  it  means.  
zŽƵ͛ůůďĞĂďůĞƚŽƚĞůůǁŚĂƚŵŽĚĞǇŽƵ͛ƌĞŝŶďǇĐŽŶƐƵůƚŝŶŐĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞďŽǆĞƐƵŶĚĞƌ
the  respective  axes.    If  the  box  below  pitĐŚƐŚŽƵůĚƌĞĂĚ͞Z,͕͟ĂŶĚĂůůƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ
ďŽǆĞƐƌĞĂĚ͞hdK͕͟ƚŚĞŶǇŽƵĂƌĞŵĂŶƵĂůůǇĐŽŶƚƌŽůůŝŶŐƚŚĞƉŝƚĐŚƌĂƚĞ͘/ĨƚŚĞďŽǆĞƐ
ďĞůŽǁ͞ZŽůů͕͟͞WŝƚĐŚ͕͟ĂŶĚ͞zĂǁ͟ĂůůƌĞĂĚ͞Z,͕͟ƚŚĞŶǇŽƵĂƌĞŝŶĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ
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control  of  the  spacecraft  attitude  rate  in  all  three  axes.    If  the  box  below  
͞ĞƐĐĞŶƚ͟ƐŚŽƵůĚƌĞĂĚ͞/E͟ƚŚĞŶǇŽƵŚĂǀĞŝŶĐƌĞŵĞŶƚĂůĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĚĞƐĐĞŶƚ
rate.  
Take  a  second  to  review  each  of  these  indicators  and  then  let  me  know  when  
ǇŽƵ͛ƌĞƌĞĂĚǇƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ͘;t/ddKKEd/EhͿ  
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The  Landing  Area  Display  is  shown  here  with  all  of  its  features  labeled.    The  main  
ďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚƐŚŽǁƐĂƚŽƉŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůŵĂƉŽĨƚŚĞŵŽŽŶ͛ƐƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ͘KǀĞƌůĂŝĚŽŶƚŚŝƐ
ŵĂƉŝƐĂ͞ŚĂǌĂƌĚŵĂƉ͟ŝŶƌĞĚ͕ǁŚŝĐŚŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐĂƌĞĂƐƵŶƐƵŝƚĂďůĞĨŽƌlanding.    This  
(INDICATE  HAZARD  MAP),  would  be,  for  example,  a  hazardous  region.  
In  the  center  of  the  screen  is  a  small  black  icon,  outline  in  white,  representing  
your  spacecraft.    (INDICATE  SPACECRAFT  ICON)    The  rounded  line  on  the  top  
represents  the  window  of  the  lander  so  that  you  can  tell  what  direction  you  are  
facing.  
Three  landing  aimpoints  are  identified  by  the  computer  as  1,  2,  and  3.    Landing  
aimpoint  1  will  always  be  selected  as  the  default  landing  aimpoint.    The  currently  
selected  landing  point  is  highlighted  in  purple,  surrounded  by  a  box,  and  also  
presents  the  range  to  target  just  above  the  landing  aimpoint.    When  the  
computer  re-­‐designates  to  a  new  landing  aimpoint,  this  box  will  move  to  reflect  
ƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞ͘ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ͕ĂŶ͞y͟ǁŝůůďĞƉůĂĐĞĚŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚůĂŶĚŝŶŐ
aimpoint.      
In  the  upper  right  of  ƚŚŝƐƐĐƌĞĞŶǇŽƵ͛ůůƐĞĞƚŚĂƚǇŽƵƌ  time-­‐to-­‐go  is  displayed  again  
(INDICATE  TGO  CLOCK).  
The  Comm.  light  is  shown  at  the  bottom  right  of  this  screen  (INDICATE  COMM  
LIGHT).    This  will  illuminate  either  green  or  blue  throughout  a  landing.    Press  the  
corresponding  button  on  the  joystick  to  respond  to  this  light.    These  buttons  are  
labeled  with  a  piece  of  green  or  blue  tape  (INDICATE  BLUE  AND  GREEN  BUTTONS),  
right  here͘zŽƵ͛ůůŐĞƚƚŽƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƚŚŝƐĚƵƌŝŶŐǇŽƵƌƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ͘Review  these  
indicators  now  and  then  let  ŵĞŬŶŽǁǁŚĞŶǇŽƵ͛ƌĞƌĞĂĚǇƚŽƉƌŽĐĞĞĚ͘    (WAIT  TO  
CONTINUE)  
Slide  10  
In  Apollo,  a  Bingo  call  was  used  to  alert  the  astronaut  to  when  they  only  had  20  
seconds  left  to  hover  before  they  ran  out  of  fuel.    You  will  receive  several  Bingo  
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calls  specifying  the  remaining  fuel  time  you  would  have  if  you  remained  in  a  
vertical  hover.    These  calls  will  come  at  60  seconds  and  30  seconds.    The  fuel  time  
is  calculated  assuming  a  fuel  burn  rate  at  a  vertical  attitude  hover,  and  might  
slightly  underestimate  the  time  you  have  left  if  you  are  descending,  meaning  you  
have  more  time  than  the  call-­‐out.    However,  if  you  are  at  high  attitude  angles  it  
may  overestimate  your  time  left,  meaning  you  have  less  time  than  the  call-­‐out.  
As  mentioned  before,  you  will  hear  a  beep  when  the  computer  changes  mode.    
zŽƵ͛ůůŶĞĞĚƚŽĐŚĞĐŬƚŚĞŵŽĚĞĂŶŶƵŶĐŝĂƚŽƌƚŽƐĞĞǁŚĂƚŵŽĚĞǇŽƵĂƌĞŝŶ͘zŽƵ͛ůů
ĂůǁĂǇƐďĞŐŝŶŝŶĂĨƵůůǇĂƵƚŽŶŽŵŽƵƐƐƚĂƚĞ͕ďƵƚƚŚĞŵŽĚĞƚŽǁŚŝĐŚǇŽƵ͛ůůƚƌĂnsition  
into  will  be  different  between  different  runs.    Let  me  know  when  you  are  ready  to  
continue.    (WAIT  TO  CONTINUE)  
Slide  11  
The  comm.  light  is  meant  to  simulate  ground  control  requesting  your  attention  at  
various  stages  throughout  the  landing.    As  I  mentioned  before  you͛ll  respond  by  
pressing  the    button  marked  with  blue  tape    if  it  is  blue  and  the  button  marked  
with  green  tape  if  it  is  green.    If  the  comm.  light  is  turquoise,  then  means  there  
are  no  comm.  signals  to  be  attended  to.  A  circle  of  this  constant  color  is  in  the  
ĐĞŶƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵŵ͘ůŝŐŚƚ͘ǇĐŽŵƉĂƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽůŽƌƐǇŽƵ͛ůůďĞĂďůĞƚŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞŝĨ
the  light  is  illuminated  and  what  the  correct  response  will  be.    The  comm.  light  
will  extinguish  if  you  ignore  it  for  long  enough.    You  are  not  penalized  in  anyway  
if  this  occurs.    Be  aware  that  this  is  only  a  secondary  task  and  that  your  primary  
task  is  landing.    Do  not  sacrifice  the  landing  task  for  the  comm.  task.    Let  me  
know  when  you  are  ready  to  continue.    (WAIT  TO  CONTINUE)  
Slide  12  
As  mentioned  earlier,  a  re-­‐designation  will  be  required  during  some  trials.    This  
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚǁŝůůďĞĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚďǇĂŶ͞y͟ĂƉƉĞĂƌŝŶŐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ  current  landing  point.    
The  computer  will  re-­‐designate  for  you.    In  the  cases  where  a  re-­‐designation  does  
ŚĂƉƉĞŶ͕ŝƚǁŝůůďĞĂĐĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞĚďǇƚŚĞŵŽĚĞƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶ͕ƐŽǇŽƵ͛ůůŚĞĂƌĂďĞĞƉĂƚ
the  same  time.    Let  me  know  when  you  are  ready  to  continue.    (WAIT  TO  
CONTINUE)  
Slide  13  
zŽƵ͛ůůŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŵŽĚĞƐŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚǁŽĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞƌƐ͕ƐŚŽǁŶ
here.    Your  left  hand  will  interact  with  the  throttle  controller  and  your  right  hand  
will  interact  with  the  joystick.    /ĨǇŽƵĐĂŶ͛ƚĐŽŵĨŽƌƚĂďůǇƌĞĂĐŚƚŚĞƐe,  take  some  
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time  now  to  situate  yourself  so  that  you  feel  comfortable  at  the  controls  and  then  
ůĞƚŵĞŬŶŽǁǁŚĞŶǇŽƵ͛ƌĞƌĞĂĚǇƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ͘;t/ddKKEd/EhͿ  
Slide  14  
zŽƵ͛ll  only  need  ƚŽƉƌĞƐƐĂĨĞǁŽĨƚŚĞďƵƚƚŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞƌƐ͘/͛ǀĞĂůƌĞĂĚǇ
explained  the  comm.  response  buttons,  ƐŽ/ǁŽŶ͛ƚŐŽŽǀĞƌƚŚŽƐĞ͘KŶƚŚĞƚŚƌŽƚƚůĞ
stŝĐŬǇŽƵ͛ůůŶŽƚŝĐĞĂďƵƚƚŽŶnear  your  index  finger  (INDICATE  ROD  BUTTON).    
tŚĞŶǇŽƵĂƌĞŐŝǀĞŶĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌǇŽƵƌƌĂƚĞŽĨĚĞƐĐĞŶƚǇŽƵ͛ůůƵƐĞƚŚŝƐďƵƚƚŽŶƚŽ
control  it.    Press  up  to  decrease  your  rate  of  descent.    Press  down  to  increase  your  
rate  of  descent.    Take  a  moment  to  find  all  of  the  buttons  and  familiarize  yourself  
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ͘>ĞƚŵĞŬŶŽǁǁŚĞŶǇŽƵ͛ƌĞƌĞĂĚǇƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ͘;t/ddK
CONTINUE)  
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As  I  mentioned  earlier,  one  of  the  ŵĂŝŶƚŚŝŶŐƐǁĞ͛ƌĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶŝƐ  how  high  you  
workload  is  during  these  runs.    You  can  think  of  workload  as  a  measure  of  how  
much  spare  attention  you  have  left  while  attending  to  your  primary  task.    If  your  
ǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚŝƐŚŝŐŚ͕ǇŽƵǁŽŶ͛ƚŚĂve  much  spare  attention.    If  your  workload  is  low,  
ƚŚĞŶǇŽƵ͛ǀĞŐŽƚĂůŽƚŽĨĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶůĞĨƚŽǀĞƌ͘  
/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽŵĞĂƐƵƌĞǇŽƵƌǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚ͕/͛ůůďĞĂƐŬŝŶŐǇŽƵĂĨƚĞƌĞǀĞƌǇƚƌŝĂůƚŽrate  
yourself  using  the  Modified  Bedford  scale.  The  Modified  Bedford  scale  was  
originally  designed  for  evaluating  the  workload  of  test  pilots  in  experimental  
ĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ͕ƐŽŝƚĨŝƚƐƚŚŝƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƋƵŝƚĞŶŝĐĞůǇ͘ƵƌŝŶŐǇŽƵƌƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ/͛ůůũƵƐƚŚĂǀĞ
ǇŽƵƌĂƚĞǇŽƵƌŽǀĞƌĂůůǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚ͘ƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶƚƌŝĂůƐ/͛ůůŚĂǀĞǇŽƵƌate  your  
ǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚďĞĨŽƌĞ͕ĚƵƌŝŶŐ͕ĂŶĚĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞŵŽĚĞƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶ͘tĞ͛ůůĚĞĨŝŶĞ͞ĂĨƚĞƌ͟  the  
transition  to  be  the  point  at  which  you  have  nulled  the  flight  director  errors  and  
feel  that  you  are  in  control  of  the  spacecraft.    During  the  transition  means  right  
when  you  were  making  the  mode  transition  and  the  time  just  following.  
ƵƌŝŶŐǇŽƵƌƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ/͛ůůĂƐŬǇŽƵƚŽƌĂƚĞǇŽƵƌƐĞůĨǁŝƚŚƚŚĞModified  Bedford  scale  
in  order  to  get  you  familiar  with  the  system.    This  scale  is  relative  to  the  task,  so  
your  ratings  are  not  set  in  stone  when  you  make  them:  feel  free  to  modify  past  
ratings  if  you  feel  that  they  were  not  accurate  based  on  more  recent  flight  
experiences.  You  are  allowed  to  make  intermediate  ratings  using  decimals.  Let  
me  know  when  you  are  ready  to  continue.    (WAIT  TO  CONTINUE)  
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Here  is  a  diagram  of  the  Modified  Bedford  Scale.    The  rating  system  is  based  on  a  
decision  tree,  in  which  you  ask  yourself  each  question  and  depending  on  the  
answer,  you  will  either  proceed  to  the  next  question  or  choose  from  the  
ĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐƌĂƚŝŶŐƐĨŽƌƚŚĂƚĂŶƐǁĞƌ͘,ĞƌĞ͛ƐĂƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐŚĞĞƚĨŽƌǇŽƵƚŽƌĞĨĞƌ
to  throughout  the  test.    You  are  to  consider  the  task  as  a  whole  when  you  are  
rating  your  workload,  not  just  the  flying  task.    For  example,  if  you  found  flying,  
responding  to  the  comm.  task,  and  making  the  callouts  a  piece  of  cake,  then  you  
ǁŽƵůĚƌĂƚĞǇŽƵƌǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚĂƐĂ͞ϭ͘͟  
;WZ^Ed^h:dt/d,͞^h:dZ&ZEDdZ/>͟,EKhdͿ  
>ĞƚŵĞŬŶŽǁǁŚĞŶǇŽƵ͛ƌĞƌĞĂĚǇƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ͘  
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Your  awareness  of  the  situation  is  an  important  piece  of  information  in  this  study.    
In  order  to  measure  this,  /͛ŵŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞĂƐŬŝŶŐǇŽƵƚŽŵĂŬĞƐĞǀĞƌĂůƚǇƉĞƐŽĨĐĂůů-­‐
outs  during  the  flight.    There  are  three  types  of  callouts:  altitude,  fuel,  and  
hazard.    As  we  go  through  the  first  half  of  thĞĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚǇŽƵ͛ůůŚĂǀĞĂĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŽ
get  familiar  with  how  to  make  these  callouts  and  when  to  make  them.    These  
ĐĂůůŽƵƚƐĂƌĞǇŽƵƌůĂƐƚƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇĂŶĚĂƌĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚůŝŬĞĂ͞ŵƵŵďůĞŵŽĚĞ͟ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ
you  demonstrate  an  awareness  of  the  different  aspects  of  the  system.    You  are  
not  penalized  at  all  for  not  making  these  callouts,  but  if  you  do  notice  the  
information  please  make  the  callout.  
/͛ůůĂƐŬƚŚĂƚǇŽƵĐĂůůŽƵƚƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĂůƚŝƚƵĚĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĨollowing  
manner.    Starting  at  450  ft,  call  out  every  50  ft  until  250  ft.    From  250  ft  to  150  ft  
call  out  every  25  ft.    From  150  ft  make  a  callout  every  10  ft.    Only  call  out  an  
altitude  as  you  are  passing  it,  if  you  missed  one  let  it  go  and  wait  to  callout  the  
ŶĞǆƚŽŶĞ͘&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕ŝĨǇŽƵŶŽƚŝĐĞƚŚĂƚǇŽƵ͛ǀĞ  passed  250  ft  at  240  ft,  wait  until  
225  ft  to  make  the  next  altitude  callout.    In  case  you  forget  the  callout  altitudes,  
these  altitudes  are  also  show  on  your  reference.  
/͛ůůĂůƐŽĂƐŬǇŽƵƚŽĐĂůůŽƵƚƚŚĞĨƵĞůƉĞƌĐĞŶƚǁŚĞŶŝƚĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ͕ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕ĨƌŽŵϳй
tŽϲй͘ĂůůŽƵƚǁŚĞŶǇŽƵŶŽƚŝĐĞƚŚĂƚŝƚŚĂƐĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ͘/͛ůůďĞŬĞĞƉŝŶŐƚƌĂĐŬƚŽƐĞĞŝĨ
you  noticed  within  a  reasonable  amount  of  time,  which  will  be  approximately  1  
second.  
ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ͕ǇŽƵ͛ůůŶĞĞĚƚŽĐĂůůŽƵƚǁŚĞŶƚŚĞLander  has  been  fully  enveloped  in  a  
new  hazard  or  non-­‐hazard  region.    For  example,  if  the  Lander  had  been  in  a  red  
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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area,  representing  hazards,  and  it  is  now  in  a  completely  grey  zone,  representing  
ĂǀŝĂďůĞůĂŶĚŝŶŐƌĞŐŝŽŶ͕ŵĂŬĞƐŽŵĞƐŽƌƚŽĨƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚĐĂůůŽƵƚ͕ůŝŬĞ͞ŐƌĞǇ͟Žƌ͞ƌĞĚ͘͟
Again,  if  you  see  that  you  noticed  this  very  late,  showing  that  you  were  not  aware  
of  the  movement  into  a  hazard  zone  at  the  time  that  it  took  place  just  let  it  go  
until  the  next  time.    Additionally,  only  make  this  callout  when  you  have  noticed  
that  the  entire  Lander  is  within  a  new  region,  not  just  a  partial  section  of  the  
Lander.  
zŽƵ͛ůůŐĞƚĂĐŚĂŶĐĞƚŽƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƚŚĞƐĞĐĂůůŽƵƚƐĂƐǁĞƉƌŽĐĞĞĚǁŝƚŚǇŽƵƌƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ͘
Try  developing  a  scan  pattern  to  force  yourself  to  continually  check  these  
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƐƚĂƚĞƐ͕ďƵƚĚŽŶ͛ƚůĞƚƚŚis  task  detract  from  your  main  flying  task  or  the  
ĐŽŵŵ͘ůŝŐŚƚƚĂƐŬ͘dŚŝƐŝƐǇŽƵƌƚĂƐŬŽĨůĞĂƐƚƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ͗ĚŽŶ͛ƚůĞƚŝƚŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞǁŝƚŚ
flying.    >ĞƚŵĞŬŶŽǁǁŚĞŶǇŽƵ͛ƌĞƌĞĂĚǇƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ͘  
Slide  18  
This  brings  us  to  the  end  of  the  training  slides.    Before  we  ďĞŐŝŶ/͛ůůŐŝǀĞǇŽƵĂŶ
ŝĚĞĂŽĨƚŽĚĂǇ͛ƐƐĐŚĞĚƵůĞ͘/ŶũƵƐƚĂĨĞǁŵŝŶƵƚĞƐǇŽƵ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶĨůǇŝŶŐƚŚĞƐŝŵƵůĂƚŽƌ
without  any  mode  transitions  or  definitive  requirements  so  that  you  become  
comfortable  with  flying  the  simulator.    ĨƚĞƌůĂŶĚŝŶŐǇŽƵ͛ůůƐĞĞƚŚĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ  screen  
pop  up,  so  that  you  can  see  how  you  did.    That  rating  screen  is  shown  here  on  the  
right.  AftĞƌǇŽƵ͛ǀĞgotten  comfortable  flying͕ǁĞ͛ůůƐƚĂƌƚthe  main  experiment.    As  
I  mentioned  beĨŽƌĞ͕ǇŽƵǁŽŶ͛ƚďĞĨůǇŝŶŐƚŚĞexperimental  trials  to  completion.  
If  ǇŽƵ͛ĚůŝŬĞƚŽƚĂŬĞĂďƌĞĂŬŶŽǁďĞĨŽƌĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐǇŽƵƌĨůŝŐŚƚƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐůĞƚŵĞ
ŬŶŽǁ͘KƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞǁĞ͛ůůŐĞƚƐƚĂƌƚĞĚ͘  
  
  
  
     
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
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Training  Session:  
Training  for  Full  Automatic  Mode  (Map  T-­0)  
The  first  mode  is  a  fully  autonomous  landing  mode.    You  will  start  every  trial  in  
this  mode.    This  mode  is  designed  to  autonomously  land  the  vehicle  at  any  one  of  
the  three  points  designated  as  primary  by  the  system.    By  default,  landing  point  1  
will  be  selected.  
  
/͛ůůĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚŝƐŵŽĚĞŶŽǁ͘Take  this  chance  to  familiarize  yourself  with  the  
display  elements  I  showed  you  earlier.    If  you  have  any  questions  about  these  
gauges  as  the  simulation  proceeds,  feel  free  to  ask.    BEGIN  DEMONSTRATION  OF  
FULL  AUTO  MODE.  
ĞŐŝŶƚŝŵŝŶŐ͙  
Auto:______________  
Would  you  like  to  rerun  this  mode?    (IF  YES,  THEN  REPEAT.    IF  NO,  THEN  
CONTINUE)  
Training  for  Manual  Pitch  Mode  (Map  T-­0)  
The  next  mode  is  a  manual  pitch  mode,  in  which  you  will  be  given  control  over  the  
rate  of  pitch  of  the  spacecraft.    You  may  exercise  this  control  by  moving  the  
joystick  forward  to  pitch  down  and  backward  to  pitch  up  (INDICATE  MOTION).    
When  you  return  the  joystick  to  center  the  flight  computer  will  maintain  the  last  
commanded  pitch  angle.    Feel  free  to  ask  any  questions  regarding  this  mode  at  
any  time.  
  
I  will  now  give  you  a  chance  to  fly  the  spacecraft  in  manual  pitch  mode.    Please  let  
ŵĞŬŶŽǁǁŚĞŶǇŽƵĨĞĞůĐŽŵĨŽƌƚĂďůĞǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐŵŽĚĞĂŶĚǁĞ͛ůůƉƌŽĐĞĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŶĞǆƚ
phase  of  your  training.  
Begin  tiŵŝŶŐ͙  
Manual  Pitch:______________  
Would  you  like  to  rerun  this  mode?    (IF  YES,  THEN  REPEAT.    IF  NO,  THEN  
CONTINUE)  
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Training  for  Manual  Attitude  Mode  (Map  T-­0)  
The  next  mode  provides  you  with  full  control  over  the  spacecrafts  attitude  in  
ǁŚĂƚ͛ƐŬŶŽǁŶĂƐZĂƚe-­‐Control-­‐Attitude-­‐Hold.    In  the  same  manner  as  in  manual  
pitch,  you  will  control  the  rate-­‐of-­‐change  in  attitude  and  the  flight  computer  will  
maintain  that  attitude  when  you  release  the  joystick.    You  will  control  pitch  in  the  
same  way  that  you  did  in  the  manual  pitch  modes.    Roll  will  be  control  by  moving  
the  stick  to  the  right  to  pitch  right  and  left  to  pitch  left  (INDICATE  MOTION).    Yaw  
can  be  controlled  as  well,  although  you  are  not  required  to  maintain  any  
particular  value  in  this  axis.    I  would  recommend  neglecting  yaw  control,  as  it  
makes  the  task  significantly  more  difficult.  
  
I  will  now  give  you  a  chance  to  fly  the  spacecraft  in  manual  attitude  mode.    Please  
ůĞƚŵĞŬŶŽǁǁŚĞŶǇŽƵĨĞĞůĐŽŵĨŽƌƚĂďůĞǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐŵŽĚĞĂŶĚǁĞ͛ůůƉƌŽĐĞĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ
next  phase  of  your  training.  
ĞŐŝŶƚŝŵŝŶŐ͙  
Manual  Attitude:_______________  
Would  you  like  to  rerun  this  mode?    (IF  YES,  THEN  REPEAT.  IF  NO,  THEN  
CONTINUE)  
Training  for  Manual  Attitude  with  ROD  Mode  (Map  T-­0)  
The  next  mode  again  provides  you  with  full  attitude  control;  however,  you  are  
also  given  incremental  control  over  the  rate-­‐of-­‐descent  of  the  vehicle.    Each  time  
you  click  the  rate-­‐of-­‐descent  button,  either  up  or  down,  you  will  increase  or  
decrease  your  rate-­‐of-­‐descent  by  1  foot-­‐per-­‐second.  
  
I  will  now  give  you  a  chance  to  fly  the  spacecraft  in  manual  attitude  mode.    Please  
ůĞƚŵĞŬŶŽǁǁŚĞŶǇŽƵĨĞĞůĐŽŵĨŽƌƚĂďůĞǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐŵŽĚĞĂŶĚǁĞ͛ůůƉƌŽĐĞĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ
next  phase  of  your  training.  
ĞŐŝŶƚŝŵŝŶŐ͙  
Manual  Attitude  and  ROD:_______________  
Would  you  like  to  rerun  this  mode?    (IF  YES,  THEN  REPEAT.    IF  NO,  THEN  
CONTINUE)     
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Subject  Break  1:  
You  have  now  completed  all  of  your  familiarization  training.    /ĨǇŽƵ͛ĚůŝŬĞƚŽtake  
a  break  before  beginning  the  first  set  of  trials,  please  let  me  know.    Otherwise,  
ǁĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶ͘  
     
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Trail  Set  1:  
Welcome  back.    dŚĞŶĞǆƚϮϰƚƌŝĂůƐǁŝůůƌĞƋƵŝƌĞǇŽƵƚŽĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚĂŵŽĚĞƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶ/ǁŽŶ͛ƚ
be  telling  you  what  mode  you  are  transitioning  into;  you  will  need  to  refer  to  the  mode  
annunciator.  zŽƵ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶĞĂĐŚƌƵŶŝŶƚŚĞĨƵůůĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐŵŽĚĞĂŶĚǁŚĞŶǇŽƵŚĞĂƌƚŚĞ
ŵŽĚĞďĞĞƉ͕ǇŽƵ͛ůůŶĞĞĚƚŽĐŚĞĐŬǁŚĂƚŵŽĚĞǇŽƵĂƌĞŶŽǁŝŶ͘  
Run  0  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐0  
9 Alternative  Mode:   PITCH  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌĨŝƌƐƚƚƌŝĂůŶŽǁ͘ƌĞǇŽƵƌĞĂĚǇ͍;t/d&KZ&&/ZDd/sͿ  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  mode  
transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Run  1  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐3  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌŶĞǆt  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Run  2  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐2  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS+ROD  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌŶĞǆƚ  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
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Run  3  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐0L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌŶĞǆƚ  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
Run  4  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐2L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   PITCH  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Run  5  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐0L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS+ROD  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
Run  6  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐1  
9 Alternative  Mode:   PITCH  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Run  7  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐3  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS+ROD  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Run  8  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐3L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   PITCH  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Run  9  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐2  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Run  10  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐1L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Run  11  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐1L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS+ROD  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
Run  12  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐2  
9 Alternative  Mode:   PITCH  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Run  13  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐1  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS+ROD  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Run  14  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐1  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Run  15  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐0  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS+ROD  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Run  16  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐3L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS+ROD  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Run  17  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐3L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
Run  18  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐2L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Run  19  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐1L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   PITCH  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
Run  20  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐0  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Run  21  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐0L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   PITCH  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
Run  22  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐3  
9 Alternative  Mode:   PITCH  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Run  23  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐2L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS+ROD  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
     
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Mandatory  Subject  Break  
tĞ͛ůůŶŽǁƚĂŬĞĂĨŝǀĞŵŝŶƵƚĞďƌĞĂŬ͘WůĞĂƐĞĨĞĞůĨƌĞĞƚŽŐĞƚƵƉĂŶĚƐƚƌĞƚĐŚ͕ŐŽƚŽ
the  bathroom,  or  get  a  drink  of  water.
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Trial  Set  2:  
tĞůĐŽŵĞďĂĐŬ͘tĞ͛ƌĞƌĞĂĚǇƚŽbegin  your  second  set  of  trails.    These  trials  will  be  similar  
ƚŽƚŚĞƚƌŝĂůƐǇŽƵũƵƐƚĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚ͗ǇŽƵ͛ůůŶĞĞĚƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽƚŚĞŵŽĚĞĂŶŶƵŶĐŝĂƚŽƌƚŽƐĞĞǁŚĂƚ
ŵŽƌĞǇŽƵ͛ƌĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐŝŶ͕ĞƚĐ͘  
Run  24  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐0  
9 Alternative  Mode:   PITCH  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌŶĞǆt  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    (WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  mode  
transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
Page  |  29  
     
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Run  25  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐3  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌŶĞǆt  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Run  26  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐2  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS+ROD  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌŶĞǆƚ  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Run  27  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐0L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌŶĞǆƚ  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
Run  28  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐2L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   PITCH  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Run  29  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐0L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS+ROD  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
Run  30  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐1  
9 Alternative  Mode:   PITCH  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Run  31  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐3  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS+ROD  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Run  32  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐3L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   PITCH  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Run  33  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐2  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Run  34  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐1L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Run  35  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐1L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS+ROD  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
Run  36  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐2  
9 Alternative  Mode:   PITCH  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Run  37  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐1  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS+ROD  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Run  38  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐1  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Run  39  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐0  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS+ROD  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Run  40  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐3L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS+ROD  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Run  41  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐3L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
Run  42  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐2L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
Page  |  39  
Run  43  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐1L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   PITCH  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
Run  44  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐0  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Run  45  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐0L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   PITCH  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
Run  46  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐3  
9 Alternative  Mode:   PITCH  
9 LPR  Required:   NO  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150            Cross  3  
   140      5  %  Fuel        
   130              
   120              
   110              
   100      4  %  Fuel        
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Run  47  
Time:__________  
9 Map:     M-­‐2L  
9 Alternative  Mode:   2-­‐AXIS+ROD  
9 LPR  Required:   YES  
tĞ͛ůůďĞŐŝŶǇŽƵƌnext  trial  now.    Are  you  ready?    
(WAIT  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE)  
You  are  flying.    (BEGIN  TRIAL)  
Modified  Bedford  Rating:  
Please  rate  your  workload  on  the  Modified  Bedford  
scale,  1  through  10,  before,  during,  and  after  the  
mode  transition.  
Phase  I  (1-­‐10):_____     II:______   III:_____  
  
Please  confirm  the  differences  between  phases.  
II-­‐I  (0-­‐9):__________           II-­‐III:____________  
SA  Rating:  
   450              
   400              
   350              
   300         7  %  Fuel      Cross  1  
   250              
   225              
   200      6  %  Fuel      Cross  2  
   175              
   150              
   140      5  %  Fuel      Cross  3  
   130              
   120              
   110      4  %  Fuel        
   100              
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
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Experiment  Conclusion  
This  completes  the  experiment  today.    Before  we  finish  I  would  like  you  to  take  a  
moment  to  rate  the  transitions  which  you  made  today  from  what  you  would  
consider  most  graceful  to  least  graceful.    Here  is  a  sheet  for  you  to  write  these  
ratings.  ;WZ^Ed^h:dt/d,͞&/E/d/KEEKZZ/E',EKhd͟Ϳ  
ďŽǀĞǇŽƵ͛ůůŶŽƚŝĐĞĂĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŐƌĂĐĞĨƵůƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶĨŽƌǇŽƵƚŽďĂƐĞǇŽƵƌ
ŽƌĚĞƌŝŶŐŽŶ͘KŶĐĞǇŽƵŚĂǀĞĨŝŶŝƐŚĞĚƚŚŝƐǇŽƵ͛ůůŚĂǀĞĨŝŶŝƐŚĞĚƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚ͘  
Thank  you  for  taking  the  time  to  participate.  
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Subject  Forms  
Experimentalist:___________________________________  
Subject  No.:________  
Date:________  
     
Definition  of  Graceful  Transition:  
The  ability  of  a  complex  system  to  change  between  levels  of  automation/  levels  of  supervisory  control  
(including  automation  modes)  with  the  operator  maintaining  control  and  awareness  of  the  system  
without  excessive  workload  or  sacrificing  system  performance.  
Rating  the  Transitions:  
Please  rate  the  gracefulness  of  the  transitions  you  experienced,  with  1  being  the  most  graceful  and  6  
being  the  least  graceful.    Please  note  any  major  factors  in  the  decision  you  made.  
____   Transition  Manual  RCAH  +  Incremental  ROD  with  landing  point  redesignation  
Comments:_____________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________  
____   Transition  Manual  RCAH  with  landing  point  redesignation  
Comments:_____________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________  
____   Transition  Manual  Pitch  with  landing  point  redesignation  
Comments:_____________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________  
____   Transition  Manual  RCAH  +  Incremental  ROD  without  landing  point  redesignation  
Comments:_____________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________  
____   Transition  Manual  RCAH  without  landing  point  redesignation  
Comments:_____________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________  
____   Transition  Manual  Pitch  without  landing  point  redesignation  
Comments:_____________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________  
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Subject Reference Material
365
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
  
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
Page  |  1  
Subject  Reference  Material  
     
Mode  Experiment         C.S.  Draper  Laboratory     
  
If  you  find  this  data  sheet,  please  return  to:          
C.S.  Draper  Laboratory  
Office  3355A  
Cambridge,  MA,  02139  
Page  |  2  
Bedford  Workload  Scale:  
  
ALTITUDE  
CALLOUTS  
450  ft  
400  ft  
350  ft  
300  ft  
250  ft  
225  ft  
200  ft  
175  ft  
150  ft  
140  ft  
130  ft  
120  ft  
110  ft  
100  ft  
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Subject  Demographics  
Experimentalist:___________________________________  
Subject  No.:________  
Date:________  
     
Age:___________________________________  
Gender:     M      F  
Flying  Experience:  
 None        
 Video  Games        
 Flight  Simulator  (Microsoft  Flight  Sim.,  etc.)       
 Actual  Flight  Time  
 Licensed  Pilot  
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Training Slides
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Lunar Landing Simulator 
Training
CJ Hainley
Kevin Duda
Chuck Oman
9/3/2010 1
Introduction
! A typical lunar landing trajectory has 3 phases
! Braking phase (deceleration out of orbit)
! Approach phase (to establish visual contact with the surface)
! Terminal descent phase (pilot directs the vehicle down to the 
surface)
! This experiment focuses on the terminal descent phase 
of landing
Terminal 
Descent 
Phase
2
Introduction
! During the terminal descent, the astronaut has 
to confirm the final selection of a landing 
location, referred to as the landing aimpoint
! In Apollo, landing aimpoints were typically 
visually confirmed, and were often changed to 
different locations by the commander
! For future missions, several landing aimpoints 
will be recommended to the astronauts by the 
ALHAT (Autonomous Landing and Hazard 
Avoidance Technology) system
! The astronaut must use his/her own judgment 
to select the final landing aimpoint
3
The Scenario
! Youʼll be flying a lunar lander in a 
simulated terminal descent.
! Several displays will be available to assist 
you, and you will make use of several 
control modes.
! A flight director will also assist your landing 
efforts.
! There will be a total of 48 landing 
simulations (about 2 minutes each).
4
The Scenario continued…
! You will begin in a fully automatic mode, in 
which the computer will perform all necessary 
control inputs for you.
! At a particular point in the trajectory, the 
computer will perform a transition to a manual 
control mode.  Youʼll need to refer to the mode 
annunciator to see what mode youʼre in. 
! During some trials a re-designation will 
accompany the mode transition.  This re-
designation will be made by the computer, 
simulating the real-time rejection of the 
current landing point.
5
Goals
! Your primary goal:
! Null the guidance errors to ensure an accurate 
and safe landing.
! Roll & Pitch within 1 degree
! Descent Rate: within .5 ft/s
! Your secondary goal:
! Minimize response time to communication 
signals
! During the transition trials Iʼll be cutting the 
simulation short of landing, meaning that you 
wonʼt fly to completion.
6
Displays
! Two displays will be provided
! Primary flight display
! Provides information about 
vehicle states, such as attitude, 
altitude, horizontal and vertical 
velocity
! Provides flight director cues
! Uses a simulated horizon; does 
not show out-the-window 
information
! Landing Area display
! Provides information about 
hazards and recommended 
landing aimpoints
! Top down view of terrain
7
Displays – Primary Flight Display
8
Displays – Landing Area Display
Primary 
Landing 
Aimpoint 
(with range)
Secondary 
Landing 
aimpoints
Edge of 
scan area
Hazard Areas 
(craters, 
boulders, high 
slope, etc.)
Time until 
Landing
Spacecraft Alerting Light
9
Displays – Auditory Display
! The Bingo time represented a measure of 
remaining fuel, and when reached indicated 
that you had only 20 seconds to land before 
you run out of fuel
! You will have an auditory call-out to remind 
you how long you have until the “Bingo” time.
! You will hear bingo callout at 60 and 30 
seconds.
! You will hear a “beep” when the computer 
switches modes.
10
Other Communications
! At various intervals, ground control will request your attention 
(as designated by a lit “Alert” button on the landing area 
display)
! The “Alert” button will be transparent if you have attended to 
all requests, and will be either blue or green if your attention 
is needed
! It is your responsibility to attend to these requests
! If the light is blue, press the blue button on the top of the joystick
! If the light is green, press the green button on top of the joystick
! The light will turn off once you have pressed the appropriate button
! Try to attend to the requests as quickly as you can
! However, do NOT compromise your main task (following the 
guidance cues to land safely)… only address the comm 
signal if it will not hinder your flying performance
11
Redesignation
! In the descent to the lunar surface, a particular 
landing aimpoint may be judged as unsafe through 
out-the-window visual views of the lunar surface 
(out-the-window views are not provided for this 
experiment)
! However, to represent that possibility, a red “X” will 
show up over a particular landing site in the 
Landing Area Display to denote an unsafe landing 
aimpoint
! If a landing aimpoint is rejected the computer will 
automatically redesignate to an alternate aimpoint.
! If a re-designation occurs, the mode transition will 
occur at the same time.
12
Controllers
! There are two controllers used, 
a joystick and a throttle
13
Controllers
! Fore-aft motion of the stick 
commands pitch, and left-
right motion of the stick 
controls roll
! Use the trigger to change 
landing points
! Use the green and blue 
buttons on top of the joystick 
to answer alert requests
JOYSTICKTHROTTLE
! Press down on the button 
to increase your descent 
rate by 1 ft/s
! Press up on the button to 
decrease your descent 
rate by 1 ft/s
Behind: 
Incremental ROD 
controller
Button to answer 
blue alerts
Button to answer 
green alerts
14
Bedford Workload Scale
! Weʼre interested in your workload during each 
trial.
! Workload
! High = little spare attention for secondary tasks
! Low = a lot of spare attention for secondary tasks
! Youʼll rate yourself with the Bedford scale 
after each run.
! The Bedford scale is a 10 point scale 
developed for aviation purposes.
! Ratings are not set in stone, feel free to 
modify past ratings if you feel they donʼt 
accurately represent the workload.
15
Modified Bedford Workload Scale
16
Was it possible to fly 
as designed?
Was the workload 
tolerable?
Was the workload 
satisfactory without 
reduction?
Was it a “piece of cake”? 1
Was there more spare time that would ever be needed for 
additional tasks? 2
There was enough time to easily attend to additional tasks. 3
Was there ample time to attend to additional tasks? 4
Was there enough time to adequately attend to additional tasks? 5
There was some but not enough spare time available for 
additional tasks. 6
Was there minimal spare time for additional tasks? 7
Was there any spare time for additional tasks? 8
It was possible to maintain adequate performance. 9
Adequate performance was impossible. 10
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Decision 
Tree
Situational Awareness
! Three types of callouts:
! Altitude, Fuel, and Hazard
! Passing Altitude Callout
! Every 50 ft between 450 ft and 250 ft
! Every 25 ft between 250 ft and 150 ft
! Every 10 ft after 150 ft
! Fuel Percent Change Callout
! When fuel percent switches (e.g. 7% to 6%)
! Entering/Leaving Hazardous Region
! When the Lander has moved from a hazardous region to a 
non-hazardous region or vice versa
! Lander is completely in the new region
! DO NOT SACRIFICE THE FLYING OR COMM 
TASKS!
Todayʼs Schedule
! Mode familiarization 
period.
! Fly-to-completion
! 48 mode transition 
trials.
! Possible re-
designations
! Definite mode 
transitions
! No fly-to-completion
18
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